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Abstract  
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the economics of international migration. It 
consists of three chapters exploring some of the consequences and implications of human 
migration.  
Chapter 1, ‘No Country for Young Men’, studies the effects of international migration on 
the schooling and labour outcomes of left-behind children. While a large literature on the 
topic already exists and focuses on Latin America and China, little is known about how 
migration affects left-behind individuals in other parts of the world; and Central Asia in 
particular. The study concentrates on Tajikistan, the country with the highest level of 
remittance inflows relative to the size of the economy. Using panel data tracking the same 
children over time, I find important and gender-differenced schooling and labour supply 
responses. In a nutshell, young males are found to benefit from the migration of one of 
their household members, while young women are not. 
The second chapter, ‘Invasive Neighbours’, provides new evidence on the effect of 
immigration on electoral outcomes in developing countries. The Dominican Republic is 
used as case study as it provides a highly interesting context to analyse this issue. The vast 
majority of its immigrants come from neighbouring Haiti, and together the two countries 
share the island of Hispaniola. I find robust evidence that higher immigrant concentration 
is associated with greater support for the right-wing political coalition that has traditionally 
been more opposed to immigration. At the same time, the popularity of the centre-left 
coalition is found to decline in localities experiencing larger inflows of foreigners. Political 
competition, citizenship and identity considerations seem to be shaping voting behaviour 
and individual attitudes towards immigrants in the Dominican Republic. 
The third and last chapter, ‘The Elusive Quest for Social Diversity?’, analyses the effect 
of social housing supply on ethnic and social diversity in France’s largest metropolitan 
areas. High income countries generally rely on the provision of affordable housing through 
various schemes to both facilitate access to decent accommodation and encourage social 
diversity at the local level. The analysis takes advantage of a national policy reform to shed 
light on the issue. I find strong evidence of a positive relationship between social housing 
and ethnic diversity in local labour markets with large immigrant networks and strong 
labour demand. Social housing provision also affects the distribution of households’ 
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income at the local level. This chapter contributes to the small but growing literature on the 
impact of social housing developments on the neighbourhoods in which they are built. 
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Introduction 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the economics of international migration. It 
focuses mainly on labour (or economic) migration as opposed to refugee migration. 
Asylum seekers and refugees have been forced to leave their countries in order to escape 
war, persecution, or natural disaster. Instead labour migration can be defined as the choice 
of an individual or household to move abroad to improve its living standards. Labour 
migration is in principle mutually agreed upon by migrants and host countries. Economic 
migrants therefore tend to choose and have prior information on their destination country 
(Dustmann et al. 2017).  
This thesis is comprised of three chapters exploring some of the consequences and 
implications of labour migration. The first chapter concentrates on the impact of migration 
on the education and labour outcomes of left behind children in poor countries. The 
second chapter puts the emphasis on the electoral consequences of immigration in 
emerging democracies. The last chapter deals with the influence of housing policies on the 
location decisions of immigrants in industrialised countries. 
Migration economists distinguish between the origin and destination countries of migrants. 
The economic literature on migration has always been interested in the effects of migration 
at the destination. In recent years, migration scholars have also begun to show great 
concern for the implications of emigration in source countries (Clemens 2011). The 
debates on the brain drain and the opportunities remittances offer for financing 
development have been written about extensively for instance. This thesis looks at 
migration in these two settings. The first chapter of this thesis is concerned with the effects 
of migration in a source country, namely Tajikistan. The second and third chapter examine 
the host countries of the Dominican Republic and France. 
Migration is a socio-economic phenomenon of a fundamentally spatial nature. It also tends 
to be urban in the sense that more migrants settle in cities than in rural areas. There are an 
estimated 232 million international migrants and 740 million internal migrants worldwide 
(UN DESA 2013). About half of international migrants reside in ten highly urbanized, 
high-income countries. These include Australia, Canada and the United States, several 
countries in Europe (France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom), and the Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Migrants also tend to concentrate 
in the cities of these countries. Further, almost all the growth in the world’s population 
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over the next few decades is expected to occur in the urban areas of low-and middle-
income countries, particularly in Africa and Asia (UN DESA 2014). This urban 
characteristic of global migration flows can be witnessed in the three cases studies of this 
thesis. More than 90% of Tajikistani migrants go to Russia to look for work, and about half 
settle in the Russian capital Moscow. In the Dominican Republic, immigration was 
traditionally associated with agricultural plantation labour. Since the 1990s however, 
immigrants have started to favour urban areas where there are numerous job opportunities 
in construction and services. France is another good example of this phenomenon. More 
than a third of its immigrants reside in the Greater Paris region.  
Migration has been a constant feature of human history, but twenty-first century migration 
is quite different from that of previous generations. Global migration flows have been 
stimulated by lower costs of transportation, communication innovations, and the rise of 
global media. Migrants have now the opportunity to maintain or develop cultural and 
socio-economic ties with their countries of origin. It is now much easier for today’s 
migrants and their descendants to return to their home countries. It is also easier for them 
to import goods and services. They can also send remittances and goods purchased abroad 
back home (IOM 2017). Migrants can influence political preferences and social behaviours 
at the origin as well. Levitt (1998) was the first to coin the term social remittances to describe 
the flow of ideas, social and political capital from receiving to sending communities. 
Immigrants also have an impact on the locations in which they settle. Labour economists 
have spent three decades debating and measuring the effect of immigration on labour 
markets, innovation and productivity for instance. In consequence, migration has multi-
faceted consequences in host and source countries. This is reflected in this thesis. The first 
chapter concentrates on the education and labour outcomes of left behind children. 
Attitudes, politics, and elections are the focus of the second chapter. The last chapter deals 
with public policies and how it affects the residential choices of immigrants. 
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature on the economics of migration. I 
discuss in each chapter these contributions in great detail. I nonetheless take the time to 
focus on a few significant ones here. Firstly, I consider original settings to analyse the 
consequences of migration. Central Asia and the Caribbean are two underexplored regions 
of the world in the academic literature. Their economic, political, and social institutions are 
quite specific, however. The seminal migration studies focusing on the experience of well 
researched case studies such as Denmark, the US, Mexico, or China have limited external 
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validity for Tajikistan and the Dominican Republic as a result. The third chapter of this 
thesis concentrates on the validity of the Welfare Magnet Hypothesis in France. This 
hypothesis states that welfare generosity acts a ‘magnet’ for migrants. Few studies have 
tested it outside the US. Secondly, by attaching a great deal of importance to econometric 
endogeneity issues, this thesis also contributes to the migration literature from a 
methodological standpoint. 
Chapter 1 studies the impact of migration on the schooling and labour outcomes of left-
behind children in rural Tajikistan. In low income countries, migration is often used as a 
strategy to cope with poverty and diversify economic risk. Despite its common adoption, 
the consequences of this strategy for left-behind children are unclear from a theoretical 
standpoint. Remittances may improve family financial situations, ease the payment of 
schooling related expenses, and lower the opportunity cost of sending children to school. 
Parental absence might be detrimental for children, however. The lost labour due to 
migration might require replacement and child effort for example. Additionally, remaining 
family members might have less time resources available to invest in the education of 
youngsters.  
Tajikistan provides a highly interesting and relevant case study to focus on. Migration has 
become a widespread phenomenon among rural households following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It is believed that as many as one in four Tajikistani households have 
engaged in international migration to improve its living standards since the country’s 
independence in 1991. Largely in consequence of these emigration flows, Tajikistan has 
also recorded the world highest level of remittance inflows as a fraction of gross domestic 
product since the middle of the last decade.  
Individual self-selection into migration is a serious challenge to measure the effect of living 
in a migrant household. The empirical analysis in this chapter relies on a detailed survey 
tracking households’ economic and social experiences during half a decade. The panel 
dimension of the sample allows eliminating a considerable amount of unobserved 
individual and household heterogeneity. To remove time varying confounding influences, I 
design an instrumental variable strategy relying on the economic conditions prevailing in 
Russia where nine out of ten migrants settle and spatial variation in the cost of migration.   
Overall, the analysis yields mixed conclusions regarding the impact of migration on 
children in rural Tajikistan. My findings indicate that male children living in migrant 
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households have a lower probability of lagging behind at school and engaging in child 
labour. They also work fewer hours per week. Interestingly, I find that migration has a 
different effect on left behind girls. Teenage females appear to be negatively affected by the 
migration of a family member in the sense that the amount of chores they have 
responsibility over increases. The positive impact documented for male children and the 
gender heterogeneity appear to be driven by financial channels, local socioeconomic 
institutions and gender norms.  
This chapter provides scarce empirical evidence for a region that has been neglected in the 
literature on the economics of migration. It also has important public policy implications 
for countries like Tajikistan implementing measures of various kinds to encourage 
emigration.  
Chapter 2 explores the electoral consequences of immigration in developing countries. 
Economists and political scientists have only recently begun to provide hard evidence on 
this topic. While empirical studies focusing on Europe and the US have been written in the 
last few years, little is known on how immigration affects attitudes and election results in 
developing countries. Such countries do not share the institutional and welfare system 
features of industrialized countries, and the voting behaviour of natives might differ. This 
chapter contributes to this literature by looking at the effect of Haitian immigration in the 
Dominican Republic (DR). In recent years migrant inflows from Haiti have skyrocketed, 
while at the same time political and ethnic tensions have grown sharply.  
This study exploits a broad range of data sources to construct a novel municipality-level 
panel dataset used to examine the impact of immigration on both presidential and 
parliamentary elections. The empirical investigation is based on a first difference model 
cancelling out all unobserved time invariant municipality characteristics. To account for the 
endogenous location decisions of migrants, I adopt an instrumental variable strategy 
capturing the influence demographic push factors have in determining the settlement 
pattern of Haitian migrants in the DR. I also exploit the devastating 2010 Haitian 
earthquake as an alternative source of exogenous variation. 
I find robust evidence of a positive relationship between a higher concentration of Haitian 
immigrants and the vote shares of the right-wing political coalition in both presidential and 
congressional elections. The small Dominican far-right party campaigning largely on an 
anti-migration platform also gains votes in more exposed municipalities. On the other 
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hand, the centre-left political coalition experiences a reduction in electoral support in the 
municipalities more exposed to Haitian migration. Empirical evidence based on both 
election data and individual opinion surveys suggests that concerns over citizenship, 
political competition and cultural identity might be the main drivers of Dominican natives’ 
political response to the immigration of Haitians. 
This chapter is the first quantitative study of the consequences of immigration on electoral 
outcomes in an emerging democracy. It exploits a rich and entirely novel dataset combining 
decennial census data, election results, and opinion survey answers. It also makes great 
effort in providing evidence on the channels driving the associations found between 
immigration and political party performance. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature looking at the location decisions of immigrants by 
providing new evidence on the Welfare Magnet Hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that spatial 
variation in the generosity of welfare systems might distort migration flows resulting in an 
unproductive allocation of migrants across labour markets. Numerous high income 
countries count on the provision of affordable housing to facilitate access to decent 
accommodation and promote social diversity. Despite their wide adoption, there is limited 
evidence on whether affordable housing programs affect population composition, urban 
segregation, and ethnic and social diversity. This chapter looks precisely at these issues in 
France, a country with a long tradition of hosting immigrants and an ambitious social 
housing policy.  
The direction of the causality between affordable housing provision, immigrant population 
presence, and neighbourhood diversity is difficult to measure. From a methodological 
viewpoint, the analysis is complicated by the complex decisions determining the allocation 
of low income housing across space. I take advantage of a national housing policy reform 
to circumvent this fundamental issue. I also go beyond ‘traditional’ magnet hypothesis 
studies and look at the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of immigrants.  
I divide the empirical analysis in two parts. First, I concentrate on the Greater Paris region 
where about one sixth of the French population and one third of immigrants live. I find 
that social housing supply attracts immigrant populations and promote ethnic diversity in 
this region. Additional evidence indicates that the bulk of the increase in foreigners is 
accounted by female and economically inactive immigrants. I also observe that 
municipalities providing more affordable housing are poorer and exhibit lower household 
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median incomes. In the second part of the empirical analysis, I extend the investigation to 
the next three largest French metropolitan areas: Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse. I do not 
detect any effect on the measures used to proxy for ethnic and social diversity for these 
urban areas. Pooling the four metropolitan area samples I study whether the effect of social 
housing supply is heterogeneous. My findings suggest that the effect of social housing on 
attracting immigrants is larger in municipalities located in local labour markets with a higher 
concentration of foreigners and more buoyant economic conditions.   
The analysis in this paper is highly relevant and has important implications for public 
policy. Higher ethnic diversity prompted by a larger social housing supply can have wide 
ranging socio-economic effects. A large literature has shown that urban segregation has 
detrimental effects on the educational, employment and life prospects of minorities. There 
is also a large and ongoing debate on the impact of immigration on the labour market 
outcomes of natives and immigrants alike.  
These three chapters provide new insights on the economics of international migration. 
Despite the heterogeneity of the research questions and cases studied, they show how 
human migration can have significant economic, political and social impacts in both origin 
and destination countries of different income levels.  
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Chapter 1 
 
No Country for Young Men. 
International Migration and Left-behind Children 
in Tajikistan1. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In low income countries, migration is often used as a strategy to cope with poverty. 
Limited economic prospects as well as capital and insurance market failures often 
encourage households to send a member abroad to search for better opportunities and 
diversify economic risk. Once established overseas migrants often remit part of their 
income to household members left behind, while the separation of families that results can 
have important consequences on the household members remaining in sending areas (Stark 
and Bloom 1985; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Gibson et 
al. 2011; Yang 2011; Antman 2013; Clemens and Ogden 2014).   
This paper aims at identifying the causal impact of migration on the schooling and labour 
outcomes of left-behind children in rural Tajikistan. This country provides an interesting 
setting to study this topic since emigration flows have grown markedly over the last two 
decades following independence in 1991 and the end of the 1992-1997 civil war. Tajikistan 
being the poorest country in Central Asia with still 27.7% of its population living with less 
than US$ 2 a day in 2009, many households turn to labour migration to improve their 
living conditions. One in four Tajikistani households is thought to have engaged at some 
point in migration to better its quality of life during the last decade (World Bank 2009, 
                                                          
1 My supervisors Steve Gibbons and Olmo Silva have provided tremendous guidance for this project. I have 
also benefited from productive conversations with Vernon Henderson, Martin Heger, Alexander Jaax, Jouni 
Kuha, and Nathalie Picarelli. 
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2011). As a consequence, the country has had the highest level of remittance inflows as a 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) in the world2 since the middle of the 2000s.  
To address the research question, the analysis relies on a three-wave panel survey with data 
collected in 2007, 2009 and 2011 by the Tajikistani National Committee for Statistics, the 
World Bank, and the Institute for East- and Southeast European Studies based in 
Germany. These surveys contain information on the education, labour market outcomes, 
and other socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. Estimating the effect of 
having a household member living abroad on the left-behind is challenging because 
individuals and households self-select into migration. The panel dimension of the sample 
allows eliminating a considerable amount of unobserved heterogeneity through a two-way 
panel fixed effects specification. Nonetheless, given the observational nature of the data 
and non-random selection into migration, I also use an instrumental variable strategy to 
account for potential sources of time-varying endogeneity affecting both migration 
decisions and individual outcomes. Since the vast majority of Tajikistani emigrants (more 
than 90 %) move to the Russian Federation (IMF 2005; IOM 2009; Danzer and 
Ivaschenko 2010), I develop an instrument based on the economic conditions prevailing in 
Russia and spatial variation in migration costs. Business cycles overseas are exogenous to 
the schooling and labour outcomes of Tajikistani children, but it is reasonable to expect 
that they affect household emigration decisions3. My findings indicate that migration has a 
differential effect on left behind boys and girls. Overall, boys seem to benefit from 
migration. All else equal male children living in migrant households have a lower 
probability of lagging behind at school or engaging in child labour on the household farm. 
They also work fewer hours per week. Instead, education spending on left-behind girls 
falls. In addition, the probability of teenage females becoming idle rises. They also appear 
to increase their participation in household chores. The differential impact of migration on 
male and female children appears to be driven by financial channels and gender norms. My 
results suggest migrant households are more likely to receive remittances and be satisfied 
with their financial situation. In addition, they seem to rely to a greater extent on young 
females to perform domestic tasks such as cooking and cleaning.  
                                                          
2 Since 2007, Tajikistan has ranked first in terms of remittance inflows as a share of GDP (World 
Development Indicators, 2016). 
3 There is empirical evidence justifying the latter argument. For instance, McKenzie et al. (2014) estimate the 
impact of economic shocks in Filipino migrant destination countries on migrant flows to those destinations 
over the period 1992–2009. They find that variations in destination countries real GDP have a large impact 
on Filipino migrant inflows. 
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From a theoretical point of view, the consequences of migration on the educational 
outcomes of the left-behind are a priori uncertain. On the one hand, the financial costs of 
migration combined with the potential need to replace the migrant’s labour and the 
associated forgone income might lead to an increase in the labour market participation of 
the remaining children. Left-behind children might even be forced to drop out of school if 
the forgone income is too substantial. Moreover, if the migrant participated in household 
activities (for instance farming, running the family business or undertaking household 
chores), left-behind children may spend more time performing household domestic tasks 
(Jadotte 2009; Lokshin and Glinskaya 2009; Binzel and Assaad 2011; Chang et al. 2011; Mu 
and van de Walle 2011). Parental absence may also result in less time and effort allocated to 
children’s education by adults. On the other hand, remittance receipt following the 
emigration of a household member should loosen budget constraints and facilitate sending 
children to school. It ought to translate as well in a reduction in the number of hours 
worked for minors already economically active. In this case, one would expect to observe a 
negative relationship between migration, dropping out of school and child labour (Kroeger 
and Anderson 2014, Cortes 2015). The receipt and amount of remittances thus play a very 
important role in determining the effect of migration on children. The prospect of future 
migration for children growing up in migrant households might also affect incentives to 
invest in human capital depending on the relative returns to education at home and abroad 
(McKenzie and Rapoport 2011; Batista et al. 2012; Antman 2013). 
Further, cultural norms and institutions may influence how members within a household 
are affected. In a country such as Tajikistan with marked gender differences with respect to 
the household division of tasks, it can be expected that female human capital investments 
will be relatively inelastic to the migration of a household member compared to that of 
young males. Tajikistan is a patrilocal society and women leave their parental households 
when they get married to settle in those of their husbands (Grogan 2007). As a result, 
parents do not benefit much from their daughters’ returns to education and have little 
incentives to invest in their schooling. Credit markets are also believed to be imperfect in 
Tajikistan. Faced with credit constraints, parents might be forced to invest only in the 
education of one or few children; especially when the returns to schooling are believed to 
be non-linear (very low first and rising fast after a certain amount of schooling). Given the 
limited labour opportunities available to women in Tajikistan, one would expect migrant 
households to choose to invest in their sons’ human capital.   
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This paper is related to the literature on migration and its effects on left-behind children’s 
schooling and labour. The existing empirical evidence has arguably failed to reach a 
consensus on what are the consequences of migration on these outcomes. Findings appear 
to be somewhat dependent on the empirical methodology adopted and at the same time 
context-specific4. Several studies find evidence of the possibility that migration and 
remittances relax budget constraints and translate in a reduction in child labour and better 
schooling outcomes. For instance, Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) examine the effect of 
remittances in El Salvador using cross-sectional data. Assuming selection on observables, 
their results indicate that remittances have a positive effect on school attendance. In 
Mexico, Alcaraz et al. (2012) focus on the short term effects of remittances on both school 
attendance and child labour. They take advantage of the 2008–2009 global economic crisis 
as an exogenous event to observe how remittance beneficiaries react to negative remittance 
shocks. Using a difference in differences strategy and instrumenting remittance receipt with 
the distance from residence municipality to the U.S. border, they find that negative 
remittance shocks cause both an increase in child labour and dropping out of school. 
Gibson and McKenzie (2014) evaluate the development impact of New Zealand’s 
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) program in Tonga and Vanuatu. They find evidence 
that in migrant households school attendance rates for 16 to 18 years old increased in 
Tonga but not Vanuatu. On the contrary, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) uncover a 
negative impact of migration on educational attainment in rural Mexico. Their results show 
a significant negative effect of migration on schooling attendance and attainment. Further, 
several studies report that the effects of migration differ based on age and gender of the 
child. Acosta (2011) finds that in remittance households in El Salvador, girls increase 
school attendance and reduce labour activities. Boys do not appear to modify their 
schooling decisions, however. Chang et al. (2011) examine the impact of migration on the 
time allocation patterns of left-behind children in rural China. Their analysis focuses on 
time use of children aged 7 to 14 years of age in farm work and domestic work. They show 
that the migration of household members increases time spent on farm work and domestic 
work, with the increase in work time being greater for girls than boys. 
There is limited evidence on the impact of migration on the children left-behind in 
Tajikistan. Using cross-sectional survey data and assuming selection on observables, 
Bennett et al. (2013) find a significant positive association between parental migration and 
children’s school enrolment. Dietz et al. (2015) exploit a panel dataset to address the same 
                                                          
4 For a thorough review of the literature, see Antman (2013). 
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research question. Controlling for time and individual fixed effects, they find a negative 
relationship between the migration of a household member and school attendance of left-
behind children. I build upon these studies by considering the trade-off between labour and 
educational outcomes. I also improve on the empirical methodology and assess the 
potential channels driving my findings.  
The identification strategy adopted in this paper improves on the empirical methodology 
employed in the literature contributions discussed above. To be precise, by combining a 
fixed effects approach with an instrumental variable (IV) strategy I provide solid causal 
evidence on the relationship studied here. Indeed, the panel nature of the dataset allows me 
to remove the influence of unobserved time fixed confounders and yearly macroeconomic 
shocks. In addition, the instrumental variable strategy further addresses the endogeneity of 
self-selection into migration by mitigating the confounding effect of time-varying 
household and individual variables. In doing so, I contribute to the limited empirical 
literature with strong empirical strategies that has looked at this question. 
The present work further contributes to the literature on migration and left-behind 
children in two important ways. First, my findings focus on both education and labour 
outcomes. In addition, they shed light on the channels driving the results. They also 
highlight the existence of gender heterogeneity in the impact of migration. Second, I 
provide empirical evidence for a region that is arguably neglected in the literature on the 
economics of migration. Tajikistan and Central Asia have been understudied despite the 
importance of the Russian – Central Asia corridor in global labour migration flows. In 
recent years, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan – four countries of the former 
Soviet bloc – have figured among the top 15 world receivers of remittances as a percentage 
of GDP. Most of the related empirical literature has instead tended to focus on Mexico and 
other Latin American and Caribbean countries where cultural norms and economic 
institutions differ markedly (de Haas 2009; Antman, 2013).  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides some 
background on international migration in Tajikistan. I then discuss data sources and 
present descriptive statistics in the third section. The identification strategy is discussed in 
the fourth section. Estimation results are presented next. The last section concludes. 
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1.2 International migration in Tajikistan 
1.2.1 Context 
A former Soviet Republic, Tajikistan is the smallest landlocked country in Central Asia with 
a population of 8.2 million inhabitants as of 2013. It is highly mountainous with the two 
ranges of the Alay and Pamir Mountains passing through the western and eastern part of 
the country’s territory, respectively. The country is the poorest in the region and more than 
two thirds of its population lives in rural areas where most of the poor are concentrated 
(World Bank 2009; Shemyakina 2011). The agricultural sector employs more than 50% of 
the labour force, and most of the rural population depends on agriculture-generated 
income (Akramov and Shreedhar 2012; Gang et al. 2016).  
Tajikistan is a highly interesting case-study for the analysis of the link between emigration, 
human capital accumulation, and the labour market outcomes of left-behind children. The 
country’s reliance on international migration as a coping strategy is a relatively new 
phenomenon. It started in the late 1990s as a direct consequence of the social and 
economic chaos caused by the post-independence civil war that ended in 1997 and the 
Russian financial crisis of 1998. With the independence of the country in 1991 followed by 
civil war and global financial turmoil, the payments system collapsed, the industrial and 
export base drastically contracted, public sector employment shrank, and daily household 
consumption began to rely on humanitarian aid. It is estimated that between 1990 and 
1997, the country’s real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 65% (Abdulloev et al. 2014; 
Gang et al. 2016). In this context, labour migration eventually became an unavoidable 
strategy to generate much needed income for a large number of households (IMF 2005; 
Kireyev 2006; Piracha et al. 2013). Over the course of the last decade, the number of 
labour migrants moving abroad in search of better opportunities kept increasing, and so 
did international remittances (see Figure 1). Since the middle of the last decade, Tajikistan 
has ranked first in terms of remittances received as a share of GDP. Between 2005 and 
2015, remittances sent from abroad amounted on average to 40 % of GDP; by far the 
highest level in the world (see Figure 2). Due to these massive emigration flows, 
Tajikistan’s workforce contracted by 10% to 20% in the last decade (Kireyev 2006). The 
country has historically had one of the highest population growth rates of the former 
Soviet republics and despite positive economic growth rates, job opportunities have 
remained scarce. These economic stagnation and demographic pressures help explain the 
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persistence of the Tajikistani out-migration throughout the last fifteen years (Jones et al. 
2007).  
Russia is by far the main destination of emigrants. According to the World Bank (2009), 
approximately 96% of Tajikistani migrants locate in the Russian Federation, with roughly 
50% of these migrants settling in Moscow. There are various reasons for the predominance 
of Russia as destination country. First, Russia possesses a sizable Tajik ethnic community 
that established itself in the country progressively through the twentieth century. In 
addition, the economy of the Russian Federation is characterized by the presence of 
dynamic or booming industries such as oil and gas, metallurgy, chemical industries and 
heavy machinery building requiring unskilled labour. Besides, Tajikistan workers do not 
need a visa to enter the country. Further, geopolitical tensions with Uzbekistan, protracted 
civil unrest in Afghanistan, and infamous cases of mistreatments of Tajikistani migrants in 
Kazakhstan divert emigrants away from neighbour countries towards Russia (Jones et al. 
2007; Buckley and Hofmann 2012). The vast majority of emigrants are young men in their 
late twenties and mid-thirties. In terms of educational outcomes, migrants have usually 
completed secondary school. Prior to migrating most of these individuals were 
unemployed. Most migration spells are temporary in nature and typically last between six 
months and five years. Most migrants end up working in the construction sector or 
performing unskilled tasks in the services sector. Given the precarious nature of these jobs, 
migrants are quite vulnerable to Russian economic conditions. Still, emigrants make on 
average six times more than the average earnings in Tajikistan. In addition, almost all tend 
to remit cash back to their relatives left behind (World Bank 2009; Danzer and Ivaschenko 
2010; Buckley and Hofmann 2012; Gang et al. 2016).  
It is widely believed that labour migration and remittance inflows have successfully helped 
smooth the economic and social impact of the transition away from a planned economy 
and the subsequent civil unrest (IMF 2005; Kireyev 2006; Clément 2011; Justino and 
Shemyakina 2012). The World Bank (2011) estimates that between 2003 and 2007 the 
national poverty headcount fell from 68% to 37%, meaning that more than a million 
people were lifted out of poverty over the period. Remittance receipts are believed to have 
played a major role in the observed poverty reduction by allowing poor households to 
enjoy higher levels of consumption and by stimulating domestic demand for goods and 
services. All things considered, these large emigration and remittance flows are still 
relatively novel for the country, and their consequences are not yet fully understood 
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(Justino and Shemyakina 2012; Abdulloev et al. 2014). The rest of the paper is dedicated to 
filling in some of the existing knowledge gap.  
1.2.2 Migrant profile 
In this sub-section I provide some information on the profile of migrants and migrant 
households in Tajikistan using the 2007 Living Standards Measurement Surveys5. I begin 
with a discussion of the average characteristics of migrant households in rural areas. Table 
1.1 shows means for selected variables in migrant and non-migrant households as well as 
the t-statistic of tests of mean equality across the two groups. As expected, almost all (90%) 
migrant households receive remittances. These households also exhibit a slightly lower 
number of members and are more likely to be female headed. Migration appears to be a 
strategy relied upon by ethnic Tajik households mainly. Not much difference in terms of 
the educational profile of household heads can be seen between the two household types. 
The data available on per capita consumption indicates that migrant households are better 
off. This suggests remittances help left-behind family members achieving higher levels of 
consumption. Much of that consumption difference is accounted by higher food expenses 
suggesting that remittances help meet basic needs.   
Descriptive statistics on the profile of current migrants can be found in Table 1.2. The vast 
majority of emigrants are young men (93.4%) in their twenties and mid-thirties coming 
from rural Tajikistan. Around 82% of these migrants are sons and daughters of the head of 
the household to which they belong. Another 11% are head’s spouses. In terms of 
educational outcomes, three fourths of migrants have completed secondary school. The 
remaining fourth is made of roughly equivalent numbers of primary and tertiary educated 
individuals. It can be seen that more than 95% of them settle in the Russian Federation. 
Prior to migrating most of these individuals were unemployed. Finally, the evidence 
presented in the bottom right panel of the table suggests that most migration spells are 
temporary in nature. Only 12.5% of migrants have been away from their households for six 
years or more. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The dataset is presented in greater detail in Section 3. 
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1.3 Data 
The analysis is based on a three-wave panel dataset comprised of the 2007 and 2009 
Tajikistan Living Standards Measurement Surveys (TLSS07 and TLSS09) and the Tajikistan 
Household Panel Survey 2011 (THPS 2011). The TLSS07 and TLSS09 surveys were 
carried out by the Tajikistani National Committee for Statistics (“Goskomstat”) with the 
assistance of the World Bank. The THPS 2011 was designed and implemented by the 
Institute for the East and Southeast European Studies as a follow-up to the two previous 
TLSS (Danzer et al., 2013). The primary purpose of these surveys is to gather data 
reflecting the actual living conditions of the population in Tajikistan. Samples were 
collected through multi-stage stratified random sampling and designed to be representative 
of Tajikistan as a whole, and of its rural and urban areas. In 2007, 4,860 households were 
interviewed after having been randomly selected from 270 communities (urban 
neighbourhoods and rural villages) chosen all across the country’s territory. A total of 
eighteen households were questioned per community. In 2009, the National Committee for 
Statistics and the World Bank decided to revisit 1,503 of those households to collect 
updated information on their living conditions. Instead of tracking each of those 
households across space, the survey collection team went back to 167 out of the 270 
communities sampled in 2007. While the second wave interviewed approximately only a 
third of the households visited in 2007, its coverage was still representative at the national, 
urban and rural area levels. The third wave re-visited households interviewed in the two 
previous surveys. Put together, the three surveys allow constructing an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 621 respondents aged between 14 and 18 years old tracked across time. The 
three waves include detailed data on the demographic characteristics, educational and 
employment outcomes of respondents. Of particular interest, the surveys collected 
information on the number of migrants per household, their destination, and remittances 
sent back. 
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for the variables later used in the empirical analysis. 
In the sample, 17.7% of the individuals live in a household with a member living abroad at 
the time of the survey. A slightly higher number lives in a household receiving international 
remittances (18.1%). This indicates that friends and relatives that are not part of the 
household also transfer funds back. Half of the surveyed persons are female. The average 
respondent is 16 years old and report living with 2.4 households members aged 14 years or 
old less. Around 13% of the individuals live in a female-headed household. 
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The outcomes I focus on are related to human capital accumulation and labour market 
outcomes. I concentrate on three measures of educational performance. The first binary 
variable measures whether an individual has dropped out of school. The second variable 
records whether an individual is lagging behind in school, i.e. being enrolled in a grade the 
individual should have already completed given her age. I also consider the total amount 
spent by the household on each child. I then consider the following three labour outcomes: 
working, idleness (not working and not being at school), and weekly number of hours 
worked. The first two variables are binary, while the last one can be treated as continuous. 
The share of individuals not enrolled in any education institution (referred to as dropouts) 
stands at 22.4%, while 11.8% are lagging behind in school (i.e., enrolled in a grade they 
ought to have completed at least one year earlier given their birth cohort). Approximately 
11% report working, while 16% are idle, i.e., neither in school nor working. The average 
number of weekly hours worked amounts to 4.3 hours. For those working, the distribution 
between labour performed on the household farm, family private business and external 
non-household work is relatively balanced (Table 1.3).  
 
1.4 Identification strategy 
The main empirical challenge is to define the correct counterfactual given the observational 
nature of the data. I adopt a reduced form approach and the main empirical specification is 
the following: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑑,𝑟,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡. 𝛽2 + 𝛽3. 𝑛𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜐𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑑,𝑟,𝑡  (1.1) 
where i is for individual, j for community/village, d for district, and t for year. 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is a 
dummy variable indicating living in a migrant household. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 are child and household 
covariates including age, age squared, number of household members aged 14 years old or 
less, number of household members aged 65 years old or more, and a female-headed 
household dummy. 𝑛𝑑,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the annual average district nightlight 
intensity6 to proxy for local economic performance. 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜐𝑟,𝑡 represent individual and 
region times year fixed effects, respectively, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑑,𝑡 is the error term. I restrict the 
                                                          
6 Tajikistan is divided in five administrative regions: Sogd, Khatlon, Region of Republican Subordination 
(RRP), Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO), and the capital city Dushanbe. Tajikistan is further divided in 58 
districts. Nightlight data comes from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
See Henderson et al. (2012) for a discussion of the use of nightlights to proxy GDP growth. 
24 
 
sample to children aged 14 to 18 years old living in rural areas for data reasons. The 
questionnaires ask about labour market participation to all individuals aged 14 years old and 
above. Children are supposed to complete high school by the time they are 18. Coefficients 
are estimated by least squares regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the community 
level to address concerns of serial correlation and within community correlation. 
The panel dimension of the data allows estimating individual and year fixed-effects 
regressions, which free the estimation results from the confounding influence of time-fixed 
unobservable factors likely to affect both selection into migration and socio-economic 
outcomes as well as common country-wide time shocks. Further, district nightlight density 
controls for local macroeconomic shocks such as plant closure or localized natural disasters 
(floods or droughts for instance) that may impact migration decisions (see Figure A-1 in 
Appendix). Including region times year fixed effects allows addressing further potential 
econometric identification concerns stemming from local economic shocks and spatial 
spillovers.   
Despite the inclusion of the set of explanatory variables and fixed effects discussed above, 
estimating the fixed-effects model set up in Equation (1.1) may not capture the causal 
effect of migration on individual outcomes. Imperfectly observable time-varying 
characteristics (such as an adverse household health shock) may influence labour market 
outcomes as well as international migration decisions. Reverse causation could also bias the 
results. For instance, sending a household member abroad might help finance the 
education of children left behind thanks to the remittances sent. However, sending 
someone overseas might also be a household strategy to finance the education of children 
in the first place. In an ideal setting, migration decisions would be randomly allocated 
across households, and in consequence there would be no selection and omitted variables 
problems. However, given the observational nature of the data at hand, an identification 
strategy addressing the absence of treatment randomization must be adopted (Adams 2011; 
Gibson et al. 2011). The Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is particularly well suited in 
this context and the one selected here (McKenzie and Sasin 2007; Angrist and Pischke 
2009). Past emigration rates have often been used as instruments for migration in cross-
sectional setting (see for example Acosta 2007; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Mckenzie and 
Rapoport 2011). However, in this context, such variables might not fully satisfy the 
exogeneity condition a valid instrument requires. Through constant and time-varying 
channels unobserved by the econometrician, it is plausible that these variables might also 
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affect current educational and labour market outcomes. The instrument I choose aims at 
addressing these fragilities and relies on both economic conditions abroad and spatial 
variation in the cost of migrating. As mentioned above, more than 90% of Tajikistani 
migrants choose the Russian Federation as destination. Close to half of those migrants go 
to Moscow and the rest scatter themselves across the other main Russian cities throughout 
the vast Russian territory.  
I use as IV for household selection into migration the inverse distance between each rural 
village and the railroad network interacted with the unemployment rate in the Russian 
Federation in the year prior to interview. I use distance to the railroad network that existed 
at the end of the Soviet era in 1991. Doing so reduces endogeneity concerns related to the 
location of railways. Formally, this instrument 𝑧𝑗,𝑡 is defined as follows:  
𝑧𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗
 (1.2) 
where 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 is the Russian nationwide unemployment rate in year t-1. 
Unemployment data comes from the World Development Indicators database, which 
contains annual unemployment rate information for the Russian Federation. The variable 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 measures the closest distance from each rural community to the 
Soviet-era railroad network (Figure 3). Tajikistani railroads are connected to the Russian 
Federation rail network7. Several trains depart each week from the capital city Dushanbe 
and Khujand with final destination Moscow. It is the cheapest way to reach Russia and the 
journey takes three days with a cost of 150 US Dollars approximately. As Tajikistan is 
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), its migrants need not a visa to 
enter Russia. Railroad geographic information system data comes from the Digital Chart of 
the World (DCW)8.  
The intuition behind this IV is the following. Local economic conditions in Russia are 
exogenous to Tajikistani households and individuals’ socio-economic outcomes. 
Nonetheless, they affect the expected returns of migrating and therefore household 
migration decisions. In other words, the lower the unemployment rate in Russia, the better 
the emigration prospects for a given Tajikistani household. Distance to the railroad 
network is a proxy for the financial cost of migrating. The greater the distance from the 
                                                          
7 A map of the Central Asian railroad network can be seen in Appendix Figure A.2. 
8 The Digital Chart of the World (DCW) is a comprehensive digital map of Earth. It is a large geographical 
information system (GIS) global database that is freely available, although it has not been updated since 1992 
- https://worldmap.harvard.edu/data/geonode:Digital_Chart_of_the_World.  
26 
 
railroad network, the more expensive the journey to Russia should be. The study period is 
particularly well suited for the use of this IV. Russia suffered a negative macroeconomic 
exogenous shock in the late 2000s as the global financial crisis hit its real economy. Its 
aggregate economic growth decelerated in 2008 and even turned negative in 2009 as a 
result of the international financial turmoil. The country emerged out of the recession in 
2010 and registered a positive and higher growth rate in 2011 (see Figure A-3).  
The instrument exploits both cross-sectional and time variation. Cross-sectional variation 
stems from the distance between villages and the railroads network. Time variation comes 
from the volatility of Russian macroeconomic conditions. The interaction of the two 
sources of variation is as good as random once year and individual fixed-effects are 
controlled for. The panel dataset being comprised of stayers, village fixed-effects are 
absorbed by the individual fixed-effects. The identification assumption is thus that 
conditional on covariates, cross-sectional unit and time fixed-effects, the instrument affects 
human capital investments and labour outcomes only through their influence on migration 
decisions.  
A large proportion of Tajikistani migrants work in construction. To assess the sensitivity of 
the results I also build an instrument using the growth rate of the construction sector’s 
value added as in Equation (1.3).  
𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗
  (1.3) 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 is the growth rate in year t-1 of the construction sector 
value added in Russia. Annual construction real gross value added data comes from the 
OECD regional statistics database. The intuition for using this instrument is the same. The 
more dynamic the construction sector, the more likely Tajikistani migrants are to found 
work on construction sites. 
 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Children labour and schooling outcomes 
First stage results using Russia’s unemployment rate and distance to railroads as 
instrumental variable are reported in Table 1.4. The first column lumps together boys and 
girls of 14 to 18-years old. The second and third columns look separately at girls and boys, 
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respectively. For the either the whole sample, or boys or girls taken separately, the 
instrument has a strong and statistically significant effect on the probability of living in a 
migrant household. The coefficients are of the right sign and imply that worse economic 
conditions in Russia are associated with a lower probability of having a household member 
living abroad. The point estimate of column 1 indicates that a one standard deviation 
increase in the instrumental variable leads to a 38.4 percentage point (pp) lower probability 
of having a migrant abroad.  
Table 1.5 tests the validity of this instrumental variable. One concern with this instrument 
is the possibility that the state of Russia’s economy has a direct effect on the schooling 
investments of teenagers in Tajikistan. I test for this channel by measuring the effect of the 
instrument on a binary variable indicating positives intention to migrate abroad in the 
future. This variable is only available in the 2007 and 2009 first two waves. The 
instrumental variable is found to have no significant effect on intentions to migrate for all 
teenage individuals and boys taken separately (columns 1 and 2). No girl in the 14-18 years 
old age range ever declares any positive intentions to migrate making it impossible to run 
regressions for this sub-group only. The last three columns test whether the power of the 
instrument is robust to the exclusion of the third wave of data. The point estimates and 
standard errors show that it is (see columns 3 to 5).  
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present the fixed effects (FE) and 2SLS estimation results of Equation 
(1.1) for boys and girls separately. Pooled results can be found in Appendix Table A.1. 
Table 1.6 considers human capital outcome variables and is divided in three panels. In the 
first four columns of Panel A, the dropout dummy is considered as dependent variable. 
The first two columns present FE and 2SLS estimates for girls, while the last two columns 
focus on boys and report FE and 2SLS estimates as well. The FE results show no 
statistically significant migration effect on being enrolled in school for both boys and girls. 
2SLS results show again no significant effect for both gender types. Lagging in school is 
the dependent variable considered in Panel B. Both FE and 2SLS estimates show no 
significant migration impact for girls on this outcome. On the other hand, 2SLS estimates 
in column 4 point to a negative and borderline statistically significant effect at the 10% 
level for young males. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that living in a migrant 
household reduces by 21 pp the probability of lagging behind in school for boys. The last 
Panel concentrates on education spending per child. While having a family member abroad 
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is associated with less education expenses for girls, the effect is positive for boys. The 2SLS 
coefficients are not significant, however.  
Table 1.7 is structured in a similar fashion. It focuses on labour market outcomes and 
reports migration effects on three dependent variables: working (Panel A), idleness (Panel 
B), and number of hours worked per week (Panel C). I discuss first the influence of 
migration on teenage males left-behind. 2SLS results in Panel A column 4 indicate that 
living in a migrant household has a negative and strongly significant effect on the 
probability of working. All else equal, boys from migrant households are found to be 77 pp 
less likely to be performing any type of work. This is a large effect, which is robust to 
estimating village fixed-effects instead of individual fixed-effects. It is also robust to 
dropping the villages with few observations from the sample. This reduction in the 
probability to work is not related to a higher propensity to be idle. The FE and 2SLS 
coefficients of Panel B show no effect of living in a migrant household on idleness. Lastly, 
the last panel of the table concentrates on the number of hours worked per week. After 
addressing endogeneity concerns, teenage males in migrant households are found to work 
on average 8.1 fewer hours per week. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level 
(column 4). In the regression results for boys, FE point estimates tend to be lower in 
absolute values than 2SLS estimates suggesting that unobservables are biasing downwards 
the FE results. Reverse causation is a possible reason for this pattern. While migration 
strategies might allow parents to send their male children to school, the households 
selecting into migration are often poorer and more likely to rely on child labour in the first 
place. The FE and 2SLS estimates of Table 1.8 suggest that the labour outcomes of teenage 
females in migrant households are not significantly affected on either the intensive or 
extensive margins. Taking into account the endogeneity of selection into migration the 
coefficients in all three panels are all statistically insignificant. The effect on idleness is 
positive and borderline significant at the 10% level, however. 
In Table 1.8, I investigate the types of work children do and look at three binary dependent 
variables. The first one measures whether children work on the household farm. The 
second variable records instead whether children work for the non-farm household 
business. The last variable focuses on work performed outside of the household for an 
external economic agent. The results of Panel A show that in migrant households the 
probability of boys engaging on farm work decreases by a large and statistically significant 
amount. The results in the other two panels indicate that the probability left-behind boys 
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perform other types of work is not significantly affected. The reduction in male child 
labour documented in the previous table thus appear to concern farm labour. In other 
words, migration allows taking teenage males out of the farm. The results in columns 1 and 
2 indicate that left-behind females are less likely to work for the household business. 
Teenage female time might be reallocated to other household activities such as domestic 
chores or looking after younger brothers and sisters. I discuss outcomes for girls in more 
detail in the next paragraph.  
While the set of results for girls seems to be consistent on the whole, one might worry that 
with a first stage F-statistic of 9.05 the instrumental variable is not powerful enough to 
discard weak IV issues. In other words, the absence of any migration effect found for girls 
could be due to both biased coefficients and inflated standard errors caused by the 
instrumental variable’s lack of strength. To address these concerns, in Appendix Table A-2, 
I report first stage results using the second instrument defined above relying on 
construction output growth in Russia. The first two columns report first stage least squares 
results and indicate that this alternative IV also meets the relevance condition. The 
coefficients are also of the right sign. The F-statistic on the instrument for the girl sample is 
now 10.28. It is lower for boys and stands at 7.78, however. In columns 3 and 4, I test 
whether this other instrument has any influence on migration intentions. I find no evidence 
of it in the whole sample and boy sample only.   
Since this second instrument is only more powerful for the girl sample, I present in Table 
1.9 2SLS results based on this IV for the teenage female sample only9. The table is divided 
in three panels respectively focusing on schooling, labour outcomes, and labour types. The 
first three columns of Panel A focus on the schooling dependent variables discussed earlier. 
Migration is still found to have a positive but not significant effect on dropping out and 
lagging behind. On the other hand, the results of column 3 suggest that migrant 
households reduce education expenditures for girls. The effect is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is approximately equivalent to the mean of the 
dependent variable suggesting that left-behind girls are taken out of school. Labour 
outcomes are analysed in the second panel of the table. Left-behind female children are 
found to be less likely to engage in any labour activity. The effect is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. In addition, a strong and positive effect is now found for idleness. Living 
in a migrant household increases by 54 pp the likelihood of being idle for teenage females. 
                                                          
9 The previous findings documented for boys are robust to this other IV. 
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The number of hours worked per week is still unaffected (column 3). The estimates in 
Panel C are consistent with the previous results based on the first instrument in Table 1.6. 
Left-behind girls appear less likely to work for the household business all else equal. The 
other types of work are not affected. All things considered this set of results based on the 
alternative instrument is consistent with the findings previously presented.  
The analysis so far suggests that girls do not gain much from the migration of a household 
member. Less is spent on their education and the probability they become idle increases. 
This suggests they take on increased domestic responsibilities in migrant households. 
Descriptive evidence supporting this finding can be found in the 2007 survey. Respondents 
participating in that survey wave were asked about responsibility over family chores. These 
include shopping, fetching water, cooking, washing and cleaning, keeping and accounting 
money, and negotiating water. Appendix Table A.3 shows that teenage females in rural 
households are more likely than teenage males to be responsible over domestic chores. For 
each of these six chores, I present the distribution over responsibility in all households, 
migrant and non-migrant households. The evidence in Panels A and B indicate that girls 
are more likely to cook, wash and clean, and fetch water than boys. Further, the gender 
disparity in chore duty is higher in migrant households.  
I also investigate whether female teenagers are more likely to be married in migrant 
households. Migration strategies could affect the incentives household heads have to marry 
their daughters. On the one hand, the financial costs of migrating to Russia could delay 
wedding decisions given the high costs of both events. On the other hand, the remittances 
from abroad might address shortage of savings and ease paying for marriage ceremonies. 
With most households being credit constrained and young men having spent too little time 
in the labour market to save sufficient resources, one popular source of marriage finance 
stems from international migration (Danzer 2013). Results in Appendix Table A.4 show 
that migration has no significant effect on the marital status of girls. I also fail to find any 
impact for boys. I return to this channel in the next sub-section where I discuss household 
level outcomes. 
Overall, these results suggest that migration mainly benefits left behind boys. Male children 
are less likely to lag behind in school or work on the household farm. They also report 
fewer hours of work in a given week. However, living in a migrant household does not 
seem to bring the same benefits to teenage females with respect to human capital 
investments and labour outcomes. This gender heterogeneity may be explained by the 
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cultural norms prevailing in Tajikistan where gender roles are rather conservatively defined. 
Another explanation could be related to Tajikistan’s patrilocal society nature where girls 
leave their parent households when they get married. As a result, parents do not benefit 
much from their girls’ returns to education and have little incentives to invest in their 
schooling. These findings are also consistent with actual or perceived non-linear returns to 
schooling (very low first and rising fast after a certain amount of schooling) and credit 
constraints forcing parents to invest only in one or few children (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). 
Given the discrimination women face on the labour market, it is not surprising that migrant 
households choose to invest in their sons’ human capital.   
1.5.2 Additional results 
To test the sensitivity of my findings and shed light on the mechanisms at work behind the 
above described results, I run household-level regressions in this section. The 2009 and 
2011 waves asked household heads a battery of questions regarding coping strategies and 
whether they (or anyone in the household) had to change or adapt any of the things they 
normally do over the last 12 months. Of the data generated from these questions, three 
binary variables are interesting for the purposes of my investigation. The first variable 
records whether the household transferred children from private to public school. The 
second asks whether the household transferred children to a cheaper public or private 
school. The third asks if someone withdrew or postponed admission to school, college or 
kindergarten. I use these three variables as dependent variables on which I study the effect 
of having an international migrant in the household.  
To assess the extent to which the remittances channel matters, I also look at the effect of 
migration on remittances receipt and financial satisfaction. The 2009 and 2011 surveys ask 
household heads about their level of satisfaction regarding their financial situation. The 
answers provided can take five distinct values and range from fully satisfied to not at all 
satisfied. I create a binary variable equal to one for answers equal to not at all satisfied and 
unsatisfied, and zero otherwise.  
The empirical specification is the following: 
𝑞ℎ,𝑗,𝑑,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1. 𝑚ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 . 𝛾2 + 𝛾3. 𝑛𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜋ℎ + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜂ℎ,𝑗,𝑑,𝑡 (1.4) 
where h is for household, j for community, d for district, and t for year. 𝑚ℎ,𝑡 is a dummy 
variable indicating migrant households. 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 is a vector of household covariates including 
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the number of household members aged 14 years old or less, number of household 
members aged 65 years old or more, and a female-headed household dummy. 𝑛𝑑,𝑡 is the 
annual average district nightlight intensity (in log). The symbols 𝜋ℎ and 𝜏𝑡 represent 
household and year fixed effects, respectively, and 𝜂
ℎ,𝑗,𝑑,𝑡
 is the error term. Descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and control variables are provided in Table A.3 in Appendix. I 
use the same instrument as described in Equation (1.2) to address the endogeneity of 
migration self-selection. First-stage results (not shown) indicate a negative and statistically 
significant influence of the IV on the migration decision. With an F-statistic of 4.03 the 
power of the IV is limited, however. In the results table I present reduced form results 
along with 2SLS results given the possible bias that may originate from the weak first stage.  
Regression results for the three education variables discussed above are presented in Table 
1.10. For each of these three variables I present FE, reduced form (RF), and 2SLS 
estimates. The first three columns focus on the probability of transferring children from 
private to public school. Both FE and 2SLS point estimates of the effect of migration are 
statistically insignificant. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the probability of 
transferring children to a cheaper school (columns 4 to 6). In the last three columns, no 
effect is found on the likelihood to withdraw or postpone admission to an education 
institution. On the whole these results, while statistically insignificant, do not contradict the 
individual-level findings reported earlier. I don’t find evidence of a systematic negative 
effect of migration on household human capital investments.  
Table 1.11 concentrates on remittances and family financial situation. Its structure is 
identical as that of Table 1.10. Both FE and 2SLS point estimates report a positive and 
strongly significant impact of living in a migrant household on the probability of receiving 
remittances. Evidence of likely reverse causation between financial situation and migration 
can be seen from the last three columns. FE estimates report a positive but insignificant 
association between migration and being unsatisfied with one’s financial situation. In 
contrast, 2SLS findings suggest that heads of migrant households are significantly less likely 
to report being unsatisfied all else equal. The difference between the point estimates of 
columns 4 and 6 could be partly explained by less wealthy households selecting into 
migration - as is believed to be the case (World Bank 2011). Overall, these results indirectly 
support the idea that financial constraints limit human capital investments in rural 
Tajikistan.  
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Finally, I look at the number of teenage girls present in the household. Weddings are quite 
expensive in Tajikistan. The family of the bride is typically responsible for providing a 
dowry. As a result, poor households often rely on friends and relatives to afford the 
celebrations. Migration is also a strategy commonly used by poor households to finance 
wedding related expenses (Danzer 2013). In particular, support from abroad via 
remittances might facilitate meeting the financial costs of arranging a daughter’s marriage. 
To investigate this outcome, I run household level regressions where the dependent 
variable is the number of females aged 14 to 18-years old in the household. Results are 
presented in Appendix Table A.6. Its structure is similar as the previous two household 
level tables. Both the RF and 2SLS estimates suggest migration has a significant impact on 
household size. Migrant households appear to have 0.3 less teenage female members. This 
finding is consistent with remittances helping to finance expensive wedding customs.   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The investigation conducted here has attempted to identify the effect of migration on the 
schooling and labour outcomes of left-behind children in rural Tajikistan using panel data. 
Post-conflict Tajikistan provides an interesting case for the study of this topic since a large 
share of its population rely on emigration towards Russia as a poverty-coping strategy.   
Overall, the analysis yields mixed conclusions regarding the impact of migration on 
children in rural Tajikistan. After addressing the endogeneity of selection into migration 
with a fixed effects and instrumental variable strategy, my empirical results indicate that the 
migration of a family member has a beneficial influence on boys but not girls. Evidence is 
found that teenage males left behind are less likely to lag behind in school or engage in 
child labour. No significant effect is found for girls. The effect reported for boys is likely to 
be mediated by remittances and household wealth. Migrant households are found to be 
significantly more likely to receive remittances and report being satisfied with their current 
financial situation. These findings are consistent with credit constraints, non-linear returns 
to schooling, and traditional gender norms. They are also consistent with limited returns to 
schooling for girls from the perspective of parents living in a patrilocal society.  
As part of its development strategy, the Tajikistani government has been actively 
encouraging migration and remittances in recent years. Public policy measures that have 
been taken include simplification of border-crossing procedures for labour migrants, 
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suppression of taxes on remittances inflows, and simplification of banking regulations on 
remittance receipts. Since the findings described in this paper suggest that the benefits of 
migration are not equally shared among children living in migrant households, the national 
migration policy should consider including a stronger gender component. 
The differences between the results described here and those of earlier studies covering 
Latin American and other Asian countries can be explained in part by institutional setting 
disparities. In a broader perspective, this work stresses the importance of examining less 
studied albeit relevant migration corridors where the economic, institutional and cultural 
influences at play differ from the dominant regions of research interest. 
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1.7 Main Tables & Figures 
 
Tables  
 
Table 1.1: Migrant household characteristics – rural areas 
 
 
Non-migrant  
HHs 
 
Migrant  
HHs 
    
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Number of migrants 0.000 
 
1.325 
 
-111.029 
 
0.000 
Receives remittances 0.038   0.896   -85.194   0.000 
Household size 6.807 
 
6.583 
 
1.744 
 
0.081 
Number of HH members aged < 15 2.382 
 
2.155 
 
2.819 
 
0.005 
Number of HH members aged 65+ 0.354 
 
0.320 
 
1.206 
 
0.228 
Dependency ratio 0.390 
 
0.352 
 
3.704 
 
0.000 
Female headed household 0.125 
 
0.265 
 
-8.572 
 
0.000 
HH Head ethnic group: Tajik  0.755 
 
0.809 
 
-2.735 
 
0.006 
HH Head ethnic group: Uzbek 0.227 
 
0.184 
 
2.262 
 
0.024 
HH Head ethnic group: Kyrgyz 0.016 
 
0.005 
 
1.941 
 
0.052 
HH head: no education 0.046 
 
0.034 
 
1.314 
 
0.189 
HH head: primary education 0.205 
 
0.242 
 
-1.949 
 
0.051 
HH head: secondary education 0.611 
 
0.597 
 
0.596 
 
0.551 
HH head: tertiary education 0.138   0.127   0.688   0.492 
Nominal consumption* 161.054 
 
173.060 
 
-2.331 
 
0.020 
   Of which:        
       Food 107.135 
 
112.740 
 
-2.144 
 
0.032 
       Non-food 31.714 
 
31.804 
 
-0.049 
 
0.961 
       Education 7.687 
 
5.870 
 
1.184 
 
0.236 
       Housing  9.400 
 
8.983 
 
0.461 
 
0.645 
Extreme poor HH 0.133 
 
0.129 
 
0.264 
 
0.792 
Poor HH 0.358 
 
0.320 
 
1.741 
 
0.082 
Non-poor HH 0.509 
 
0.551 
 
-1.843 
 
0.065 
HH owns land 0.860   0.898   -2.408   0.016 
Observations 2,584   566         
Notes: 2007 LSMS data. Rural area sample. * Monthly nominal consumption per capita in local currency units.  
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Table 1.2: Current migrant characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in % unless indicated otherwise) 
Basic demographics 
 
Destination country 
Male migrant 93.48 
 
Russian federation 95.32 
Age (years) 28.31 
 
Central Asia 0.92 
Rural area 76.37 
 
Other 3.77 
     
Relationship to head 
 
Occupation before migrating 
Son or daughter 81.77 
 
Working 26.58 
Spouse 10.59 
 
Unemployed 66.4 
Mother/father or brother/sister 3.67 
 
Student 5.6 
Other (niece/nephew, cousin, ...) 3.97 
 
Other (housewives, military, …) 1.43 
     
Education completed 
 
Time since migrant left household 
Primary 12.93 
 
1 year 12.22 
Secondary general 64.36 
 
2-3 years 61.91 
Secondary technical/special 11.81 
 
4-5 years 13.03 
Tertiary 10.69   6 years or more 12.53 
Source: TLSS 2007. Information on family members living abroad currently is provided by the household head. 982 observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dropout  1,326 0.224 0.417 
Lagging  1,326 0.118 0.322 
Education spending (nominal local currency units) 1,326 208.546 606.496 
Working 1,326 0.112 0.316 
Idle 1,326 0.161 0.367 
Weekly hours worked 1,326 4.283 13.096 
Household farm work 1,322 0.041 0.198 
Household non-farm business work 1,322 0.027 0.163 
Work for non-household member 1,322 0.042 0.200 
Migrant household  1,326 0.177 0.382 
Remittances 1,326 0.181 0.385 
Female 1,326 0.503 0.500 
Age 1,326 16.019 1.343 
Age squared 1,326 258.407 42.987 
Married 1,326 0.005 0.007 
Number of household members aged 14 or less 1,326 2.369 1.673 
Number of household members aged 65 or more 1,326 0.220 0.512 
Female headed household 1,326 0.128 0.334 
Annual average district nightlights (in log) 1,326 0.026 1.424 
Sogd region 1,326 0.199 0.399 
Khatlon region 1,326 0.367 0.482 
RRP region 1,326 0.317 0.466 
GBAO region 1,326 0.117 0.321 
Notes: Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and TLSS11. Individuals aged 14-18 years old. 
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Table 1.4: First stage results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Dependent variable: Migrant household 
 
All 14-18 
 
Girls 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
      
Unemployment over distance -0.389*** 
 
-0.364*** 
 
-0.447*** 
 
(0.0983) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.0859) 
Age  0.203 
 
0.437** 
 
-0.144 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.244) 
Age squared -0.00785* 
 
-0.0158** 
 
0.00335 
 
(0.00467) 
 
(0.00625) 
 
(0.00748) 
HH members aged < 15 -0.000141 
 
0.00863 
 
-0.00198 
 
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0216) 
 
(0.0232) 
HH members aged 65+ -0.0859 
 
-0.00582 
 
-0.177** 
 
(0.0620) 
 
(0.0770) 
 
(0.0885) 
Female headed household 0.489*** 
 
0.469*** 
 
0.557*** 
 
(0.0690) 
 
(0.0962) 
 
(0.0852) 
            
Mean dependent variable 0.177 
 
0.181 
 
0.173 
Number of clusters 104   96   98 
Annual district nightlights Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y 
Observations 1,326 
 
667 
 
659 
R-squared 0.189   0.225   0.206 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network. The instrumental variable is standardized to ease table interpretation. 
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Table 1.5: Migration intentions 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Dependent variable: Intends to migrate 
 
Migrant household 
Sample: All 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
 
All 14-18 
 
Girls 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
          
Unemployment over distance -0.0139 
 
-0.0150 
 
-0.444*** 
 
-0.376*** 
 
-0.743*** 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0431) 
 
(0.0833) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.0629) 
Age  -0.0882 
 
-0.180 
 
0.0191 
 
0.0935 
 
-0.229 
 
(0.0745) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.254) 
Age squared 0.00245 
 
0.00517 
 
-0.00324 
 
-0.00817 
 
0.00709 
 
(0.00239) 
 
(0.00507) 
 
(0.00581) 
 
(0.00775) 
 
(0.00815) 
HH members aged < 15 0.00846 
 
0.0131 
 
-0.0299 
 
0.00295 
 
-0.0471 
 
(0.00869) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0264) 
 
(0.0297) 
 
(0.0364) 
HH members aged 65+ 0.00345 
 
-0.0273 
 
0.0310 
 
0.148 
 
-0.110 
 
(0.00667) 
 
(0.0253) 
 
(0.0854) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.0991) 
Female headed household 0.0289 
 
0.0921 
 
0.119 
 
0.0667 
 
0.196* 
 
(0.0300) 
 
(0.0676) 
 
(0.0876) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.101) 
                    
Mean of dependent variable 0.006 
 
0.014 
 
0.147 
 
0.152 
 
0.141 
Number of clusters 104   98   104   96   98 
Annual district nightlights Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 1,003 
 
497 
 
1,003 
 
506 
 
497 
R-squared 0.044   0.092   0.065   0.156   0.087 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living 
in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network. The instrumental variable is 
standardized to ease table interpretation. 
 
 
40 
 
Table 1.6: Schooling outcomes 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Sample: Girls 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
Estimator OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
        
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Dropout 
        
Migrant -0.0266 
 
0.0798 
 
0.0456 
 
0.0347 
 
(0.0560) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.0588) 
 
(0.0843) 
        
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Lagging 
        
Migrant -0.0289 
 
0.0587 
 
-0.0974 
 
-0.212 
 
(0.0475) 
 
(0.179) 
 
(0.0635) 
 
(0.137) 
        
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Education spending 
        
Migrant 25.43 
 
-28.81 
 
16.62 
 
264.2 
 
(33.46) 
 
(256.4) 
 
(68.58) 
 
(427.3) 
                
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic     9.05       27.13 
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 667   667   659   659 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network.    
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Table 1.7: Labour outcomes 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Sample: Girls 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
Estimator: OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
        
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Working 
 
              
Migrant -0.0352 
 
-0.0896 
 
-0.0595 
 
-0.772*** 
 
(0.0465) 
 
(0.285) 
 
(0.0525) 
 
(0.161) 
        
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Idleness 
 
              
Migrant -0.0347 
 
0.248 
 
0.0786 
 
-0.0000281 
 
(0.0632) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.0513) 
 
(0.101) 
        
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Weekly hours worked 
 
              
Migrant -0.575 
 
9.177 
 
-4.170 
 
-8.144** 
 
(1.976) 
 
(11.52) 
 
(2.697) 
 
(4.162) 
        
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic     9.05       27.13 
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 667   667   659   659 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network.    
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Table 1.8: Labour types 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Sample: Girls 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
Estimator: OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
        
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Household farm work 
 
              
Migrant 0.00357 
 
0.0159 
 
0.0571 
 
-0.717*** 
 
(0.0309) 
 
(0.0676) 
 
(0.0391) 
 
(0.140) 
        
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Household non-farm business work 
 
              
Migrant -0.0396 
 
-0.314*** 
 
-0.0222 
 
-0.0420 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0742) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0519) 
        
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Work for non-household member 
 
              
Migrant 0.00387 
 
0.213 
 
-0.101** 
 
-0.0128 
 
(0.0373) 
 
(0.301) 
 
(0.0458) 
 
(0.0569) 
 
              
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic     9.10       27.06 
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 665   665   657   657 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network.    
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Table 1.9: Teenage female results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
      
 
Panel A. Schooling outcomes 
Dependent variable: Dropout 
 
Lagging 
 
Education spending 
      
Migrant 0.0597 
 
0.0291 
 
-292.0*** 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(99.71) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 10.28 
 
10.28 
 
10.28 
Observations 667 
 
667 
 
667 
            
      
 
Panel B. Labour outcomes 
Dependent variable: Working 
 
Idleness 
 
Weekly hours worked 
      
Migrant -0.369* 
 
0.540** 
 
6.425 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(9.800) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 10.28 
 
10.28 
 
10.28 
Observations 667 
 
667 
 
667 
            
      
 
Panel C. Labour types 
Dependent variable: HH farm work 
 
HH business work 
 
Outside HH work 
      
Migrant 0.0235 
 
-0.618*** 
 
0.232 
 
(0.0638) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.258) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 10.33 
 
10.33 
 
10.33 
Observations 663 
 
663 
 
663 
            
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian construction growth divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network.    
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Table 1.10: Household education decisions 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: 
Transfer from private to public 
school  
Transfer to cheaper school 
 
Withdrew a member's admission to 
school 
Estimator: OLS-FE FE-RF 2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE FE-RF 2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE FE-RF 2SLS-FE 
            
Migrant -0.0238 
 
0.315 
 
-0.0250 
 
0.496 
 
0.00856 
 
0.324 
 
(0.0366) 
 
(0.357) 
 
(0.0380) 
 
(0.582) 
 
(0.0290) 
 
(0.348) 
Unemployment over distance 
 
-0.0659 
   
-0.104 
   
-0.0677 
 
  
(0.0459) 
   
(0.0733) 
   
(0.0419) 
 
HH members aged<15 -0.0107 -0.0109 -0.0151 
 
-0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0185 
 
-0.0128 -0.0126 -0.0169 
 
(0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0126) 
 
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0154) 
 
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0115) 
HH members aged 65+ 0.0241 0.0264 0.0459 
 
0.0861** 0.0890** 0.120** 
 
0.0784** 0.0786*** 0.0986** 
 
(0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0441) 
 
(0.0368) (0.0367) (0.0606) 
 
(0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0446) 
Female headed household -0.00166 -0.0105 -0.161 
 
-0.0471 -0.0551 -0.292 
 
-0.0188 -0.0123 -0.167 
 
(0.0489) (0.0503) (0.178) 
 
(0.0487) (0.0509) (0.285) 
 
(0.0451) (0.0416) (0.174) 
                        
Annual district nightlights Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic . . 4.03   . . 4.03   . . 4.03 
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,718 
 
1,718 1,718 1,718 
 
1,718 1,718 1,718 
R-squared 0.031 0.030 .   0.064 0.065 .   0.039 0.039 . 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS09 and THPS11. Migrant household status is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network. The instrumental variable is standardized to ease table interpretation. 
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Table 1.11: Household finances 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Remittances 
 
Unsatisfied with financial situation 
 
OLS-FE FE-RF 2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE FE-RF 2SLS-FE 
        
Migrant 0.843*** 
 
0.902*** 
 
0.0505 
 
-0.983* 
 
(0.0283) 
 
(0.0482) 
 
(0.0396) 
 
(0.578) 
Unemployment over distance 
 
-0.189* 
   
0.206*** 
 
  
(0.0958) 
   
(0.0316) 
 
HH members aged<15 -0.00158 0.00969 -0.00235 
 
-0.00888 -0.00852 0.00460 
 
(0.00684) (0.0127) (0.00656) 
 
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0178) 
HH members aged 65+ -0.0365 -0.0883* -0.0327 
 
0.0220 0.0162 -0.0444 
 
(0.0301) (0.0479) (0.0316) 
 
(0.0545) (0.0536) (0.0760) 
Female headed household 0.0261 0.428*** -0.00162 
 
0.0565 0.0729 0.541* 
 
(0.0308) (0.0629) (0.0260) 
 
(0.0590) (0.0630) (0.281) 
                
Annual district nightlights Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic . . 4.03   . . 4.03 
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,718 
 
1,718 1,718 1,718 
R-squared 0.726 0.120 .   0.421 0.422 . 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS09 and THPS11. Migrant household status is 
instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network.  The instrumental variable is standardized 
to ease table interpretation.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Remittance inflows in Tajikistan 
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Figure 1.2: World’s top 15 receivers of international remittances (2005-2015 average) 
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Figure 1.3: Tajikistan sample communities and railroads 
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Appendix A 
No Country for Young Men. 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A.1: Pooled results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Estimator: OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
            
 
Panel A. Schooling outcomes 
 
Dropout 
 
Lagging 
 
Education spending 
            Migrant 0.00453 
 
0.0747 
 
-0.0660 
 
-0.0653 
 
23.85 
 
-42.66 
 
(0.0386) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.0401) 
 
(0.0926) 
 
(39.14) 
 
(217.2) 
            K-P F stat . 
 
15.68 
 
. 
 
15.68 
 
. 
 
15.68 
Observations 1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
R-squared 0.410 
 
. 
 
0.152 
 
. 
 
0.019 
 
. 
                        
            
 
Panel B. Labour outcomes 
 
Working 
 
Idleness 
 
Weekly hours worked 
            Migrant -0.0429 
 
-0.386*** 
 
0.0189 
 
0.184* 
 
-2.136 
 
1.493 
 
(0.0354) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.0396) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(1.661) 
 
(5.940) 
            K-P F stat . 
 
15.68 
 
. 
 
15.68 
 
. 
 
15.68 
Observations 1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
 
1,326 
R-squared 0.103 
 
. 
 
0.238 
 
. 
 
0.068 
 
. 
                        
            
 
Panel C. Labour types 
 
HH farm work 
 
HH business work 
 
Outside HH work 
            Migrant 0.0304 
 
-0.322*** 
 
-0.0329** 
 
-0.216*** 
 
-0.0422 
 
0.148 
 
(0.0247) 
 
(0.0859) 
 
(0.0139) 
 
(0.0438) 
 
(0.0306) 
 
(0.162) 
            K-P F stat . 
 
15.70 
 
. 
 
15.70 
 
. 
 
15.70 
Observations 1,322 
 
1,319 
 
1,322 
 
1,319 
 
1,322 
 
1,319 
R-squared 0.052 
 
. 
 
0.053 
 
. 
 
0.046 
 
. 
                        
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year 
FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network.    
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Table A.2: First stage results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Dependent variable: Migrant household 
 
Intends to migrate 
Sample size: Full 3-wave sample 
 
2007 & 2009 samples 
 
Girls 14-18   Boys 14-18   All 14-18   Boys 14-18 
        
Construction growth / distance 0.133*** 
 
0.128*** 
 
0.0138 
 
0.0148 
 
(0.0415) 
 
(0.0458) 
 
(0.0129) 
 
(0.0426) 
Age 0.453** 
 
-0.144 
 
-0.0882 
 
-0.180 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.0745) 
 
(0.154) 
Age squared -0.0162** 
 
0.00334 
 
0.00245 
 
0.00517 
 
(0.00618) 
 
(0.00748) 
 
(0.00239) 
 
(0.00507) 
HH members aged < 15 0.00444 
 
-0.00166 
 
0.00846 
 
0.0131 
 
(0.0227) 
 
(0.0233) 
 
(0.00869) 
 
(0.0151) 
HH members aged 65+ -0.0105 
 
-0.176** 
 
0.00345 
 
-0.0273 
 
(0.0759) 
 
(0.0884) 
 
(0.00667) 
 
(0.0253) 
Female headed household 0.469*** 
 
0.553*** 
 
0.0289 
 
0.0921 
 
(0.0961) 
 
(0.0860) 
 
(0.0300) 
 
(0.0676) 
                
Annual district nightlights Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 667 
 
659 
 
1,003 
 
497 
R-squared 0.224   0.199   0.044   0.092 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian construction sector growth divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network. The instrumental variable is standardized to ease table interpretation. 
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Table A.3: Responsibility over family chores (in %) – rural households 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Shopping 
 
Fetching water 
 
All 
HHs 
Non-migrant 
HHs 
Migrant 
HHs  
All 
HHs 
Non-migrant 
HHs 
Migrant 
HHs 
Adult males 77.4 79.3 68.7 
 
7.6 8.2 4.6 
Adult females 21.0 19.0 30.0 
 
71.9 71.3 74.6 
Males under 16 y. old 1.1 1.2 0.9 
 
7.9 8.2 6.7 
Females under 16 y. old 0.4 0.5 0.4 
 
9.7 9.4 11.3 
Not applicable 0.1 0.1 0.0 
 
2.9 3.0 2.8 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Panel B 
 
Cooking 
 
Washing and cleaning 
 
All 
HHs 
Non-migrant 
HHs 
Migrant 
HHs  
All 
HHs 
Non-migrant 
HHs 
Migrant 
HHs 
Adult males 3.1 3.2 2.8 
 
4.1 4.5 2.7 
Adult females 90.8 90.8 90.6 
 
84.7 84.6 85.3 
Males under 16 y. old 1.5 1.6 0.9 
 
1.8 2.0 0.7 
Females under 16 y. old 4.5 4.3 5.7 
 
9.3 8.9 11.1 
Not applicable 0.1 0.1 0.0 
 
0.1 0.1 0.2 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Panel C 
 
Keeping and accounting money 
 
Negotiating to get water 
 
All 
HHs 
Non-migrant 
HHs 
Migrant 
HHs  
All 
HHs 
Non-migrant 
HHs 
Migrant 
HHs 
Adult males 71.0 72.1 65.9 
 
77.3 77.7 75.6 
Adult females 28.1 27.0 33.2 
 
19.5 18.9 22.3 
Males under 16 y. old 0.3 0.2 0.5 
 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
Females under 16 y. old 0.5 0.5 0.4 
 
0.5 0.6 0.2 
Not applicable 0.2 0.2 0.0 
 
2.2 2.3 1.4 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number of observations 3,150 2,584 566   3,150 2,584 566 
Notes: Household data from TLSS 2007.  
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Table A.4: Marital status 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
 
Dependent variable:  Being married 
Sample: Girls 14-18 
 
Boys 14-18 
Estimator: OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
 
OLS-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
        
Migrant 0.00108 
 
-0.00286 
 
-0.00253 
 
0.00385 
 
(0.00189) 
 
(0.00336) 
 
(0.00304) 
 
(0.0119) 
                
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic     9.06       27.12 
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Individual FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region*Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 666 
 
666 
 
658 
 
658 
R-squared 0.039   .   0.045   . 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS07, TLSS09 and THPS11. 
Individuals aged 14- to 18-years old. Living in a migrant household is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by 
community distance to end Soviet-era railroad network. The instrumental variable is standardized to ease table interpretation. 
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Table A-5: Descriptive statistics – households 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Transfer from private to public school 1,718 0.131 0.337 
Transfer to cheaper school 1,718 0.148 0.356 
Withdrew a member's admission to school 1,718 0.096 0.295 
Unsatisfied with financial situation 1,718 0.345 0.475 
Migrant 1,718 0.227 0.419 
Remittances 1,718 0.229 0.420 
Number of household members aged 14 or less 1,718 2.375 1.797 
Number of household members aged 65 or more 1,718 0.337 0.605 
Female headed household 1,718 0.174 0.379 
Annual average district nightlights (in log) 1,718 -0.127 1.355 
Number of girls aged 14-18 years 1,718 0.874 1.491 
Sogd region 1,718 0.264 0.441 
Khatlon region 1,718 0.327 0.469 
RRP region 1,718 0.276 0.447 
GBAO region 1,718 0.133 0.339 
Notes: Data from TLSS09 and THPS11.  
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Table A.6: Number of teenage females in the household 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable:  Number of girls aged 14-18 years old in the household 
 
OLS-FE 
 
RF-FE 
 
2SLS-FE 
      
Migrant 0.0623 
   
-0.298** 
 
(0.0588) 
   
(0.141) 
Unemployment over 
distance   
0.0623* 
  
   
(0.0370) 
  
            
Annual district nightlights Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Household FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Time FE Y   Y   Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic         4.03 
Observations 1,718 
 
1,718 
 
1,718 
R-squared 0.046   0.044   . 
Notes: Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from TLSS09 and 
THPS11. Migrant household status is instrumented with Russian unemployment rate divided by community distance 
to end Soviet-era railroad network.  The instrumental variable is standardized to ease table interpretation.  
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Appendix Figures 
Figure A-1: Nightlight density 
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Figure A-2: Soviet railroad network in Central Asia 
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Figure A-3: Unemployment rate and construction sector growth in the Russia 
Federation 
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Chapter 2 
 
Invasive Neighbours. 
Haitian Immigration and Electoral Outcomes in 
the Dominican Republic10. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Anti-foreigner sentiment has been on the rise in several European countries in recent years. 
For instance, one of the major factors behind the Brexit vote of May 2016 has been 
attributed to voters’ perception of immigration. In 2014, East Germany saw the emergence 
of the Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) political movement 
campaigning in favour of a stricter enforcement of Germany’s existing laws on asylum and 
deportation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, immigration and the hostile reactions 
natives may have towards foreigners are not social issues specific to industrialized 
countries. In numerous developing countries such as India and South Africa, immigration 
from poorer neighbours has been triggering hostile and at times violent responses from 
native populations. In younger democracies, violence can sometimes be more pronounced, 
and the rule of law is often less established leading to human rights violations against 
migrants. Yet, little is known on how immigration affects attitudes and election results in 
developing countries. Understanding it is all the more important as political outcomes can 
lead to public policy reforms with long term welfare consequences. This paper fills this gap 
by looking at the effect of immigration in the Dominican Republic (DR). A middle-income 
country located in the Caribbean, the DR provides a very interesting natural experiment 
setting to study the relationship between immigration and the political preferences of 
                                                          
10 This chapter has greatly benefitted from the supervision of Steve Gibbons and Olmo Silva. It has also 
gained from fruitful conversations with Vernon Henderson, Alexander Jaax, Ara Jo, Francisco Lazzaro, 
Lukas Linsi, Covadonga Meseguer, and Nathalie Picarelli. I also wish to thank participants at LSE research 
seminars, the 2nd Workshop on the Economics of Migration at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, the 9th 
World Bank – AFD International Conference on Migration and Development, the 2016 CESifo Junior 
Economist Workshop on Migration Research, the 28th European Association of Labour Economists 
Conference, and the Barcelona Institute of Economics invited seminar for useful and constructive comments.   
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natives. Over the last decades immigration from its neighbour Haiti, with which it shares 
the island of Hispaniola, has soared. Census data from the Office for National Statistics 
reveal that between 2002 and 2010 the official number of Haitians living in the DR 
increased five-fold, increasing the population by nearly 3%. In total, immigrants from Haiti 
represented as much as 81% of the total foreign population at the end of 2010. This 
increase was not evenly distributed across the Dominican territory and resulted in 
significant variation across space. This demographic trend has been accompanied by inter-
ethnic tensions, unlawful and arbitrary deportations, and even a Constitutional amendment 
implicitly aimed at depriving Dominicans of Haitian descent of their Dominican 
nationality.  
This paper addresses the question of whether Haitian immigration has influenced electoral 
outcomes in the DR. To do so, it draws upon a broad range of data sources, including a 
novel municipality-level panel dataset that combines for the first time information from 
various Dominican public databases. The analysis relies on the local outcomes of the 2004 
and 2012 presidential elections, and the 2002 and 2010 congressional elections. Census data 
from 2002 and 2010 provides information on immigrant populations and local municipality 
characteristics. The choice of the study period is dictated by data availability. Using 
municipal-level data is advantageous since municipalities are rather small administrative 
units, implying that individuals are directly exposed to immigrant inflows. The empirical 
investigation is based on a first difference model that allows to difference out all 
unobserved time invariant municipality confounders. The focus on two countries sharing 
one island provides interesting opportunities to identify arguably exogenous sources of 
variation in Haitian migration. To account for the endogenous location decisions of 
migrants, I adopt an instrumental variable (IV) strategy capturing the influence 
demographic push factors have in determining the settlement pattern of Haitian migrants 
in the DR. The first instrument is based on a municipality’s distance to Haiti’s main 
administrative units interacted with population growth in Haiti. The second instrument 
exploits the large exogenous shock of the 2010 Haitian earthquake.  
I find robust evidence of a positive relationship between a higher concentration of Haitian 
immigrants and the vote shares of the right-wing political coalition traditionally opposed to 
immigration. Moreover, I find that the historically more immigration-friendly coalition 
located at the centre of the political spectrum experiences a reduction in electoral support 
in municipalities with larger population shares of Haitians. This holds for presidential and 
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congressional elections. Even though these estimates must be interpreted as reduced form 
relationships between immigrant concentration and electoral outcomes, my estimates still 
have a causal interpretation. To shed light on the channels through which immigration 
affects electoral outcomes, I analyse opinion answers from Vanderbilt’s University 
AmericasBarometer 2010 survey. The empirical evidence based on individual opinions 
suggests that concerns over citizenship, political competition, and cultural identity might be 
the main drivers of the political response of Dominican natives to the immigration of 
Haitians. 
This paper brings together the economics of international migration and the political 
economy of migration. A large number of studies have looked at the consequences of 
immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives (see e.g., Card 2001; Friedberg 
2001; Borjas 2003; Dustmann et al. 2005). In recent years several papers have investigated 
the link between immigration and crime (see e.g., Bianchi et al. 2012; Bell et al. 2013). 
Significantly less research has attempted to understand the political consequences of 
immigrant inflows and a consensus has yet to be found on how immigration affects the 
popularity of different political parties. The papers most relevant to my work are those of 
Halla et al. (2012) looking at Austrian elections, Barone et al. (2016) focusing on Italian 
national elections, and Mayda et al. (2016) studying US votes. These three studies either use 
a shift-share instrumental variable similar to Card (2001) or the inverse distance to origin 
countries to predict the location decisions of immigrant inflows. The focus on migration 
from Haiti only to the Dominican Republic prevents me from adopting these instruments. 
Instead, my analysis relies on two original instruments. The first exploits population growth 
and demographic pressure in Haiti, and the second relies on the distance to the January 
2010 Haitian earthquake epicentre. My empirical findings are robust to the use of these 
alternative instruments. I also assess the sensitivity of my results to alternative validation 
checks and control for bilateral trade proxies, exclude outlier municipalities, and test for 
native flight.   
This paper contributes to the literature on immigration and political outcomes in the 
following ways. It is to the best of my knowledge the first quantitative study of the 
consequences of immigration on electoral outcomes in a developing country. It is also the 
first study looking at an emerging democracy. In both settings political behaviour generally 
differs from European democracies. For instance, voters tend to have less experience with 
party politics and democracy. Combined with weaker rule of law, natives might more 
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readily voice their discontent at foreigners using violence rather than the ballot box. In new 
democracies, new electorates are also unlikely to have long-term party attachments guiding 
their behaviour (Dalton and Klingemann 2011). Electoral choice in the DR involves 
important sociocultural cleavages, such as ethnicity. Moreover, the literature on attitudes 
towards immigration has arguably put too much focus on the experiences of European 
countries (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Second, this paper exploits a rich and entirely 
novel dataset combining decennial census data, election results, and opinion survey 
answers. Third, instead of relying on traditional identification strategies this paper proposes 
a new instrumental variable based on distance and population growth abroad to account 
for the endogeneity of the location decisions of migrants. Fourth, it provides evidence 
using individual opinion survey data on the channels that might be driving the association 
found between immigration and political party performance.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical 
background and reviews the relevant literature on the subject. In the third section, I 
provide some contextual information on the Dominican-Haitian setting. The fourth section 
describes the data used and the identification strategy, while section 5 discusses the main 
empirical results. Section 6 discusses channels and empirical evidence from individual 
opinion survey data. The last section concludes. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background and literature review 
Immigration can impact voting outcomes through two distinct channels. First, when 
immigrants become naturalized and participate in the elections of host countries, they 
directly influence political outcomes. Immigrants can also have an indirect effect by 
affecting the utility of native voters and their preferences towards immigration policy, and 
in consequence the identity of the political party natives decide to cast a vote for (Mayda et 
al. 2016). Only the indirect channel is relevant in the Dominican case as Haitian immigrants 
are de jure banned from obtaining the Dominican citizenship and voting rights.      
Individual preferences over immigration policy are certainly determined by several 
considerations. Scholars have identified various economic and non-economic channels 
through which higher immigration can negatively affect natives’ beliefs and attitudes 
towards foreigners. These channels have in common that they emphasize the potential 
threat that immigration might represent for the economic, political, and cultural interests of 
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natives. Labour market competition is arguably the most obvious of these channels. Native 
workers with similar skills and professional experience as immigrant workers might oppose 
immigration on the ground that foreigners stimulate competition in the labour market, 
which in some cases may translate into reduced wages or higher unemployment. On the 
other hand, native workers with different qualifications than migrants may favour 
immigration to the extent that they complement each other in the labour market and 
production (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; Ortega and Polavieja 2012). Welfare 
state (or fiscal burden) considerations are the other main economic factor that might 
adversely affect the attitudes of natives. Fear of immigration-induced higher tax rates 
and/or reduced amount of public benefits might push natives to become reticent to open-
door immigration policies (Hanson et al. 2004; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Facchini and 
Mayda 2009). Card et al. (2012) stress that immigration can provoke concerns over the 
compositional amenities natives enjoy - such as neighbourhoods, schools, or workplaces. 
In other words, natives might oppose immigration if they see it as a threat to the 
characteristics they appreciate of their local environment. According to the group-conflict 
theory, immigration can also result in greater hostility from natives if the latter perceive 
their culture and identity to be threatened. Central in this theory is the distance between 
hosts and destination countries with respect to norms, values, culture, and ethnicity 
(Dustmann and Preston 2001; Schneider 2008). Natives might also be worried that in the 
longer run naturalized immigrants alter the political balance between parties. In what 
follows I refer to these alternative channels as ‘resource-threat’ theories. 
In contrast, the Contact Theory or Contact Hypothesis argues that proximity and 
interpersonal contact can help reduce prejudice between groups (Haubert and Fussel 2006; 
Carrell et al. 2015). In the original formulation of the contact hypothesis, the capacity of 
intergroup interactions to foster more amicable feelings is contingent on a number of 
factors, including the kinds of persons who are involved, participants’ relative social status, 
as well as the frequency, duration, objective, and intimacy of the interaction (Williams 1947 
p.69; Allport 1954, p.262-3; Katz 1991). In sum, theoretical predictions of what is the effect 
of greater exposure to immigration on natives’ attitudes are a priori unclear. Understanding 
how anti-foreigner sentiment evolves following an influx of migrants in a particular country 
or locality remains an empirical question, the answer of which is ultimately context-specific. 
The empirical literature on the effect of immigration on electoral outcomes is thin. Yet, the 
evidence available so far suggests that in Europe support for more conservative political 
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parties is strengthened by a higher concentration of immigrants. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) 
study the relationship between local immigrant concentration and the success of pro- and 
anti-immigration parties in the German city of Hamburg. Their analysis focuses on local 
city districts over a period during which the city experienced substantial inflows of 
immigrants and asylum seekers. Their fixed-effects results indicate a positive and 
substantial impact of growing shares of foreigners on the political success of extreme right-
wing parties. In addition, they find a negative association between rising concentrations of 
immigrants and electoral support for the Green party, which was the only major party 
promoting liberal immigration and asylum policies during the time of study. Halla et al. 
(2012) find similar results when studying support for the far-right and anti-immigration 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Pooling the outcomes of six national elections at the 
municipality level and relying on a time invariant instrument, the authors find that 
residential proximity with immigrants has a positive effect on the electoral performance of 
the FPÖ. Further, their empirical evidence suggests that it is the presence of low- and 
medium-skilled immigrants that is driving this result. Highly-skilled immigrants have no 
effect on FPÖ votes. Steinmayr (2016) also studies Austria but focuses instead on the 
effect of exposure to refugees on the 2015 state election results. His findings are 
contradictory to those of Halla et al. (2012). Using pre-existing local supply of group 
accommodations as instrumental variable for the spatial distribution of refugees, his results 
suggest that hosting refugees dampens local support for far-right, nationalist, anti-
immigration parties in small rural communities. The discrepancy in the findings of these 
two studies could be explained by the fact that refugees are different from economic 
migrants. Barone et al. (2016) analyse the impact of immigration on the political 
preferences of natives in Italy. Using municipality panel data on national elections and 
migrant past settlement patterns as instrumental variable, they find that in municipalities 
that experienced relatively larger arrivals of immigrants, the electorate has been more 
willing to vote for the centre-right coalition with political platforms less favourable to the 
immigrants. They also find that the gain in votes for the centre-right coalition was 
accompanied with a loss of votes for the centre-left parties. These findings appear to be 
explained by multiple channels, including concerns over cultural diversity, native-
immigrants competition in the labour market and access to public services. Finally, Mayda 
et al. (2016) empirically analyse the impact of immigration to the U.S. on the share of votes 
to the Republican and Democrat parties in recent years. Using variation across states and 
years as well as a novel instrumental variable combining distance and migrant’s historical 
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location patterns, they find that on average immigration to the U.S. has a significant and 
negative impact on the Republican vote share. This average effect is driven by elections in 
the House of Representatives and works through two main channels. While the impact of 
immigration on Republican votes is negative when the share of naturalized immigrants in 
the voting population increases, the impact can be positive when the share of non-citizen 
immigrants reaches a certain threshold above which migration becomes a salient policy 
issue in voters’ minds.  
While there are only few studies that have looked at the relationship between immigration 
and electoral outcomes empirically, the literature on individual attitudes towards 
immigrants and immigration policy has benefitted from a vast amount of contributions 
from economists, political scientists, and sociologists. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) 
provide a thorough review of the subject, and overall find little evidence that individuals 
form their attitudes based on their personal economic situations. The labour market 
competition and fiscal burden hypotheses seem to have failed in most empirical cases. 
Education on the contrary appears as perhaps the most powerful predictor of policy 
preferences. The authors remark that schooling achievement however captures more than 
skills and includes for instance tolerance, political correctness, and taste for cultural 
diversity. On the other hand, concerns about the nation-wide cultural and economic effects 
of immigration appear to be strongly correlated with people views on immigration. Other 
factors that have regularly been found to matter comprise racial prejudice, ethnocentrism, 
political discourse, and the nature of media coverage of immigration issues. Ceobanu and 
Escandell (2010) also review the literature on public attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration. They report that the effect of minority size is ambiguous as some studies have 
found that it has either a positive or negative influence on individual opinions.  
 
2.3 The Dominican-Haitian case 
2.3.1 A brief history of Dominican attitudes towards Haitian migrants 
Haiti and the DR are located on the island of Hispaniola in the West Indies. They share a 
rich, complex, and at times violent history. The eastern part of the island, now the DR, was 
colonized and ruled by Spain for more than two hundred years. Haiti on the western part 
of the island, used to be a lucrative French plantation colony. France set up highly 
extractive institutions in Haiti and imported slave labour on a large scale from Africa 
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during the 18th century. With large territories to administer on the American continent, the 
Spanish crown did not invest as much in the island as France. Haitian slaves revolted in 
1791 and fought for freedom and independence for 13 years. Haiti became the first 
republic of freed slaves in 1804. In 1822 the Haitian army invaded the DR, which had 
obtained its independence from Spain a year earlier. The DR became independent again in 
1844 after 22 years of Haitian occupation. Unlike most countries in the region, the 
Dominican Independence Day celebrates independence from Haiti and not Spain or the 
United Kingdom. Some cultural differences between the two nations persist to this day. 
For instance, Dominicans are Hispanics whereas Haitians speak French and creole 
(Jaramillo and Sancak 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2012). 
The attitudes of Dominicans toward Haitians have their roots in the distant past, and 
Haitian immigrants have suffered from stigmatization in the Dominican Republic for most 
of the last 150 years. This historical stigmatization has been documented by scholars and 
termed ‘anti-Haitianism’ (Howard 2001). Obtaining independence relatively early, Haiti 
invaded (or tried to invade) the DR five times in the course of the 19th century. These 
armed conflicts gave rise to a lasting suspicion of Haiti’s intentions among Dominicans. 
Modern aspects of anti-Haitianism are largely the product of 20th century politics however; 
chiefly the anti-Haiti propaganda of Trujillo’s right-wing dictatorship (1930-1961). During 
that period and subsequently under the rule of Joaquín Balaguer (1960-1962; 1966-1978; 
1986-1996), the Dominican identity was built in good part by differentiating itself from the 
Haitian one. For decades, the DR has celebrated its European and indigenous heritage 
while downplaying its African roots. In contrast, Dominican elites have portrayed Haitians 
as being inferior, black, voodoo practitioners, and culturally African (Sagás 2000; Paulino 
2002). Given the 330 km long and porous border between the two countries, Dominican 
leaders often talk of a silent invasion from Haiti and assert that Haitian immigration 
threatens the “three-pillars” of the Dominican society: Spanish ancestry, Hispanic culture, 
and Catholicism. As a result, a culture of entrenched prejudice against Haitians exists in the 
Dominican Republic (Martin et al. 2002; Howard 2007; Morgan et al. 2011). While anti-
Haitianism used to be promoted by the State under Trujillo’s and to some extent Balaguer’s 
presidencies, nowadays anti-Haitianism is diffused throughout the Dominican society 
mainly by non-state actors such as school textbooks, news media, and ultranationalist 
literature (Sagás 2000; Paulino 2002).  
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2.3.2 Immigration in the Dominican Republic 
Despite the aforementioned widespread resentment, the Dominican economy is highly 
dependent on cheap Haitian labour. From the beginning of the 20th century until the 1980s, 
most of the legal migration from Haiti to the DR was limited to seasonal labour contracts 
to work in the sugar cane cutting industry. Illegal migration must also have occurred during 
that period but limited information is available. Post 1980, with the decline of the sugar 
industry, the diversification of the Dominican economy, and the fall of the Duvalier 
dictatorship in Haiti (which was receiving bribes in exchange for the supply of short-term 
labour migrants), Haitians began to cross the border to work in other sectors – mostly 
agriculture, construction, tourism and services (Martin et al. 2002; Wooding and Moseley-
Williams 2004). 
The Dominican Republic has enjoyed a solid period of economic expansion over the last 
twenty years. It ranked among the fastest growing economies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the 1990s (World Bank 2006). Between 1998 and 2013, real GDP per capita 
grew at an average annual rate of 3.4%. In addition, Dominican democratic institutions 
have remained stable and fairly open over the last 20 years, features which have become 
entrenched in the country’s political culture after a rather politically volatile 20th century. 
Conversely, Haiti has stagnated in terms of income per capita growth and suffered from 
repeated period of political instability (See Figures 1 and 2). The reasons for this drastic 
long-term divergence of fortunes between the two neighbouring nations are still debated. 
Reasons usually put forward include environmental factors, the institutional histories of the 
two countries, the profile and legacy of the two mid-20th century dictators ruling over each 
side of the island, political instability and the contrasted implementation of stabilisation and 
structural market-friendly policies (see e.g., Jaramillo and Sancak 2009; Diamond 2010; 
Acemoglu et al. 2012).  
In practice, the economic divergence between the two countries has encouraged a large 
number of Haitians to cross the border in the hope of finding better economic 
opportunities and living conditions (World Bank 2006). Dominican census figures show 
that between 2002 and 2010, the number of individuals born in Haiti increased five-fold to 
represent 3.3% of the total population and 80.7% of the foreign population by the end of 
the decade (see Table 2.1 and Figure 3). Far behind Haiti in terms of immigrant numbers, 
the other main origin countries contributing to the foreign population living on the 
Dominican soil are the US, Spain, Puerto-Rico, and Venezuela (see Table B.1 in Appendix). 
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Haitian immigrants in the DR tend to settle close to the border, in the northern part of the 
country where sugar, banana and rice are cultivated, in the main urban centres - Santo 
Domingo the capital city and economic centre of the country in the South, and Santiago in 
the West -, and in the Eastern tip of the island where sugar cane grows on large-scale 
plantations and the tourism industry has been booming in recent years (see Figures 4 and 
5). Roughly 60% of Haitian migrants settle in urban areas nowadays. This contrasts with 
the mostly plantation-labour related migration of the first half the 20th century. The Haitian 
immigrant population is also fairly young and mostly comprised of men (see Table B.2 in 
Appendix). About a fourth of Haitian migrants do not know how to read or write, with a 
higher proportion of illiteracy in rural areas where work is generally more physically 
intensive and less demanding in terms of literacy skills. In addition, only a third of the 
migrant population is believed to speak Spanish well. Prior to going abroad, most Haitian 
migrants were idle and living in urban areas. Those who had a job were mainly employed in 
the agriculture, trade, and construction sectors (ONE 2012 National Survey of 
Immigrants).  
Data from the Dominican Office for National Statistics (2012) suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between the population size of the Haitian administrative regions 
(départements) and the number of migrants leaving these regions for the DR. On the other 
hand, there is a negative association between the distance of Haitian regions to the border 
and the number of migrants leaving these Haitian regions. This is clearly shown in Figures 
6 and 7. Proximity to the border is evidently strongly correlated with migration costs.  
Once in the DR, Haitian men are more likely to be working than Haitian women. Marked 
gender differences can also be observed with respect to occupational categories and 
economic sectors. Most Haitian men work as wage-employee, while close to half of the 
working women engage in self-employment. Men tend to work in physically demanding 
sectors (agriculture and construction) whereas women tend to work in the services sector. 
The working conditions of migrants are often quite precarious with a high prevalence of 
temporary work and verbal contracts (ONE 2012 National Survey of Immigrants). 
Discrimination in the workplace is also quite frequent, and the hardest tasks are usually left 
for Haitians (World Bank 2006). Abuses and various forms of discrimination have been 
denounced by non-governmental organisations and human rights groups. For instance, 
Haitian migrants lacking residency permits are regularly deported by Dominican authorities 
without any notice. In addition, while Dominican citizenship is subject to the jus soli 
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principle, in practice children of Haitian migrants born on Dominican soil are often refused 
their rights to citizenship and as a result are denied access to public services such as schools 
(Howard 2001; Amnesty International 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015).        
2.3.3 Dominican politics 
The Dominican Republic has a presidential system of government with independent 
executive and legislative branches. The president and the vice president are directly elected 
in each presidential election. The candidate with at least 50.01% of valid votes is declared 
winner of the election and is elected for four years. If none of the candidates receives a 
majority of the votes in the first round, a second round of voting is held (Nohlen 2005; 
IFES 2015; PDBA 2015). One of the advantages of working with presidential elections in 
the DR is that political platforms focus on nation-wide issues, such as immigration policy. I 
also analyse the effect of Haitian immigration on congressional election results. In the DR 
congressional elections are held in even numbered years not divisible by four, with even-
numbered years divisible by four being reserved for presidential elections. I rely here on the 
2002 and 2010 elections. In congressional elections, voters directly elect both Senators and 
Deputies. The Dominican Constitution vests all legislative power in the Congress, and the 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate are equal partners in the legislative process, i.e., legislation 
cannot be enacted without the approval of both chambers (Nohlen 2005). The Senate 
comprises 32 seats, and its members are elected in single-seat constituencies by simple 
majority vote to serve 4-year terms (one Senator per province). Deputies are directly 
elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and serve 4-year 
terms. In the 2002 election 150 seats were to be assigned in the Chamber of Deputies. In 
2010, there were 183 seats to be allocated. 
The Dominican political system has been dominated by two main parties since the end of 
the 1990s and under the period of study. The PLD (Partido de la Liberación Dominicano) and 
PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) have converged towards the centre of the political 
spectrum since the 1980s. While the two parties are not drastically different in terms of 
policy platforms, the PLD appeals to a more right-wing oriented electorate than the PRD 
(Hartlyn and Espinal 2009; Morgan et al. 2011; Meilán 2014). A few examples from recent 
history help corroborate this point. For instance, Hipólito Mejía, the last PRD member to 
seat in the presidential office, focused on modernizing and improving access to public 
services in poor rural areas during his term 2000-2004 term. His administration also 
established the first social-security type retirement system of the country. His successor, 
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Leonel Fernández from the PLD, focused instead on large infrastructure investments and 
macroeconomic stability during his 2004-2012 rule. He was publicly perceived as less 
attentive to social issues and socioeconomic inequality (Meacham 2013). Evidence on the 
ideology differences of the two parties can be found in the 2010 AmericasBarometer11 opinion 
survey data. On average, a simple t-test of equality of means reveal that PRD sympathizers 
place themselves statistically significantly closer towards the left than PLD sympathizers on 
a 1-10 Left-Right political ideology scale (Appendix Table B.3). The AmericasBarometer 
survey also provides evidence suggesting that PLD sympathisers hold more conservative 
views. For instance, they are more likely to attach importance to religion in their life. They 
are also less likely to have relatives living abroad, possibly making them less sensitive to the 
difficulties migrants face.  
Since none of these parties are usually predicted in opinion polls to win more than 50% of 
votes in the first round, the PLD and PRD are used to form coalitions with smaller parties 
to avoid a runoff election (Hartlyn and Espinal 2009). In 2004 and 2012, the PLD formed a 
coalition with six and thirteen other parties, respectively. The PRD was allied with five 
parties in both elections. Both elections under study were won by the PLD coalition. With 
57.1% of the votes obtained in the first round, the PLD took over power in 2004 from the 
PRD after campaigning on the incumbent dismal economic record (Sagás 2005). In 2012, 
the PLD coalition won by a narrow margin in the first round of the election (51.2%) for 
the third consecutive time (Meilán 2014). In each election, the two coalition groups 
collected more than 90% of the votes (Figure 8). The PLD coalition did well in the North 
and the South of the country in the 2010 elections (Figure 9). Appendix Table B.4 shows 
the composition of each coalition in the 2004 and 2012 presidential elections.  
None of these two parties adopts an explicit pro-Haitian stand. Yet, the PRD has 
historically been seen as less racially prejudiced; in large part because it was led by José 
Francisco Peña Gómez, a descendant of Haitian immigrants, for almost two decades. In 
addition, PRD Antonio Guzmán who led the DR between 1978 and 1982 tried explicitly to 
improve diplomatic relations with Haiti at a time when they were particularly tense. During 
the 2000-2004 presidency when the PRD was in power for the last time in recent history, 
the government announced measures to ease the access of unauthorized Haitian children 
                                                          
11 The AmericasBarometer is a series of surveys of democratic public opinion and behaviour that covers the 
Americas (North, Central, South and the Caribbean). It is managed by the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP), which is hosted by Vanderbilt University. Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org. 
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to primary and secondary schools (Martin et al. 2002; Sagás 2000; Wooding and Moseley-
Williams 2004).  
On the other hand, all the controversial citizenship laws and constitutional amendments 
targeting Haitian migrants were undertaken under recent PLD rule. The August 2004 
General Migration Law introduced a different registration system for the children born in 
the Dominican Republic to foreign women who do not have regular migration status. The 
new law de facto stipulated that children of foreign mothers who had irregular migration 
status at the time of giving birth could no longer be Dominicans. In 2010 the DR revised 
its constitution to grant citizenship automatically only to those children born on 
Dominican soil with parents holding formal legal status. In 2013, the Dominican 
Constitutional Court issued a ruling retroactively denationalizing Dominicans of Haitian 
descent whose parents lacked formal residency permits, extending all the way back to 1929. 
In good part due to the pressure exerted by the international community, a subsequent law 
was passed in 2014 to provide a way to re-claim citizenship for those affected by the 2013 
ruling, but only conditional on being able to prove that parents were in the Dominican 
Republic legally at the time of birth; a conditionality that is hard to meet in practice 
(Amnesty International 2015). Further, in both presidential elections under study the ultra-
nationalist and most vocal anti-immigration Fuerza Nacional Progresista (FNP) party joined 
the PLD coalition. The FNP essentially campaigns on a far-right anti-Haitian migration 
platform. It backed the constitutional amendment stripping Haitian Dominicans of their 
citizenship rights. The FNP has proposed to build a wall along the border with Haiti. It 
also advocates putting in place preferential treatment recruitment practices for 
Dominicans12. As a result, if ‘resource-threat’ theories were to apply in the Dominican case, 
municipalities with a larger population share of Haitian immigrants would be expected to 
show greater support for the migrant-hostile PLD coalition, and less support for the PRD. 
The Contact Hypothesis predicts the opposite. 
Lastly, it is important to note that Haitian immigrants cannot vote in presidential elections. 
In addition, naturalization is not an issue here as successive governments and Dominican 
institutions have literally made it almost impossible for Haitian immigrants to obtain 
Dominican citizenship. A non-negligible share of Dominican natives lacks identity papers 
and the right to vote as well due to the bureaucratic rigidities of the national registration 
                                                          
12 Vinicio Castillo, FNP president, in the Listin Diario (2014): http://www.listindiario.com/puntos-de-
vista/2014/06/09/325153/la-invasion-esta-anunciada.  
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system. The DR actually is one of the Latin American countries with the highest share of 
undocumented natives (Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004; Hartlyn and Espinal 2009). 
 
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
2.4.1 Data sources  
The data used in this part of the analysis comes from two distinct sources. Electoral 
outcomes for the congressional and presidential elections were obtained from the 
Dominican Central Electoral Board. The 2002 and 2010 national census provides 
municipality-level socio-economic indicators, including Haitian population presence. 
Census survey teams carried out field work in October 2002 and December 2010, and 
therefore almost a year after the earthquake for the last census. Appendix Table B.5 reports 
descriptive statistics for some municipality-aggregate variables. On average, over the two 
time periods considered, Haitians (defined as individuals born in Haiti) represents 3.1% of 
the population of Dominican municipalities, but the distribution is far from homogenous. 
In 2002, a few municipalities still have no Haitian migrants. In 2010, a fourth of the 
population of the municipality of La Descubierta are Haitians. Looking at the unemployment 
rate, it can be seen that economic conditions are also quite uneven across the Dominican 
territory.   
Figures 10 and 11 plot the change in the stock of Haitian migrants (in percentage of the 
2002 municipality population) against party vote share variation in presidential elections. 
There appears to be a marked positive association between Haitian immigration and right-
wing PLD coalition vote shares. On the other hand, PRD presidential election results 
display a weak negative association with Haitian immigration. A few municipalities stand 
out as outliers due to the large increase in migrant population recorded over the study 
period. I drop these municipalities from the analysis later on to assess the sensitivity of the 
results to their exclusion.   
2.4.2 Empirical methodology 
To measure the effect of exposure to Haitian immigration on electoral outcomes, I 
estimate long first-difference (FD) equations of the following form: 
𝛥𝑌𝑚,𝑟
𝑗 = 𝛽1.
∆𝐻𝑚
𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1
+ 𝛥𝑋′𝑝−𝑚. 𝛽2 + 𝜑𝑟 + ∆𝜀𝑚,𝑟 (2.1) 
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where 𝛥𝑌𝑚,𝑟
𝑗
 refers to the change in vote share received by political party coalition j in 
municipality m in region r between two elections. The key variable of interest is the change 
in the stock of Haitian immigrants 
𝛥𝐻𝑚
𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1
 and is expressed in percentage of the 2002 
municipality population as is common in the literature. I include a vector of province-level 
covariates net of municipality characteristics 𝑋𝑝−𝑚 to avoid post-treatment bias. It includes 
the dependency ratio defined as the number of individuals aged 0-15 years old and over 65 
years old (in percentage of the total population) to account for a potential demographic 
association between age composition and voting outcomes. The shares of adults with 
secondary and tertiary education are also included to control for the local level of human 
capital available. The unemployment rate is also considered as economic conditions are 
quite likely to influence political preferences. I include information on agriculture and 
manufacturing employment to control for the structure of the local economy. I also control 
for municipality total population. 𝜑𝑟 are region fixed effects and allow to flexibly control 
for unobserved regional shocks13 common to municipalities. 𝛽𝑘 are the parameters to be 
estimated and 𝜀𝑚,𝑟 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
2.4.3 Identification strategy 
Figure 4 above made clear that Haitian migrants do not select their destination 
municipalities at random. Estimating the causal effect of exposure to immigration on 
election results therefore cannot be done with ordinary least squares (OLS). More generally, 
three endogeneity issues prevail: i) reverse causation; ii) omitted variable bias; and iii) 
measurement error. Reverse causation might arise if Haitians decide to settle in localities 
relatively more immigration-friendly. At the same time, the most hostile natives may leave 
host municipalities in response to migrant inflows (Mocetti and Porello 2010; Sá 2014). 
Also, time-varying omitted variables such as local economic shocks could determine at the 
same time the location of immigrants and the political preferences of the Dominican 
population (Zavodny 1999; Åslund 2005). Finally, there are valid reasons to believe that 
some measurement error plagues the data as a large number of Haitian migrants cross the 
border illegally. Official statistics are also thought to underreport the true size of the 
Haitian population living in the DR (World Bank 2006).  
                                                          
13 The DR is divided into ten regions and 30 provinces in my sample. See Figure A.1 in Appendix for a map 
of the ten regions.  
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To address these endogeneity concerns and given the nature of the data and research 
question, I instrument time variation in the migrant stock with push factors variables. It has 
long been established in the migration literature that so-called push factors (demographic, 
socio-economic and political conditions at home) affect individuals’ decisions to emigrate 
(Massey et al. 1993; Özden et al. 2011). They are also less likely to be correlated with 
unobserved destination characteristics.  
The first instrument proposed for the presence of Haitians in each municipality is based on 
the Haitian migration patterns discussed in the previous section. It relies on population 
growth in Haiti and distance measures, two variables which were shown to be associated 
with the size of migrant stocks. The instrumental variable is constructed as follows. First, I 
calculate for each Dominican municipality the distance between its centroid and each 
centroid of the ten Haitian départements. Second, I measure the population size of each 
Haitian administrative unit using 2003 census data and 2009 population estimates produced 
by the Haitian Institute for Statistics14. Third, for every Dominican municipality I divide 
population size in each Haitian department by its distance to the municipality’s centroid. 
Finally, I sum the ratio described above across the ten Haitian départements to obtain an 
instrumental variable, which can be understood as a population distance-weighted average 
(see Figure 12). Formally this instrument 𝑍𝑚,𝑡 can be written as: 
𝑍𝑚,𝑡 =  ∑
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑,𝑡
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚,𝑑
10
𝑑=1   (2.2)  
where 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑡 represents Haitian department d’s census population figures for 
2003 (t=1) and population estimates for 2009 (t=2). The last Haitian population census was 
conducted in 2003 and in 2009 the Haitian Institute for Statistics calculated population 
estimates for the various regions of the country. The percentage point (pp) variation of the 
stock of Haitian migrants in each municipality is thus instrumented with the distance-
weighted change in population in Haiti; with 𝛥𝑍𝑚 defined in Equation (2.3). 
∆𝑍𝑚 =  ∑
∆(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚,𝑑
10
𝑑=1              (2.3) 
An instrumental variable must meet three conditions to be valid. The relevance condition 
states that the instrument must be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable. I 
present in the next sub-section first-stage least squares results showing that the instrument 
                                                          
14 Institut Haïtien de la Statistique et d’Informatique (IHSI). 
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is highly correlated with Haitian immigration to discard weak instrument problems. The 
second condition requires that the instrument must be as good as randomly allocated. Both 
components of the instrument used here, i.e., distance to Haitian departments and 
population growth abroad, can be assumed to be exogenously determined from the 
perspective of a given Dominican municipality. Finally, the exclusion restriction, states that 
the instrument must be exogenous and uncorrelated with any other unobserved 
determinants of the dependent variable, here electoral outcomes (Imbens and Wooldridge 
2007; Angrist and Pischke 2008, p.116). Population growth in Haiti could affect electoral 
outcomes in the Dominican Republic through two other channels than immigration. 
Firstly, as population grows in Haiti, market size increases and that increase could lead 
Dominicans to migrate to Haiti to seize new economic opportunities. As a result, the native 
population left-behind taking part in elections would be a sub-sample (probably less 
Haitians-friendly) of the original Dominican population. However, that argument is 
unlikely to hold in practice for cultural, historical and economic reasons explained earlier. 
In particular, the poor state of the Haitian economy is a strong deterrent for any 
Dominican to cross the border. Indirect evidence supporting this claim can be found in the 
2012 election data. In this election, Dominicans residing overseas were allowed for the first 
time to cast their ballots in 19 voting centres located in countries where the Dominican 
diaspora is deemed sizable enough. While polling stations were opened in the US, Panama, 
Canada, Spain, Venezuela and even Italy, none was opened in Haiti. This confirms that the 
Dominican population present in Haiti is negligible. Moreover, in 2010 the total stock of 
immigrants in Haiti represented less than 0.3% of the Haitian population15. I also directly 
test for (and refutes) internal migration or ‘native flight’ responses in a later section. 
Secondly, population growth in Haiti could create bilateral trade opportunities with the 
Dominican Republic. While Haiti exports virtually nothing to its neighbour according to 
official trade statistics (see Table B.6), Haiti is a non-negligible markets for Dominican 
exports. Through trade-generated employment, Dominicans’ political opinions could be 
affected. The idea of a relationship between trade, tolerance and peace is far from novel 
and can be traced to Montesquieu (1748)16. There is no data on trade with Haiti at the 
province or municipality levels. To account for the potential confounding channel brought 
by trade, in the regressions that are discussed next, in addition to controlling for the local 
                                                          
15 World Development Indicators, 2016. 
16 “Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally 
dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling: and thus their union is 
founded on their mutual necessities.” Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat. “De l’esprit des lois (1748).” 
Chapter II, Book XX. 
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unemployment rate as well as manufacturing and agriculture employment I also run 
regressions including a proxy variable for bilateral trade defined at the provincial level. The 
identification assumption is thus that conditional on the included control variables 
distance-weighted population increase in Haiti has no effect on electoral outcomes other 
than through the share of Haitians present in a municipality’s population.   
The second instrument exploits the 2010 earthquake as source of exogenous variation to 
instrument for the inter-census change in local Haitian immigration. Gröger and 
Zylberberg (2016) and Henderson et al. (2017) have documented a strong link between 
environmental disasters and migration in developing countries. On January 12, 2010 a 
powerful earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti near the capital city 
Port-au-Prince. The quake claimed the lives of 250,000 individuals and displaced more than 
1.5 million inhabitants (Kolbe et al. 2010). The capital city where more than half of the 
country’s GDP was produced suffered substantial devastation and economic activities took 
a massive blow. The DR was not directly affected by the seism. Haitians crossed the border 
with the DR in large numbers as a result. I instrument the change in Haitian migrant 
population stock with the inverse of the distance between a municipality’s centroid and the 
earthquake epicentre (see Figure 13). While distance to the epicentre as a variable is 
undeniably as good as randomly allocated, the exclusion restriction could potentially be 
violated due to some unobservable variables correlated with both proximity to the 
earthquake and political preferences. To address such concerns and test the robustness of 
my results, I run regressions controlling for municipality distance to the border in what 
follows.  
 
2.5 Results  
2.5.1 Presidential and Congressional Elections 
This section discusses the results of the effect of the share of Haitian migrants in the local 
population on electoral outcomes in the DR. I start by looking at the first stages. Table 2.2 
reports first-stage least squares estimates of Equation (2.1) using weighted population 
growth as IV in the first two columns and distance to the 2010 quake epicentre in the last 
two columns. For each instrumental variable, I present first stage results without and with 
region fixed effects. Distance-weighted population is positively and strongly associated with 
Haitian migration. This positive relationship suggests that greater population growth in 
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Haiti is associated with higher migration, which is consistent with the descriptive evidence 
discussed earlier. The second instrument is also positively and statistically significantly 
associated with Haitian immigration. The sign of the coefficient indicates that 
municipalities closer to the epicentre have experienced a larger inter-census increase in the 
stock of Haitian migrants. Adding region fixed effects lowers the power of the two 
instruments but does not invalidate the identification strategy.       
Two-stages least squares estimates of the impact of Haitian population concentration on 
vote shares in presidential elections are presented in Table 2.3. The first three columns 
consider the vote shares of the right-wing PLD coalition as dependent variable. Centre 
PRD coalition votes feature as explained variables in columns 4 to 6. The last three 
columns consider support for the far-right FNP party instead. For each of these three 
outcome variables, I start by presenting first-difference estimates in the first column. I then 
present two-stage least squares results based on the population growth instrument and the 
inverse distance to the epicentre instrument. First-difference (FD) estimates reported in 
column 1 show that Haitian immigration is positively associated with PLD right-wing 
coalition’s vote shares. Comparing estimates of the first column to the second and third, it 
appears that measurement error and reverse causation are biasing first-difference results 
downwards. The 2SLS point estimates of column 2 and 3 are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. According to the results, a one percentage point increase in the 
stock of Haitians living among the municipality population leads to a 1.3 pp increase in the 
vote share of the right-wing PLD coalition. Instead, Haitian immigration is found to have a 
negative effect on support for the PRD-led coalition. The coefficient of column 6 suggests 
that a 1 pp increase in the share of Haitian migrants leads to a reduction of 0.2 pp of the 
centre PRD coalition vote share. The effect is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels however.  
The last three columns show that Haitian immigration has a small but positive and 
significant impact on the popularity of the far-right FNP party. Immigration thus seems to 
create some amount of dissatisfaction among voters who turn to parties with an anti-
Haitian agenda. On the whole, these results are consistent with ‘resource-threat’ theories. 
The local performance of the right-wing political coalition (including the FNP) tends to 
benefit from a larger concentration of Haitian immigrants. Two-stage least squares results 
generally suggest that first-difference estimates are downward biased. Measurement error is 
a likely source driving this bias. As discussed earlier, it is generally believed that Haitian 
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migration statistics are underreported. Assuming bilateral trade reduces prejudice towards 
Haitians, it could also drive the downward bias found in FD regressions. I discuss (and 
address) bilateral trade related sources of bias in greater detail in the robustness check 
section.  
Congressional elections are the focus of Table 2.4. The table is structured in a similar 
fashion as the previous one. The impact of exposure to Haitian immigrants on the vote 
share of the PLD coalition is also positive and statistically significant in 2SLS regressions. 
The magnitude of the effect is larger with a 2.1 pp increase in the vote share for every 1 pp 
increase in Haitian immigration. FD estimates are downward biased again, suggesting that 
measurement error confounds the estimates of column 1. Columns 4 to 6 concentrate on 
PLD coalition support. The effect of exposure to migrants is still negative but becomes 
now significant at the 5% level. This finding is robust to the use of the two instruments. 
There is now more robust evidence that the performance of the centre coalition led by the 
PRD suffers in municipalities with more migrants. The FNP did not run in the 2002 race 
for congress. I cannot use time variation in its local performance here in consequence. 
Overall, these results support the finding that greater exposure to Haitian immigration 
translates into an increase in the popularity of the right-wing coalition parties. The centre-
left coalition is penalised instead.   
Another way through which voters can express their discontent is through abstention. 
Alternatively, some previously inactive voters could decide to cast their ballots when 
unpleased with the country’s immigration policy (Dustmann et al. 2016). To explore if any 
such voter behaviour can be seen in the DR, I perform the same regression analysis as 
earlier with presidential election turnout as outcome variable in what follows. I focus on 
presidential elections as data on turnout in the congress elections is not available at the 
municipality level. The results are shown in Table 2.5. Overall I find no evidence that 
immigration creates some amount of dissatisfaction among voters. Results in the three 
columns show that Haitian immigration has a small and negative but insignificant impact 
on turnout.  
2.5.2 Robustness tests  
In this sub-section, I discuss several sensitivity tests. I begin by trimming off the tails of the 
migrant stock distribution. I exclude the top 5% municipalities that have experienced the 
largest increase in the stock of Haitian migrants over the period. Regression results are 
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shown in Appendix Table B.7. The table is comprised of two panels. Panel A focuses on 
presidential election outcomes, while Panel B concentrates on congressional elections. The 
right-wing PLD coalition vote share is the dependent variable in the first three columns of 
each panel. Votes for the centre-left PRD coalition are analysed in the last three columns. 
For every dependent variable I show FD results as well as 2SLS estimates based on the two 
alternative instrumental variables. The population growth instrument now performs better 
in the first stage as pointed out by the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics shown at the bottom of 
the table. Overall the 2SLS results discussed previously are highly robust. Point estimates 
are somewhat larger than those discussed above. The positive effect of Haitian immigration 
on support for the PLD coalition is always positive and significant at the 5% level for both 
types of elections (columns 2 and 3). On the other hand inflows of Haitian migrants hurt 
the performance of the PRD coalition. The 2SLS estimates are negative but only significant 
for the congressional race.   
As discussed above, bilateral trade is a potential confounder. However, if one makes the 
realistic assumptions that trade and population growth are positively correlated, or that 
trade and border distance are positively associated, and that trade creates more friendly 
attitudes among trade partners, the nature of the bias works against finding a positive 
relationship between immigration and support for the right-wing party. In that sense, my 
2SLS estimates can be considered lower bounds of the true effect of immigration. To 
provide further support for my results, I use a proxy variable to control for bilateral trade. 
Regressions presented in Appendix Table B.8 control for the inter-census change in the 
number of operating special economic zone (SEZ) firms. This variable is defined at the 
province level17 and is obtained from the Office for National Statistics. Special economic 
zones play a very important role in the Dominican economy. In 2008 free zone exports 
accounted for close to 70% of the country’s total merchandise exports (World Bank 2011). 
In 2011 they were employing more than 125,000 individuals and Haiti was their eleventh 
more important export market18 (CNFZE 2012). There is some amount of annual variation 
in the ranking of Haiti as trade partner, and in the previous decade Haiti often figured 
among the top ten export destinations of the DR.  Regression results are barely affected by 
the inclusion of the number of operating SEZ firms despite the reduction in the power of 
the instruments. Haitian immigration is still found to generate an increase in the votes for 
the right-wing coalition (columns 2 and 3) and a reduction in support for the centre PLD 
                                                          
17 There are 30 provinces in the dataset. 
18 As measured by the total number of firms exporting products to Haiti. 
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coalition group (columns 5 and 6) in both presidential and congressional elections. The 
estimated 2SLS coefficients estimates are quite close to those of Tables 3 and 4. 
Having two instrumental variables opens the possibility to estimate overidentified 2SLS 
regression coefficients. Appendix Table B.9 provides such estimates. The table contains 
two panels covering each a different election. The first two columns consider the PLD 
coalition performance. The last two columns concentrate on the PRD coalition. I estimate 
overidentified regressions with 2SLS and the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) estimator. The two instruments taken together have weaker explanatory power 
than when taken individually. The coefficients are highly stable and close to those 
presented in Tables 2 and 3. Using the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
estimator instead of 2SLS does not alter the results and conclusions previously drawn (see 
columns 2 and 4). Sargan tests of overidentified restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  
The two instruments used in the analysis are constructed using distance measures. Despite 
first differencing the data and the inclusion of region fixed effects it cannot be ruled out 
that the instruments capture the confounding influence of unobserved variables whose 
time variation is correlated with distance to the Haitian border. To address such concerns, I 
control for border distance (in km) in Appendix Table B.10. The results are not affected by 
this sensitivity check. Point estimates remain significant and of the same sign. The same 
conclusions can be thus drawn from the estimated coefficients with respect to the influence 
of Haitian immigration on electoral outcomes. My findings are not affected either if instead 
of controlling for municipality population I weight the regressions by the initial 
municipality population recorded in the 2002 census (Appendix Table B.11). 
I apply all these robustness checks to the vote share of the far-right FNP party in Table 2.6. 
In the first two columns of the table, I control for the number of SEZ firms in activity. 
The results of both columns indicate that a 1 pp increase in the share of Haitian migrants 
leads to a 0.11 pp increase in vote share of the FNP. Controlling for distance to the border 
instead does not affect much the previous results. The point estimates are now larger and 
equal to approximately 0.13 pp (columns 3 and 4). In the next two columns I report 
population weighted regressions. The results are essentially unchanged. I take advantage of 
having two instruments and report overidentified regressions in the last two columns. I still 
find a positive and statistically significant effect of immigration on support for the far right 
party.   
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My results could be contaminated by native flight, i.e., the internal migration response of 
Dominican natives. The voters most negatively affected by or opposed to immigration are 
the most likely to leave. Assuming it is the case over the study period, my results would 
likely underestimate the true effect of Haitian immigration on election outcomes in 
consequence. To test for any native mobility response across municipalities, I follow Peri 
and Sparber (2011) and Lewis and Peri (2014) and estimate Equation (2.4) below: 
∆𝑁𝑚,𝑟
𝑃𝑚,𝑟,𝑡−1
=  𝛾1.
∆𝐻𝑚
𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1
+ 𝛥𝑋′𝑝−𝑚. 𝛾2 + 𝜑𝑟 + ∆𝜈𝑚,𝑟 (2.4) 
where 𝛥𝑁𝑚 is the change in native population in municipality m, 𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1 is the initial 
population size of the municipality, and 𝛥𝐻𝑚 is the change in the stock of Haitian migrants 
as defined previously. I abstract from the skill-experience cell dimension typically used in 
the literature on immigration and labour market outcomes because I am interested in the 
whole population and not only the labour force. First-difference and 2SLS results are 
presented in Table 2.7. On the whole the results provide no evidence of any significant 
internal mobility response of natives. The 2SLS estimates are negative and non-significant. 
In other words, the results suggest no significant displacement effect. This is to be 
expected in the Dominican context. Internal migration mainly occurs from rural areas, and 
migrating abroad is a costly and long-term strategy that is unlikely to be related to Haitian 
immigration. Consequently, these findings do not cast doubt on the validity of the analysis 
conducted so far.       
In sum, I find solid evidence of a positive relationship between Haitian immigration and 
support for right-wing and far-right political parties. At the same time higher immigration 
leads to a reduction in the support for centre-left parties. These findings hold for both 
presidential and congressional elections. They are also in line with those of Barone et al. 
(2016) and Dustmann et al. (2016) for the cases of Italy and Denmark. Contrary to these 
two previous studies, I do not find any effect on turnout at the polls in municipalities more 
exposed to migrants inflows.  
 
2.6 Channels  
The association between Haitian immigration and the political success of right-wing parties 
found above could be driven by several channels, including labour market competition, 
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welfare state concerns, compositional amenities, political competition, and perceived 
cultural threat. This section seeks to understand which of these channels are most relevant 
in the Dominican context.  
2.6.1 Channels and elections 
In this section I explore the transmission mechanisms going from immigration inflows to 
native voting behaviour. I rely on interaction terms to provide causal evidence of the 
relevant channels. I consider nine variables measured in the baseline period in levels to 
proxy for initial characteristics. Unless stated otherwise these characteristics are measured 
in 2002 at the province level. I instrument the interaction between Haitian immigration and 
a given channel by multiplying distance to the earthquake with that channel. Second, I look 
at the impact of immigration on natives’ unemployment. 
2.6.1.1 Baseline Municipal Characteristics 
I start by discussing the results of the interactions with baseline provincial or municipal 
characteristics. The results are shown in Table 2.8 where the dependent variable is the vote 
share of the PLD coalition in presidential elections. I begin with municipality population in 
column 1. Supportive of previous results, the baseline coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant. The interaction however is negative and significant, suggesting that the impact 
of migration inflows is weaker or even negative in more populated areas. This is consistent 
with the findings of Dustmann et al. (2016) in Denmark.  
The next two characteristics I focus on are the initial dependency ratio and the population 
share of individuals aged 65 years and above (both from the 2002 census). These measures 
aim at assessing the cultural and the public taxation and services channels. Children and the 
elderly tend to use public services relatively more than the average population. They are 
also eligible to receive various welfare benefits. Older people are also more likely to care 
about Dominican values and culture whereas parents with young children might be afraid 
that exposure to Haitian migrants affects the beliefs and values their offspring are brought 
up with. Despite the possible relevance of this channel, I find that the interactions are 
negative but insignificant suggesting these channels might not be the most pertinent in the 
Dominican context (columns 2 and 3).  
Haitian migrants are predominantly low skilled workers and a large fraction work in 
agriculture. In order to evaluate the labour market competition channel, I focus on three 
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variables: employment in agriculture, the share of adults with a primary education, and the 
unemployment rate. The results in columns 4 to 6 show that the labour market channel 
does not matter much when measured with those variables. While the baseline coefficients 
are positive, the interactions are not. This is not too surprising given the division of labour 
generally in place in the DR. Dominicans tend to stay away from low skilled and physically 
difficult tasks such as construction or plantation work. As a result Haitians do not threaten 
much the labour prospects of natives. 
I concentrate next on political factors. I consider the initial performance of the PLD 
coalition in the 2004 elections (i.e., at the beginning of the timeframe studied). I also look 
at political competition measured as the absolute difference between the vote share of the 
PLD and PRD coalitions in 2004. The higher the value of this variable we can assume the 
lower is the local competition between the two parties. Both these variables are constructed 
at the municipal level. Baseline coefficients in columns 7 and 8 are positive and significant. 
The initial PLD performance interaction is negative and significant suggesting that the 
impact of Haitian migration is higher in places where the PLD did not perform well in 
2004. It is not obvious to provide an explanation for this result. One possibility is that 
voters might believe the PLD to be capable of addressing their migration related concerns 
more when they have no experience with the party. Also, it is possible that voters might 
trust the PLD party discourse on migration and turn to this party following their 
experience with the more liberal PRD. Interestingly, the political competition interaction is 
negative and statistically significant. This implies that in closely contested municipalities 
immigration seems to have a higher impact on PLD coalition support suggesting that 
natives might perceive Haitian migrants as threats to local (and national) political equilibria.                
The last channel I explore is violence and crime. Foreigners might be perceived as more 
likely to engage in petty criminal activities. It is also common for anti-migration 
propaganda to exploit the fear of natives to rally support. I interact Haitian migration with 
homicide rates measured at the province level (per 10,000 inhabitants). I use 2007 data as it 
is the earliest for which homicide statistics are available. The baseline coefficient in column 
9 is positive and statistically significant, but the interaction is not. Despite political rhetoric 
linking immigration and crime, there is no evidence that migration has a different impact in 
more violent provinces. Most Haitians come to the DR to work and find better living 
conditions, and it is unlikely that they engage in criminal activities in a disproportionate 
way.  
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2.6.1.2 Migration & Natives Unemployment  
Finally, to make the most of my municipality panel dataset I evaluate next whether 
immigration has any effect on native unemployment rates. Evidence of a positive effect 
would suggest that the labour market competition channel is still relevant. To be consistent 
with the previous analysis, I follow the area approach in the literature on the labour market 
impact of immigration (see e.g., Dustmann et al. 2005, Lewis and Peri 2014). I estimate 
Equation (2.5) below using the two previously defined instrumental variables, and with 𝐿𝑚 
standing for the unemployment rate of Dominican natives in the municipality. The other 
variables are defined as earlier.   
𝛥𝐿𝑚,𝑟 =  𝜆1.
∆𝐻𝑚
𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1
+ 𝛥𝑋′𝑝−𝑚. 𝜆2 + 𝜑𝑟 + ∆𝜍𝑚,𝑟  (2.5) 
The results are displayed in Table 2.9. The first column shows first difference estimates. 
Columns 2 and 3 contain 2SLS estimates from the main specification based on the two 
different instruments. The next two columns control for SEZ firms, while the last two 
columns include distance to the border in the list of covariates. The association between 
Haitian migration and unemployment in column 1 is negative and insignificant. This 
negative association is likely to be partly driven by reverse causation with Haitian 
immigrants settling in municipalities with buoyant labour markets. The 2SLS estimates 
based on the preferred specification in columns 2 and 3 change sign. They are positive but 
not significant. Results from alternative specifications in the next columns are similar in 
substance. Overall, there is no evidence of Haitian immigration harming the labour market 
prospects of Dominican natives. These results add evidence and further cast doubt on the 
validity of the labour market channel in explaining the electoral results of section 5. 
Given the limited power of the identification strategy in this section so far, I rely on 
opinion survey data in the next sub-section to provide more evidence on the mechanisms 
driving the association between immigration and electoral outcomes.   
2.6.2 Opinion survey data 
The analysis conducted here is more of a descriptive nature and relies on the 2010 wave of 
the AmericasBarometer - Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys collected 
by Vanderbilt University. The nationally representative survey interviews about 1,500 
Dominicans about their opinions regarding a wide range of political and social issues. 
Information on the socio-economic characteristics of respondents is also collected. Of 
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particular interest, the 2010 wave contains a battery of questions regarding Haitian 
immigration and information on the municipality of residence of respondents. It also asks 
respondents which party they would vote for if congressional elections were held on the 
interview day.  
2.6.2.1 Methodology  
To the greatest extent possible, I follow the approach of Dahlberg et al. (2012) who analyse 
the effect of ethnic diversity on preferences for redistribution in Sweden. I estimate linear 
probability model equations of the following form by 2SLS: 
𝐴𝑖,𝑚,𝑟 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1.
𝐻𝑚
𝑃𝑚
+ 𝐶′𝑖,𝑚. 𝜇2 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑚,𝑟  (2.6) 
where i, m, and r denote individuals, municipalities, and regions respectively. 𝐴𝑖,𝑚,𝑟refers to 
individual attitudes towards migrants or party preferences. 𝐶𝑖,𝑚 is a vector of individual and 
municipality covariates, 𝜑𝑟 are region fixed-effects, 𝜇𝑘 are the parameters to be estimated, 
and 𝜂𝑖,𝑚,𝑟 is the error term. I estimate heteroskedasticy-robust standard errors clustered at 
the municipality level.  
As before, the results obtained from estimating Equation (2.6) with OLS are certain to 
suffer from endogeneity issues. In an attempt to address these issues, the share of Haitians 
in the municipality population 
𝐻𝑚
𝑃𝑚
 is instrumented with the inverse distance from the 
municipality centroid to the border with Haiti. While the instruments in the previous 
section were instrumenting changes, here an instrument for the levels is needed. The 
identifying assumption is that distance to the border has no effect on individual attitudes 
and voting intentions other than through the share of Haitians in the local population after 
controlling for region fixed effects and covariates. This is a rather strong assumption. 
Proximity to Haiti could be correlated with trade. Assuming trade and attitudes towards 
foreigners are positively correlated, my results could be underestimated. The results I 
discuss next are robust to controlling for the number of SEZ firms in operation. Proximity 
might also have a direct effect on attitudes towards Haitians, and in the regions near the 
border especially. Given the theoretical ambiguity with respect to the role of exposure and 
proximity in ‘group threat’ theories and the Contact Hypothesis, it is hard to anticipate the 
direction of any possible bias. The inclusion of region fixed-effects reduces the likelihood 
of bias however. First-stage least squares results indicate that distance to the border does a 
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reasonable job at predicting Haitian immigrant concentration with F-statistics on the 
excluded instrument ranging from 7.10 to 9.62 depending on the sample size (Appendix 
Table B.13).  
2.6.2.2 Data  
I focus on seven highly relevant survey questions to try to identify the channels at play. The 
first question deals with the issue of citizenship and asks respondents: “Do you agree with 
the children of Haitian immigrants born in the DR being Dominican citizens?” Answers 
can range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). I dichotomise this variable with 
values {1,2,3} being now equal to 1 and the remaining answer values {4,5,6,7} set to 0. The 
new dummy variable effectively measures opposition to granting citizenship to Haitian 
second generation immigrants. The second question focuses on access to public services 
and asks: “Do you agree with the Dominican government offering social services to 
undocumented migrants?” Responses can vary between 1 (strongly agree) and 5 (strongly 
disagree). Once again? I dichotomise this variable with values {4,5} set to 1 and the rest 
{1,2,3} to 0. I also create a binary variable from the answers to the question: “The 
government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich 
and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”. Answers 
again range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and I assign a value of 1 to the 
responses {1,2,3}, and 0 otherwise. Next, I consider a question looking at immigrants and 
job competition. The phrasing goes as follows: “In general, would you say that people from 
other countries coming to live here do jobs Dominicans don’t want to do (1), or take jobs 
away from Dominicans (2)?”  I rescale the answers of the question to obtain an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if respondents believe Haitian migrants take jobs away from 
Dominicans, and zero otherwise. In addition, I exploit the responses to the following 
question on work permits: “To what extent do you agree with the government granting 
work permits to undocumented Haitians living in the Dominican Republic - 1 (strongly 
disagree); 7 (strongly agree)?”. I dichotomize again the answers given to create a variable 
capturing opposition to work permits provision. All the binary indicators created so far are 
scaled to measure anti-Haitian attitudes, i.e., a value of 1 means more antagonistic attitudes. 
I also include a question on insecurity phrased as follows: “Speaking of the neighbourhood 
where you live and thinking about the possibility of being the victim of an assault or 
robbery, do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure or very insecure?” I 
create a dummy equal to 1 for respondents feeling somewhat insecure or very insecure. 
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Last but not least, I take advantage of the following question: “If the congressional 
elections were held today, who would you vote for: PLD, PRD, others?” Based on answers 
provided, I create two indicator variables equal to one if the respondent stated voting for 
the PLD or the PRD, and zero otherwise. Appendix Table B.13 presents descriptive 
statistics of these variables. In the sample, 46.3% of the respondents declare disagreeing 
with second generation immigrants being Dominicans. Another 33.4% disagree with 
undocumented migrants accessing social services, while 40.7% think immigrants take 
natives’ jobs. More than half of the respondents say they would vote for the PLD and only 
a fourth support the PRD.  
To explain attitudes and voting intentions, I control for a set of explanatory variables 
commonly used in the literature on attitudes towards immigration (see e.g., O’Rourke and 
Sinnott 2006; Facchini et al. 2013). I try to use parsimony in the selection of controls and I 
restrict the list to covariates that are arguably the most exogenous. These consist of 
demographic characteristics, religious belief19, and ethnicity controls. Summary statistics of 
these variables can also be found in Appendix Table B.12. In the sample, more than 67% 
of individuals self-identify as Mestizo, and another 10% identify as Black. Whites and 
Mulattos both represent about 10% of the sample. Only 1% does not identify as part of 
one of these four groups and is likely to be comprised of ethnic Chinese, Syrians and 
Lebanese. The average interviewed individual is 41 years old, has completed close to nine 
years of education, and lives in a household with three children. Half of the respondents 
are women (51.0%), slightly more than a fourth live in rural areas, and 22.5% report being 
married. In terms of religious beliefs, more than 60% of the individuals are Roman 
Catholics. Evangelists and Protestants respectively constitute 18.1% and 5.5% of the 
respondents. This is line with national averages. 
2.6.2.3 Findings  
Results on voting intentions are reported in Table 2.10. The first two columns consider 
voting intentions for the PLD as explained variable. The last two columns focus on 
intentions to vote for the PRD. For each dependent variable I report OLS and 2SLS 
estimates. Haitian migrant concentration appears to have a strong, positive and statistically 
significant effect on the probability to vote for the migrant-hostile PLD. The coefficient 
point estimates indicate that a 1 pp increase in the share of Haitians in the municipality 
                                                          
19 Exposure to migrants could affect religious beliefs. The results in this section are robust to the exclusion of 
religion related covariates.   
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population is linked with a 13.6 pp higher probability of supporting the right-wing PLD. 
On the contrary, higher migrant presence is associated with a lower probability of 
supporting the PRD. These results are consistent with the previous findings reported in 
section 5. The 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS estimates in both cases. This finding 
can be explained by attenuation bias stemming from measurement error as well as reverse 
causation with migrants avoiding highly hostile municipalities.   
Table 2.11 reports the estimated effect of Haitian immigration on attitudes. I begin with 
the labour market channel. Greater migrant concentration is found to have a positive and 
significant effect at the 10% level on the likelihood of believing that immigrants take jobs 
from natives. However, exposure to immigration does not affect views on work permits 
provision (columns 1 to 4). Again the evidence in favour of this channel is weak at best. 
Looking at the welfare state channel next, Haitian concentration does not appear to 
influence opinions on whether undocumented migrants should be allowed to access social 
benefits. It does not affect preferences towards redistribution either (see columns 5 to 8). 
This is perhaps not too surprising since Haitians have been excluded so far from the 
provision of most social services. As such, immigrants do not represent a threat to natives’ 
access to welfare programs. Opinions on the citizenship rights of second generation 
Haitian immigrants are found to be strongly influenced by the local presence of Haitians. 
Greater migrant concentration is associated with a higher and statistically significant 
probability of disagreeing with granting citizenship on jus soli grounds to children with 
Haitian parents (column 9). This suggests natives might worry about the influence Haitians 
could have on political outcomes and cultural identity in the long run. Lastly, exposure to 
Haitians does not appear to affect feelings of insecurity. This is consistent with the earlier 
results.  
In sum, these results tend to confirm the previous findings based on election results and 
interaction terms. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data analysed in this section and 
the various issues characterising opinion surveys (see e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2001), the evidence presented in this section is not as solid as the election results described 
earlier. Some interesting patterns still emerge from the data and suggest that the welfare 
state channel might not be the primary concern driving attitudes towards Haitian migrants 
and electoral preferences. Labour market competition is found to have an ambiguous 
influence on individual attitudes but overall does not seem to be the primary concern of 
Dominicans either. Citizenship rights, political equilibria, and plausibly cultural identity 
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seem to be the most important channels shaping Dominican electoral behaviour and 
individual attitudes. This result is consistent with anecdotal evidence and findings reported 
by anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists studying the Dominican case (see 
e.g, Sagás 2000; Howard 2001; Morgan et al. 2011). Finally, the PLD and its coalition seems 
to be seen as the political party natives turn to in order to express their concerns over 
Haitian immigration and citizenship issues.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper analyses the impact of immigration on electoral outcomes in the DR. In recent 
years the DR has experienced large inflows of immigrants from neighbouring Haiti. 
Immigration is also a highly salient issue in the country and as such this setting offers a very 
exciting context to study this question. The analysis is based on a municipality panel dataset 
comprising presidential and congressional elections results as well as two census waves. I 
account for the endogeneity of Haitian immigrant location decisions with two different 
instrumental variables exploiting exogenous migration push factors.  
I find robust evidence that immigration impacts voting behaviour and election results. In 
municipalities with larger stocks of Haitian migrants, natives are more inclined to vote for 
the right-wing coalition characterized by a more negative stance towards Haitians. The 
popularity of the main far right political party also increases in such municipalities. At the 
same time, greater population diversity has a significantly negative effect on the electoral 
success of the main rival coalition party with a centre-left political agenda. The analysis of 
mechanisms based on election data and opinion surveys suggests that the main channels 
through which immigration impacts voting are citizenship rights and political competition, 
as well as cultural identity. 
These results suggest that the spatial distribution of Haitian migrants may have important 
consequences in terms of local political outcomes and the degree of hostility of natives 
towards foreigners. Given the importance of Haitian migrants for the proper functioning 
of the Dominican economy, results here underline the risk of inflammatory anti-migrant 
political rhetoric and policies. Further, the paper provides empirical evidence that 
immigration is not only a salient social issue specific to developed countries. It shows that 
in developing countries, voters tend to behave in a similar manner as in industrialised 
countries when exposed to migrant populations. In terms of external validity, it speaks to 
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other democratic developing countries experiencing immigration from countries with 
cultural and linguistic differences. Overall, I shed light on an important social consequence 
of immigration and open the door to further analysing it in developing country settings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
2.8 Main Tables & Figures 
 
Tables  
 
Table 2.1: Immigration in the Dominican Republic 
 
 
2002 
 
2010 
    
 
Total country population 
Total Dominican population 8,562,541 
 
9,445,281 
Born in the DR 8,466,308 
 
9,058,779 
Foreign-born 96,233 
 
386,502 
    
 
Haitian immigrant population in the DR 
Born in Haiti 61,863 
 
311,969 
Share of total country population 0.72% 
 
3.30% 
Share of immigrant population 64.28%   80.72% 
Data source: ONE 2002 and 2010 national censuses 
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Table 2.2: First stage least squares results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Dependent variable: Haitian migrants stock (%) 
 
        
IV: distance weighted population growth 0.581*** 0.748** 
  
 
(0.144) (0.289) 
  
IV: inverse distance to quake epicentre 
  
1.190*** 1.534*** 
   
(0.295) (0.534) 
Dependency ratio (%) -1.345*** -0.413 -1.586*** -0.273 
 
(0.406) (0.440) (0.372) (0.485) 
Secondary education (%) -0.551** 0.0115 -0.578** 0.0522 
 
(0.255) (0.390) (0.243) (0.368) 
Tertiary education (%) -1.834*** -1.420*** -2.052*** -1.518*** 
 
(0.416) (0.448) (0.400) (0.463) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.163 -0.0726 0.0212 -0.0548 
 
(0.143) (0.183) (0.135) (0.167) 
Agriculture employment (%) -0.352*** -0.195 -0.424*** -0.244* 
 
(0.107) (0.125) (0.117) (0.135) 
Manufacturing employment (%) -0.338*** -0.477*** -0.375*** -0.472*** 
 
(0.114) (0.107) (0.109) (0.110) 
Municipality population (000’s) 0.0161*** 0.0187*** 0.0161*** 0.0184*** 
 
(0.00470) (0.00455) (0.00429) (0.00434) 
          
IV F-statistic 16.25 6.69 16.32 8.24 
Region FE   Y   Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134 134 134 
R-squared 0.642 0.728 0.668 0.740 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican National Office for 
Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.3: Presidential Election Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
PRD coalition vote share 
 
FNP vote share 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
            
Haitian immigrants 0.289 1.643** 1.347** 
 
0.194 -0.331 -0.226 
 
0.0213 0.111* 0.113* 
 
(0.217) (0.646) (0.553) 
 
(0.132) (0.405) (0.371) 
 
(0.0179) (0.0636) (0.0584) 
Dependency ratio (%) -1.638* -0.316 -0.605 
 
-0.240 -0.754 -0.650 
 
-0.0690 0.0185 0.0200 
 
(0.982) (1.143) (1.087) 
 
(0.708) (0.713) (0.697) 
 
(0.0903) (0.125) (0.120) 
Secondary education (%) -1.411** -1.681* -1.622* 
 
0.333 0.437 0.416 
 
-0.0461 -0.0639 -0.0642 
 
(0.682) (1.016) (0.915) 
 
(0.532) (0.645) (0.612) 
 
(0.0737) (0.0694) (0.0699) 
Tertiary education (%) -0.538 1.327 0.920 
 
1.693*** 0.969 1.115* 
 
0.0245 0.148 0.150 
 
(0.738) (1.083) (0.981) 
 
(0.559) (0.694) (0.661) 
 
(0.0887) (0.134) (0.128) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.276 0.385 0.361 
 
-0.185 -0.228 -0.219 
 
0.0102 0.0175 0.0176 
 
(0.226) (0.382) (0.341) 
 
(0.200) (0.232) (0.221) 
 
(0.0280) (0.0335) (0.0336) 
Agriculture employment (%) -0.250 -0.0608 -0.102 
 
-0.128 -0.202 -0.187 
 
-0.0222 -0.00964 -0.00942 
 
(0.253) (0.326) (0.299) 
 
(0.216) (0.211) (0.205) 
 
(0.0208) (0.0228) (0.0220) 
Manufacture employment (%) -0.243 0.498 0.336 
 
-0.0530 -0.341 -0.283 
 
0.0202 0.0692 0.0701 
 
(0.214) (0.382) (0.334) 
 
(0.170) (0.230) (0.218) 
 
(0.0269) (0.0515) (0.0487) 
Municipality population (000's) -0.0206 -0.0460** -0.0405** 
 
0.00813 0.0180 0.0160 
 
-0.000181 -0.00186 -0.00189 
 
(0.0132) (0.0197) (0.0179) 
 
(0.0147) (0.0171) (0.0165) 
 
(0.00114) (0.00169) (0.00161) 
                        
IV: population growth Y 
   
Y 
   
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
   
Y 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   6.69 8.24     6.69 8.24     6.69 8.24 
Region FE Y Y Y    Y Y Y    Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 
 
134 134 
  
134 134 
  
134 134 
R-squared 0.474      0.846      0.160   
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See 
text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.4: Congressional election results 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
PRD coalition vote share 
  FD FD-2SLS   FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.432 2.165** 2.085** 
 
0.00765 -1.220** -0.974** 
 
(0.392) (0.857) (0.839) 
 
(0.142) (0.578) (0.474) 
Dependency ratio (%) -5.419** -3.727 -3.805 
 
0.572 -0.627 -0.386 
 
(2.215) (2.575) (2.560) 
 
(0.950) (1.125) (1.066) 
Secondary education (%) -0.522 -0.867 -0.851 
 
0.284 0.528 0.479 
 
(1.103) (1.355) (1.322) 
 
(0.605) (0.746) (0.678) 
Tertiary education (%) -0.00665 2.381 2.270 
 
0.354 -1.337 -0.998 
 
(1.572) (1.996) (1.977) 
 
(0.791) (1.044) (0.941) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.425 -0.285 -0.291 
 
0.141 0.0415 0.0614 
 
(0.478) (0.622) (0.618) 
 
(0.221) (0.341) (0.310) 
Agriculture employment (%) 0.0841 0.326 0.315 
 
-0.451** -0.622** -0.588** 
 
(0.439) (0.543) (0.537) 
 
(0.224) (0.295) (0.271) 
Manufacturing employment (%) -1.080*** -0.131 -0.175 
 
-0.273 -0.946** -0.811** 
 
(0.355) (0.614) (0.598) 
 
(0.206) (0.386) (0.325) 
Municipality population (000's) -0.0719** -0.104*** -0.103*** 
 
0.0308*** 0.0538*** 0.0492*** 
 
(0.0280) (0.0306) (0.0299) 
 
(0.0116) (0.0152) (0.0136) 
                
IV: population growth 
 
Y 
   
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   6.69 8.24     6.69 8.24 
Region FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Number of observations 134 134 134 
 
134 134 134 
R-squared 0.910     0.480   
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for 
Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5: Presidential election turnout 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Dependent variable: Turnout 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
    
Haitian immigrants -0.0434 -0.171 -0.195 
 
(0.0490) (0.141) (0.125) 
Dependency ratio (%) 0.907 0.782 0.758 
 
(0.580) (0.586) (0.582) 
Secondary education (%) 0.479 0.505 0.509 
 
(0.403) (0.383) (0.386) 
Tertiary education (%) -0.00412 -0.180 -0.213 
 
(0.307) (0.345) (0.334) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.168** -0.178*** -0.180*** 
 
(0.0811) (0.0688) (0.0679) 
Agriculture employment (%) -0.0900 -0.108 -0.111 
 
(0.0734) (0.0724) (0.0731) 
Manufacturing employment (%) -0.102 -0.172** -0.186** 
 
(0.0760) (0.0730) (0.0753) 
Municipality population (000's) 0.000708 0.00310 0.00356 
 
(0.00357) (0.00410) (0.00390) 
        
IV: population growth 
 
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   6.69 8.24 
Region FE Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134 134 
R-squared 0.515 
  
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central 
Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for 
definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.6: FNP vote - sensitivity checks 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Sensitivity check: 
Special Economic 
Zone firms  
Distance to the 
border  
Weighted  
regressions  
Overidentified 
regressions 
 
2SLS 
 
2SLS 
 
2SLS 
 
2SLS LIML 
            
Haitian immigrants 0.112* 0.113* 
 
0.128* 0.126** 
 
0.135 0.144* 
 
0.114** 0.114** 
 
(0.0652) (0.0595) 
 
(0.0692) (0.0636) 
 
(0.0881) (0.0864) 
 
(0.0569) (0.0569) 
                        
IV: population growth Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
 
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. 6.24 7.77   7.91 10.22   5.65 5.43   4.30 4.30 
Region FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Covariates Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Nb of municipalities 134 134   134 134   134 134   134 134 
Notes: Dependent variable is FP vote share in presidential elections. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican 
Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.7: Native flight regressions 
 
  (1)   (2) (3) 
 
Dependent variable: Native population 
  FD   FD-2SLS 
     
Haitian immigrants 0.461 
 
-1.271 -0.540 
 
(0.456) 
 
(1.031) (0.947) 
          
IV: distance population growth 
  
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic     6.69 8.24 
Region FE Y 
 
Y Y 
Covariates Y   Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 
 
134 134 
R-squared 0.445       
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central 
Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for 
definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.8: Immigration and local characteristics 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
                  
Haitian immigrants 1.311** 2.457 4.433 1.849*** 4.140 2.488 8.109*** 1.538*** 1.320** 
 
(0.512) (1.824) (4.445) (0.715) (4.460) (1.660) (1.097) (0.582) (0.592) 
Haitian imm. * municipality population -0.00776*** 
        
 
(0.00250) 
        
Haitian imm. * elderly population 
 
-0.167 
       
  
(0.299) 
       
Haitian imm. * dependency ratio 
  
-0.0671 
      
   
(0.0984) 
      
Haitian imm. * agriculture employment 
   
-0.0313 
     
    
(0.0295) 
     
Haitian imm. * primary education 
    
-0.0582 
    
     
(0.0933) 
    
Haitian imm. * unemployment rate 
     
-0.0588 
   
      
(0.0815) 
   
Haitian imm. * initial PLD coalition vote 
      
-0.178*** 
  
       
(0.0336) 
  
Haitian imm. * political competition 
       
-0.112*** 
 
        
(0.0208) 
 
Haitian imm. * homicide rate 
        
-0.0593 
         
(0.251) 
                    
Cragg-Donald F statistic 11.47 13.36 7.33 11.76 11.87 7.07 6.28 8.79 2.97 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 4.01 5.31 7.46 4.14 4.21 5.31 5.64 4.11 2.55 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE). See text for definition of 
covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.9: Native unemployment rate 
 
  (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7) 
Specification: 
Main  
specification  
Main  
specification  
SEZ  
firms  
Distance to the 
border 
  FD   FD-2SLS   FD-2SLS   FD-2SLS 
           
Haitian immigrants -0.0236 
 
0.280 0.104 
 
0.299 0.116 
 
0.104 -0.0432 
 
(0.0925) 
 
(0.270) (0.222) 
 
(0.279) (0.223) 
 
(0.220) (0.203) 
                      
IV: population growth 
 
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic     6.69 8.24   6.24 7.77   7.91 10.22 
Region FE Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Covariates Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134   134 134   134 134   134 134 
Notes: Dependent variable is native unemployment rate. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: 
Dominican Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of 
covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.10: Opinion survey - voting intentions 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Dependent variable: PLD vote 
 
PRD vote 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.00652 
 
0.136*** 
 
-0.0137* 
 
-0.115*** 
 
(0.00778) 
 
(0.0410) 
 
(0.00733) 
 
(0.0336) 
                
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic     7.10       7.10 
Observations 1,154 
 
1,154 
 
1,154 
 
1,154 
R-squared 0.036       0.039     
Notes: OLS and 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. LAPOP 2010 individual 
opinion survey. Haitian immigrant population instrumented with inverse distance to border. Variables described in text. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2.11: Opinion survey - channels 
 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Channels: Labour market competition 
 
Welfare state - tax burden 
 
Citizenship and 
identity  
Violence and 
insecurity 
Dependent variable: Job competition 
 
Work permits 
 
Public services 
 
Redistribution 
 
Citizenship  
 
Insecurity 
 
OLS 2SLS 
 
OLS 2SLS 
 
OLS 2SLS 
 
OLS 2SLS 
 
OLS 2SLS 
 
OLS 2SLS 
                  
Haitian migrants -0.00400 0.0387* 
 
0.00962 -0.0466 
 
0.00640 -0.000323 
 
-0.00103 0.0121 
 
0.00889 0.0560** 
 
-0.0132 0.0109 
 
(0.00681) (0.0213) 
 
(0.00757) (0.0306) 
 
(0.00706) (0.0190) 
 
(0.00341) (0.0108) 
 
(0.00743) (0.0237) 
 
(0.00877) (0.0225) 
                                    
Covariates Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Region FE Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
K-P F-stat. 9.62     7.49     9.07     9.61     7.44     8.70 
Observations 1,317 1,317 
 
1,395 1,395 
 
1,396 1,396 
 
1,375 1,375 
 
1,399 1,399 
 
1,418 1,418 
R-squared 0.070     0.054     0.060     0.029     0.065     0.034   
Notes: OLS and 2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. LAPOP 2010 individual opinion survey. Haitian immigrant population instrumented with inverse distance to 
border. Variables described in text. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Growth divergence 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Political (in)stability 
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Figure 2.3: Haitian population growth 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Haitian immigrant population per destination municipality (2010 
Census) 
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Figure 2.5: Haitian immigrant population per destination municipality (2010 
Census) 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Haitian emigration (1/2) 
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Figure 2.7: Haitian emigration (2/2) 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Presidential election outcomes 
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Figure 2.9. 2012 Presidential election outcomes 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Right-wing vote shares and Haitian immigration 
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Figure 2.11: Centre coalition vote shares and Haitian immigration 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Haitian départements and Dominican municipalities 
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Figure 2.13: January 2010 earthquake instrumental variable  
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Appendix B  
Invasive Neighbours. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table B.1: Origin of immigrants – Top ten source 
countries 
 
  Number of migrants 
Haiti 311,969 
US 24,457 
Spain 6,691 
Puerto-Rico 5,763 
Venezuela 5,132 
Cuba 3,639 
Italy 3,595 
Colombia 3,416 
France 1,936 
Germany 1,574 
Data source: ONE 2010 Census. 
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Table B.2: Summary statistics – Dominican natives and Haitian 
immigrants 
 
  Dominicans Haitians 
Demographics: 
  
Age 28.5 29.4 
 
(20.5) (14.2) 
Female (%) 50.3 37.6 
Urban status (%) 74.7 59.6 
Years of schooling (16-64 population) 8.8 4.2 
 (4.9) (4.6) 
Secondary education completed (%, 16-64 population) 26.4 8.6 
Tertiary education completed (%, 16-64 population) 9.4 1.1 
Employed (%, 16-64 population) 48.4 59.3 
Unemployed (%, 16-64 population) 9.1 8.3 
Inactive (%, 16-64 population) 41.1 31.3 
Occupational composition of employment (%): 
  
Legislators, senior officials and managers 2.1 0.3 
Professionals 6.5 0.7 
Technicians and associate professionals 6.4 0.9 
Clerks 8.2 0.9 
Service workers and shop and market sales 25.5 17.9 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 6.3 18.5 
Crafts and related trades workers 14.6 22.2 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 10.8 2.5 
Elementary occupations 18.6 36.1 
Armed forces 1.0 0.0 
Industrial composition of employment (%): 
  
Agriculture, fishing, and forestry 8.4 35.1 
Manufacturing 12.9 8.0 
Construction 6.0 20.1 
Wholesale and retail trade 24.3 18.4 
Hotels and restaurants 4.8 3.3 
Transportation and communications 6.4 1.5 
Public administration and defence 5.1 0.3 
Education 5.1 0.8 
Private household services 8.7 7.7 
Other 18.4 4.8 
Data source: 2010 census. 
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Table B.3: Value differences between PLD and PRD sympathisers 
 
 
PRD sympathisers 
 
PLD sympathisers 
 
Mean differences 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
|t-test| 
 
p-value 
Political ideology 1-10 scale [1=far-left ; 10=far-right] 6.103 
 
185 
 
7.245 
 
441 
 
4.55 
 
0.000 
Religion importance in one's life 1-4 scale [1=not at all; 4=very] 2.635 
 
222 
 
2.732 
 
530 
 
1.89 
 
0.059 
Self-identify as 'having a black skin'  [1=yes ; 0=no] 0.104 
 
221 
 
0.069 
 
524 
 
1.63 
 
0.103 
Family abroad [1=yes ; 0=no] 0.353   221   0.247   531   2.98   0.000 
Notes: LAPOP 2010 survey data.  See description in text.  
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Table B.4: PLD and PRD coalitions results (in %) 
  
2004 Presidential Elections 
 
2012 Presidential Elections 
PRD Coalition 33.65 
 
PLD Coalition 57.10 
 
PRD Coalition 46.95 
 
PLD Coalition 51.19 
Partido Revolucionario Dominicano 
(PRD) 
30.67 
 
Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana 
(PLD) 
49.01 
 
Partido Revolucionario Dominicano  
(PRD) 
42.13 
 
Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana 
(PLD) 
37.73 
Partido Quisqueyano Democrata 
Cristiano (PQDC) 
0.76 
 
Bloque Institucional Social 
Democrata (BIS) 
2.72 
 
Partido Movimiento Democratico 
Alternativo (MODA) 
2.02 
 
Partido Reformista Social Cristiano 
(PRSC) 
5.87 
Partido  Renacentista Nacional  
(PRN) 
0.31 
 
Partido Alianza por la Democracia 
(APD) 
2.34 
 
Partido Revolucionario Social 
Democrata (PRSD) 
1.36 
 
Bloque Institucional Social 
Democrata (BIS) 
1.59 
Partido de Unidad Nacional  
(PUN) 
1.24 
 
Partido de los Trajadores 
Dominicanos (PTD) 
0.68 
 
Partido Humanista Dominicano  
(PHD) 
0.76 
 
Partido Union Democrata Cristiana 
(UDC) 
0.78 
Unidad Democratica  
(UD) 
0.52 
 
Partido Union Democrata Cristiana 
(UDC) 
0.89 
 
Partido Democrata Institucional  
(PDI) 
0.26 
 
Partido Quisqueyano Democrata 
Cristiano (PQDC) 
1.32 
Partido Humanista Dominicano  
(PHD) 
0.15 
 
Partido Liberal de la Republica 
Dominicana (PLRD) 
0.39 
 
Partido Alianza Social Dominicana  
(ASD) 
0.42 
 
Fuerza Nacional Progresista  
(FNP) 
0.73 
   
Fuerza Nacional Progresista  
(FNP) 
1.07 
    
Partido de los Trajadores 
Dominicanos (PTD) 
0.57 
         
Partido Popular Cristiano  
(PPC) 
0.49 
         
Partido Democrata Popular  
(PDP) 
0.21 
         
Partido Civico Renovador  
(PCR) 
0.59 
         
Partido de Unidad Nacional  
(PUN) 
0.27 
         
Partido Liberal de la Republica 
Dominicana (PLRD) 
0.26 
         
Partido Accion Liberal  
(PAL) 
0.46 
                  
Partido Social Verde  
(PASOVE) 
0.32 
Source: Central Electoral Board (JCE) 
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Table B.5: Summary statistics 
 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Presidential election outcomes 
     
PRD coalition vote share 268 43.70 7.41 23.30 63.47 
PRD party vote share 268 39.47 6.62 21.25 57.19 
PLD coalition vote share 268 49.88 6.55 30.60 72.15 
PLD party vote share 268 38.59 7.47 17.69 62.00 
Participation rate (turnout) 268 76.54 4.61 58.33 86.81 
Covariates 
     
Haitian immigrants (in % of population) 268 3.10 4.02 0.00 24.63 
Haitian immigrants (in % of 2002 population) 268 3.23 4.47 0.00 29.50 
Dependency ratio 268 42.17 3.82 34.23 52.58 
Secondary education 268 23.06 4.79 11.63 33.52 
Tertiary education 268 8.26 3.83 2.50 29.64 
Unemployment rate 268 12.00 4.83 4.70 32.30 
Agriculture sector employment 268 18.41 13.17 0.41 64.93 
Manufacturing sector employment 268 6.73 6.00 0.14 29.94 
Municipality population (in 000s) 268 67.19 145.76 4.70 992.85 
Data sources: Central Electoral Board and National Office for Statistics. Census data: 2002 and 2010. Presidential elections of 
2004 and 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.6: Dominican international trade - 2007-2013 period 
 
Partner / Trade flow Total trade Exports Imports 
World (US$ - 000s)        20,997,705           6,228,356         14,769,350  
Haiti (US$ - 000s)             804,345              782,292               22,053  
Haiti (in % of world trade flow) 3.8 12.6 0.1 
Source: UN COMTRADE. Average for 2007-2013 period. 
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Table B.7: No outliers 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
PRD coalition vote share 
 
Panel A. Presidential election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.214 2.675** 3.008** 
 
0.114 -0.878 -1.105 
 
(0.280) (1.078) (1.276) 
 
(0.260) (0.746) (0.923) 
                
 
Panel B. Congressional election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.382 3.063** 4.253** 
 
-0.137 -1.919** -2.247** 
 
(0.300) (1.350) (1.730) 
 
(0.225) (0.835) (0.986) 
                
IV: population growth Y 
   
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   9.72 7.74     9.72 7.74 
Region FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 127 127 127 
 
127 127 127 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, 
Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.8: Special economic zones 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
PRD coalition vote share 
 
Panel A. Presidential election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.270 1.614** 1.326** 
 
0.213 -0.297 -0.201 
 
(0.233) (0.630) (0.536) 
 
(0.141) (0.392) (0.358) 
SEZ firms -0.265* -0.201 -0.215 
 
0.267*** 0.242** 0.247** 
 
(0.136) (0.167) (0.153) 
 
(0.0978) (0.101) (0.0984) 
                
 
Panel B. Congressional election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.386 2.083*** 2.027*** 
 
0.00788 -1.228** -0.978** 
 
(0.437) (0.801) (0.781) 
 
(0.141) (0.595) (0.484) 
SEZ firms -0.651*** -0.569** -0.572*** 
 
0.00326 -0.0561 -0.0441 
 
(0.203) (0.224) (0.220) 
 
(0.168) (0.181) (0.171) 
                
IV: population growth 
 
Y 
   
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   6.24 7.77     6.24 7.77 
Region FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134 134 
 
134 134 134 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, 
Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.9: Overidentifed regressions 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share PRD coalition vote share 
 
2SLS LIML 
 
2SLS LIML 
 
Panel A. Presidential election results 
      
Haitian immigrants 1.144** 1.320** 
 
-0.153 -0.169 
 
(0.517) (0.665) 
 
(0.357) (0.375) 
Sargan-Hansen test p-value [0.038] [0.055] 
 
[0.21] [0.22] 
            
 
Panel B. Congressional election results 
      
Haitian immigrants 2.029** 2.036** 
 
-0.804* -0.903* 
 
(0.874) (0.879) 
 
(0.428) (0.506) 
Sargan-Hansen test p-value [0.76] [0.76] 
 
[0.070] [0.083] 
            
IV: population growth Y Y 
 
Y Y 
IV: distance to epicentre Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 12.93 12.93 
 
12.93 12.93 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 4.30 4.30   4.30 4.30 
Region FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Covariates Y Y   Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134   134 134 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, 
Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.10: Distance to the border 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
PRD coalition vote share 
 
Panel A. Presidential election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.272 1.041** 0.859** 
 
0.208* 0.152 0.161 
 
(0.199) (0.411) (0.384) 
 
(0.121) (0.250) (0.229) 
                
 
Panel B. Congressional election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.435 2.371*** 2.244** 
 
0.0192 -0.844* -0.666* 
 
(0.395) (0.910) (0.917) 
 
(0.131) (0.450) (0.384) 
                
IV: population growth 
 
Y 
   
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   7.91 10.22     7.91 10.22 
Region FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134 134 
 
134 134 134 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute 
for Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.11: Weighted regressions 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: PLD coalition vote share 
 
PRD coalition vote share 
 
Panel A. Presidential election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants 0.228 3.167** 2.922** 
 
0.312* -1.418 -1.293 
 
(0.186) (1.477) (1.484) 
 
(0.187) (1.093) (1.117) 
                
 
Panel B. Congressional election results 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
 
FD FD-2SLS 
        
Haitian immigrants -0.107 4.191* 4.329* 
 
0.227 -3.476** -3.251** 
 
(0.432) (2.176) (2.336) 
 
(0.282) (1.634) (1.622) 
                
IV: population growth Y 
   
Y 
 
IV: distance to epicentre 
  
Y 
   
Y 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic   5.65 5.43     5.65 5.43 
Region FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Number of municipalities 134 134 134 
 
134 134 134 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. First difference regressions. Data sources: Dominican Central Electoral Board, Dominican National Office for Statistics (ONE), Haitian Institute for 
Statistics (IHSI). See text for definition of covariates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.12: Opinion survey - descriptive statistics 
 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variables: 
     
Anti-Haitianism: job competition 1,380 0.407 0.491 0 1 
Anti-Haitianism: work permits 1,461 0.517 0.499 0 1 
Anti-Haitianism: access public services 1,466 0.334 0.472 0 1 
Anti-Haitianism: redistribution 1,444 0.069 0.255 0 1 
Anti-Haitianism: citizenship 1,463 0.463 0.499 0 1 
PLD vote intention 1,207 0.503 0.500 0 1 
PRD vote intention 1,207 0.254 0.435 0 1 
Other party vote intention 1,207 0.244 0.429 0 1 
Covariates: 
     
Haitians (in % of municipality population) 1,500 3.289 2.644 0.651 16.318 
Unemployment rate 1,500 7.298 1.503 4.7 13.9 
Gender (women=1; men=0) 1,500 0.510 0.500 0 1 
Age  1,499 41.209 16.756 18 90 
Age sq./1000 1,499 1.979 1.562 0.324 8.1 
Education (years) 1,495 8.619 4.806 0 18 
Married 1,487 0.225 0.417 0 1 
HH size (number of children) 1,499 2.905 2.653 0 18 
Rural area 1,500 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Self-identify as: Indio/Mestizo 1,483 0.676 0.468 0 1 
Self-identify as: White 1,483 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Self-identify as: Mulatto 1,483 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Self-identify as: Black 1,483 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Self-identify as: Other 1,483 0.014 0.118 0 1 
Catholic 1,460 0.603 0.489 0 1 
Evangelist 1,460 0.181 0.385 0 1 
Protestant 1,460 0.054 0.226 0 1 
Religion other 1,460 0.016 0.127 0 1 
Atheist 1,460 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Data source: LAPOP 2010 individual opinion survey. Vanderbilt University.  
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Table B.13: Opinion survey - first stage results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
First stage regression of: PLD vote 
 
PRD vote 
 
Job competition 
 
Work permits 
 
Public services 
 
Redistribution 
 
Citizenship 
 
Insecurity 
 
Dependent variable: Haitian immigrants (%) 
                
Inverse distance to border 15.60** 
 
15.60** 
 
14.41*** 
 
15.72*** 
 
14.75*** 
 
14.76*** 
 
15.85*** 
 
15.00*** 
 
(5.854) 
 
(5.854) 
 
(4.645) 
 
(5.743) 
 
(4.897) 
 
(4.764) 
 
(5.813) 
 
(5.088) 
                                
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Region FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 1,154 
 
1,154 
 
1,317 
 
1,395 
 
1,396 
 
1,375 
 
1,399 
 
1,418 
R-squared 0.555   0.555   0.516   0.517   0.515   0.502   0.519   0.511 
Notes: OLS first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. LAPOP 2010 individual opinion survey. Haitian immigrant population instrumented with inverse distance to 
border. Variables described in text. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Figures 
 
Figure B.1: Dominican regions and municipalities  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Elusive Quest for Social Diversity?  
Social Housing, Immigration, and Diversity in 
France20. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
High income countries tend to rely on the provision of affordable housing through various 
schemes to both facilitate access to decent accommodation and encourage social diversity 
at the local level. While each country’s housing system is unique and reflects its own 
history, legal framework, and economy, several European countries have developed sizable 
low-income housing programs. For instance, in England, France, the Netherlands, and the 
Scandinavian countries, the social rented housing sector represented close to or more than 
20% of all housing at the end of the last decade (Scanlon and Whitehead 2011). Despite 
their wide adoption, there is limited evidence on whether affordable housing programs 
affect population composition, urban segregation, and ethnic and social diversity. Yet, 
these dimensions matter to understand how housing policies affect neighbourhood living 
conditions, and whether they facilitate social upward mobility (Chetty et al. 2016).  
This paper addresses these questions by providing new evidence on the Welfare Magnet 
Hypothesis (WMH) for France. The WMH was first coined by Borjas (1999) and states 
that welfare generosity acts a pull factor for migration (Giulietti and Wahba 2013). In other 
words, generous welfare systems act as a ‘magnet’ for migrants (Razin and Wahba 2015). I 
look at the case of France where successive governments have invested a substantial 
amount of resources in the social housing sector. In 2014, the latest year for which data is 
                                                          
20 This research project has benefitted from the support and guidance of Steve Gibbons and Olmo Silva, as 
well as insightful conversations with Ghazala Azmat, Laurent Gobillon, Jordi Jofre-Monseny, Hans Koster, 
Gabriel Loumeau, Ana Moreno-Monroy, Henry Overman, Nathalie Picarelli, Cheng-Keat Tang, Jos van 
Ommeren. Participants at LSE seminars, the 2017 Migration and Welfare International Conference at Rome 
La Sapienza University, and the 7th European Meeting of the Urban Economics Association also provided 
useful feedback and comments.  
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available, low income housing accounted for 14.7% of the all primary residences. The 
social tenant population totalled approximately 10 million that year (National Office for 
Statistics, Insee). I exploit a national policy reform to provide quasi-experimental evidence 
on the role of social housing availability in explaining immigrant location choices. I go 
beyond traditional studies of the WMH and look also at the demographic, economic, and 
social characteristics of immigrants.  
The direction of the causality between social housing provision and neighbourhood ethnic 
diversity is hard to pin down. On the demand side, immigrants and socio-economically 
disadvantaged natives could exert pressure on their municipal authorities to provide social 
dwellings. Immigrants are on average less educated and wealthy than French natives 
(Fougère et al. 2011, Gobillon and Solignac 2016). They also tend to perform worse on the 
labour market (Gobillon et al. 2014). Several studies have also found that immigrants tend 
to be discriminated in both the labour and private housing markets in France (Adida et al. 
2010, Bonnet et al. 2016). On the supply side, given their admissibility requirements new 
social housing units are expected to bring in and be occupied by populations with lower 
income. Due to the French context, one would expect immigrants to take a significant part 
of these inflows of new social dwellers. Yet, several factors complicate this 
interrelationship. The allocation process of social rental units is often influenced by local 
political economy considerations among the various local authorities and citizen 
associations. There is anecdotal and indirect empirical evidence of cases of discrimination 
against foreigners in social housing allocation committees (Tissot 2006, Bonnal et al. 2012, 
Schmutz 2015). Further, any observed relationship between immigrant population presence 
and social housing supply could be driven by unobserved local shocks. This research 
project aims to isolate the net supply side effect of social housing on local ethnic and social 
diversity. 
Evaluating the impact of social housing developments at the local level is challenging. The 
allocation of affordable housing across space is determined by a host of observable and 
unobservable factors. I rely on a quasi-experimental setting to address these endogeneity 
issues. This setting is based on the Solidarity and Urban Renewal Law, known as the Loi 
SRU. After transferring decision-making power to municipalities over low income housing 
provision in the 1980s, the French government passed the SRU Law in 2000 to restructure 
the social housing sector. The SRU Law states that from 2002 onwards at least 20% of the 
primary housing stock in all medium and large urban municipalities should be social rental 
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units. That is municipalities with a population above 3,500 residents (1,500 residents in the 
Greater Paris region) and belonging to an urban unit of more than 50,000 inhabitants are 
under the obligation to meet the 20% social housing stock requirement. Municipalities 
failing to provide enough social dwellings are to draw up plans to increase their social stock 
and are subjected to pay fines for as long as they do not meet the threshold imposed by 
this Law. These eligibility rules provide opportunities to isolate quasi-exogenous variation 
in municipalities’ social housing stocks. I combine three sources of variation, before and 
after the SRU policy implementation, population size thresholds, and geographic location 
(within or right outside the border of a dense eligible urban unit), to create a sample of 
observationally similar control and treated municipalities. I then rely on the nationwide 
policy reform to instrument local social housing supply. The method I adopt is essentially 
an instrumental variable strategy where a difference in differences set-up is used in the first 
stage. The empirical analysis relies on a municipality panel dataset constructed with the last 
four housing and population censuses (1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012). 
The analysis is divided into two parts. First, I concentrate on the greater Paris (Ile de 
France) region where about one sixth of the French population lives. The policy reform is 
found to have had a positive and statistically significant effect on the size of social housing 
stocks in treated units. This result is robust to several sensitivity checks. Relying on this 
strong first stage, I find that social housing supply attracts immigrant populations and 
promote ethnic diversity measured as the share of foreigners in the population. In all the 
municipalities in my sample, the share of foreigners in the population is always well below 
50%. I therefore assume that a higher share of foreigners correspond to greater ethnic 
diversity. Additional evidence indicates that the bulk of the increase in foreigners is 
accounted by female and economically inactive immigrants. I also observe that 
municipalities providing more affordable housing are poorer and exhibit lower household 
median incomes. On the other hand, I do not find any evidence of higher diversity in terms 
of socio-professional categories. These results survive a large number of robustness checks. 
I use alternative sample selection criteria to show that my results are not driven by arbitrary 
sample definitions. I also try different treatment and control group definitions based on 
geographic location to alleviate spatial spillover concerns. Additionally, I perform a placebo 
test using untreated municipalities on the outskirts of the territory where the SRU Law 
applies. I assume the first ring of bordering municipalities is treated in the last two time 
periods while the second ring of outskirt municipalities constitutes the control arm. I fail to 
find any effect on either social housing supply of foreign population presence.  
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In the second part of the empirical analysis, I extend the investigation to the next three 
largest French metropolitan areas, namely Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse. I replicate the 
methodological approach discussed above for each of these samples separately and then 
pool all the samples, including Paris in some regressions. For all Lyon, Marseille, and 
Toulouse, I find evidence of a positive impact of the SRU reform on the size of the social 
sector. The order of magnitude of the impact is rather similar to the one found for Paris. 
However, no effect is detected on the measures used to proxy for ethnic and social 
diversity. I still find evidence of a negative association between social housing supply and 
median household income nonetheless. Pooling the four metropolitan areas confirms that 
the positive effect on ethnic diversity is specific to the Ile de France region. There is 
however strong evidence in favour of a significant effect on the income distribution. 
Pooling that data also allows testing for non-linearities in the effect of social housing. My 
findings suggest that the effect of social housing on attracting immigrants is larger in 
municipalities located in local labour markets with a higher concentration of foreigners and 
more buoyant economic conditions.   
The analysis in this paper is highly relevant and has important implications for public 
policy. Higher immigrant and income segregation prompted by a larger social housing 
supply can have wide ranging socio-economic effects. A large literature has shown that 
urban segregation has detrimental effects on the educational, employment and life 
prospects of minorities. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) find that African Americans in more 
segregated areas have significantly worse outcomes than blacks in less segregated areas. 
Ananat (2011) shows that racial segregation in the US increases rates of black poverty and 
black-white income disparities. Chetty et al. (2016) find that children who move to lower-
poverty neighbourhoods through the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment in the US 
improve their chance to attend college and earn higher earnings.  
Immigrant concentration has been found to matter for educational achievements. Gould et 
al (2009) show that the overall presence of immigrants in a grade had an adverse effect on 
the chances of natives of passing the high school matriculation exam in Israel in the 1990s. 
There is large and ongoing debate on the impact of immigration on the labour market 
outcomes of natives and immigrants alike (see e.g., Friedberg 2001, Edin et al 2003, Borjas 
2003, Dustmann et al. 2005, Manacorda et al 2011, Foged and Peri 2016). Immigration 
inflows have also been found to lead to native outflows, lower house prices, and 
discriminatory zoning policies (Card and DiNardo 2000, Saiz and Wachter 2011, Sá 2014, 
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Shertzer at al. 2016). There is also evidence that greater ethnic concentration matters in 
France. Piketty (2004) finds a negative correlation between primary school test scores and 
the share of foreign students in the classroom. Algan et al. (2016) find that ethnic diversity 
leads to social anomie, and neglect and vandalism of building commons. Hémet and 
Malgouyres (2017) obtain evidence suggesting that ethnic diversity has also a negative 
effect on employment probability.  
This paper relates to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on the 
determinants of immigrant residential location decisions, and the WMH in particular. 
Whilst most WMH studies have ignored the endogeneity of welfare systems (Giulietti and 
Wahba 2013), I provide quasi-experimental evidence on an additional publicly funded 
factor affecting the spatial distribution of immigrants. Borjas (1999), Kaushal (2005), and 
Alves Pena (2014) have debated the importance of state-level variation in welfare benefit 
generosity in explaining patterns of immigrant settlement in the US. In Europe, De Giorgi 
and Pellizzari (2009) have tested the magnet hypothesis across the countries of the pre-
enlargement European Union. They find a significant but small effect of welfare state 
generosity on migration decisions. Razin and Wahba (2015) also find evidence in favour of 
the magnet hypothesis in Europe. Using a larger sample of OECD countries, Pederson et 
al. (2008) fail to find any migrant selection based on welfare regimes, however. This paper 
builds on the evidence of Verdugo (2015) who finds that French cities with higher social 
housing stocks attracted new immigrant men with children during the period 1960-1980 
period. It goes beyond the previous WMH literature in the sense that it looks at a smaller 
geography. In addition, it provides more evidence on the socio-economic and demographic 
profile of the immigrants drawn to municipalities with larger social housing stocks. It also 
tests for non-linearities in the effect of social housing supply.  
Secondly, I contribute to the small but growing literature on the impact of social housing 
developments and housing policies on the neighbourhoods in which they are built and 
implemented. Previous evidence primarily comes from the US and has looked mainly at 
house prices, labour outcomes, household sorting based on income, and crime (see e.g., 
Baum-Snow and Marion 2009; Rossi-Hansberg et al. 2010; Aliprantis and Hartley 2015; 
Chetty 2016). This paper is rather closely related to Diamond and McQuade (2016) who 
study the effect of the US Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program onto 
neighbouring residents. I contribute to that literature by focusing on a European country 
and looking at how social housing developments impact local ethnic and social diversity. 
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the French social 
housing policy and the national reform used for identification. In the second section, I 
discuss my dataset and econometric strategy. The third section presents the main results 
and sensitivity checks. In the fourth section, I extend the analysis to the metropolitan units 
of Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse. These urban units are respectively the second, third, and 
fourth largest metropolitan units of the country according to the last census (2012). The 
last section concludes.  
 
3.2 Institutional framework   
3.2.1 Social housing and immigration in France 
The primary objective of the French social housing policy is to provide decent 
accommodations to working and middle class households. In recent years, this policy has 
also aimed at promoting local social diversity. Access and eligibility to social dwellings is 
based on household income ceilings, personal and family circumstances. In spite of these 
eligibility criteria, between 60% and 70% of French and legal immigrant households have 
been eligible to obtain a social housing unit over the last fifteen years (Goffette-Nagot and 
Sidibe 2016). Long waiting lists are one consequence of these generous criteria.  
The French social rented sector counted 4.5 million units in 2009, accounting for 17% of 
the country’s total housing stock (Stébé 2016). More than half of the social housing stock 
was built before 1976 as part of the post war effort to rebuild the country. The spatial 
distribution of social housing tends to reflect that of the French population. The vast 
majority of social units are located in large cities whereas very few are found in small towns 
or rural areas. Furthermore, the distribution of social housing within metropolitan areas is 
quite skewed. Major concentrations can be seen in the banlieues around major cities such as 
Paris and Lyon, while prosperous municipalities farther away from historical central 
districts hardly have any social tenant.  
With regards to migration, France has a long tradition of immigration, and historians 
generally distinguish between three main waves of migrant influx: the Industrial revolution 
era, the inter-war period (1918-1940), and post-World War II. The size and composition of 
these three waves in terms of skills and origin countries are quite different. In the 19th 
century, the majority of immigrants were coming from neighbouring European countries. 
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Nowadays, the main groups of migrants include those born in Southern Europe (Spain, 
Italy, and Portugal), North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), Turkey, South-East Asia 
(Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) and sub-Saharan Africa. Over the course of the second 
half of the 20th century, the share of immigrants increased and reached 8.9% of the total 
population in 2013. The foreign-born population tends to concentrate spatially in urban 
areas, near physical borders with neighbouring countries, and in locations with an existing 
sizable immigrants stock (see e.g., Safi 2009, Fougère et al. 2011, Shon and Verdugo 2014). 
Immigrants tend to disproportionally occupy social housing units. For instance, immigrant 
households made up 9.6% of the total population but occupied 17.5% of the social rented 
sector in 2006 (Scanlon and Whitehead 2011). Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing a 
marked positive relationship between the population share of immigrants and the stock of 
social housing in all French municipalities, and in the urban areas of Paris, Lyon and 
Marseille.  
3.2.2 The policy reform of 2000 
As part of a national decentralisation process, the responsibility to provide social housing 
units was officially transferred to municipalities in 1982. The decentralisation of social 
housing provision is commonly believed to be partly responsible for the unequal 
distribution of social dwellings over France’s territory (Stébé 2016). The Solidarité et 
Renouvellement Urbains Law (SRU – Solidarity and Urban Renewal) drafted by the Socialist 
government of Lionel Jospin was adopted in December 2000. The broad objective of this 
reform is to promote sustainable urban development and renewal as well as social diversity. 
Its Article 55 stipulates that in medium and large municipalities, the share of social housing 
units in the total stock of primary residences must be at least equal to 20%. This target 
must be reached by 2022. All municipalities of more than 3,500 inhabitants (1,500 residents 
in the Ile-de-France region where Paris is situated) that are part of an urban unit of more 
than 50,000 inhabitants containing at least one central city of more than 15,000 residents 
must comply. From January 2002 onwards, the municipalities failing to provide enough 
social housing have had to pay administrative fines and draw up plans to increase their 
stock of social units so as to reach the legal threshold. Once collected these fines are 
redistributed to municipalities with high proportions of social housing and public bodies in 
charge of promoting the provision of social dwellings (Vignolles 2014).  
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Figure 2 shows the municipalities of the Ile-de-France region that falls within the SRU 
policy territory, i.e., within an urban unit of more than 50,000 inhabitants with a central city 
of more than 15,000 people. The two urban units of Paris and Meaux in the Eastern part of 
the region qualify. Figure 3 displays in red the municipalities within these urban units that 
fell in 2002 under the obligation to construct more social housing units. These ‘treated 
municipalities’ seem to be relatively evenly distributed across the region.   
The 2007 Droit au Logement Opposable Law (DALO - enforceable right to housing) extended 
the eligibility criteria of the SRU Law to large municipality associations (not part of any 
previously eligible urban unit). This amendment did not affect the geography of the SRU 
Law in Ile de France. In January 2013, the social housing threshold was raised to 25% and 
the eligibility criteria were enlarged further (Levasseur 2015). In 2015, more than 1,973 
municipalities were concerned by the SRU policy nationally and 1,258 were not meeting 
their legal obligation in terms of social housing supply (Ministère de l’Ecologie, du 
Développement Durable et de l’Energie 2015).   
 
3.3 Data and identification strategy 
The empirical analysis relies on the last four housing and population censuses of 1990, 
1999, 2007, and 2012. Using data provided by the National Office for Statistics (Insee), I 
construct a balanced municipality panel dataset containing information on the social, 
demographic, and economic characteristics of the population and housing sector. I also 
include in some parts of the analysis household income data from the Insee fiscal income 
database21. This dataset is available at the municipality level for the period 2001-2011 only. I 
match the 1999 census data with the 2001 income dataset. 2007 (2012) census data and 
2007 (2011) income data are matched consecutively. I therefore lose the first time period 
when working with fiscal household income data.     
The main difficulty of the empirical analysis is the definition of the right counterfactual. In 
an ideal experimental setting, social housing developments would be randomly allocated 
across municipalities. As in other European countries, social dwellings are endogenously 
provided by the French local authorities. Given the absence of randomization, quasi-
experimental methods must be adopted to address the research objective of this paper. The 
                                                          
21 Source Revenus fiscaux des ménages, Insee. 
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2000 SRU reform provides an interesting policy experiment to isolate quasi-exogenous 
variation in local housing sector characteristics. I rely on that reform and adopt an 
instrumental variable strategy design to identify the effect of the local supply of social 
housing on ethnic and social diversity. I cannot use a regression discontinuity design in the 
traditional sense because another policy, mayors’ salary, also changes at the 3,500 
inhabitants population cut-off. 
Equation (3.1) below is the baseline specification linking municipality outcomes to social 
housing provision: 
𝑦𝑚,𝑧,𝑑,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. ℎ𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑧,𝑡. 𝛽2 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝛿𝑡 + µ𝑑. 𝑡 +  𝜈𝑚,𝑧,𝑑,𝑡  (3.1) 
where 𝑦𝑚,𝑧,𝑑,𝑡 stands for population composition in municipality m located in travel-to-
work area (TTWA22) z in district d at time t. Municipalities (communes) are the lowest level of 
territorial administrative division. There are more than 36,000 municipalities in France. 
Districts (départements) are the local authorities above the municipalities. Mainland 
metropolitan France counts 96 districts. TTWAs are statistical constructs of the Insee and 
define local labour markets. Each TTWA generally comprise several municipalities. 
TTWAs are always smaller than districts23. The main variable of interest is ℎ𝑚,𝑡 and 
measures the share of social housing units in the stock of primary residences. 𝑋𝑧,𝑡 is a 
parsimonious vector of exogenous covariates defined at the TTWA level (net of 
municipality m). Control variables include the unemployment rate, industry employment 
share and public administration employment share. I avoid including time varying 
municipality characteristics to circumvent post-treatment bias. Social housing supply is 
likely to have an effect on the housing market; via house prices and construction for 
instance24. It is also likely to influence municipality socio-economic characteristics and 
political preferences through its effect on population composition. 𝜃𝑚, 𝛿𝑡, and 𝜈𝑚,𝑧,𝑑,𝑡 are 
municipality fixed effects, year effects, and the error term respectively. The municipality 
fixed effects control for persistent differences across municipalities and year dummies 
control for time period specific shocks affecting every municipality in the same way. I also 
                                                          
22 The travel-to-work areas used are the French zones d’emploi as defined in 1999 by the Statistical office Insee. 
23 The city of Paris is an exception. It is both a district, a municipality and one TTWA. 
24 See Chapelle (2017) for a detailed study on the impact of social housing on the construction sector in 
France. 
132 
 
include district25 specific linear time trends (µ𝑑. 𝑡) to control for unobserved district-level 
variables varying over time in an approximately linear fashion.  
Despite the use of municipality and year fixed effects, several threats to identification 
remain. Omitted variables will bias coefficients if unobserved factors affect the housing 
sector and the population composition of a municipality at the same time. Reverse causality 
is another econometric concern. The local population affects the characteristics of the 
housing sector through their economic and political preferences. Since immigrants tend to 
suffer from discrimination in the housing and labour markets, they might pressure 
municipal authorities to provide a larger amount of social dwellings. If that reverse channel 
is operating, and assuming there is also a positive effect of the social housing supply on the 
share of foreigners, the estimate of  𝛽1 will be upward biased. The third potential 
econometric concern is measurement error. It can plausibly be discarded here as the Insee 
releases exhaustive information on the housing sector for each census. 
To obtain causal estimates, I exploit the top-down national social housing reform discussed 
in the previous section to address the endogeneity of social housing provision at the local 
level. This allows me to design an instrumental variable strategy. I take advantage of the 
geographic and population discontinuities established by the SRU policy to define control 
and treatment groups. I begin by restricting my sample to the municipalities located inside 
the SRU territory and the ones directly contiguous to it (see Figure 4). Following Gobillon 
and Vignolles (2016), I further limit my sample to the 189 municipalities with a population 
greater than 800 inhabitants and lower than 6,000 inhabitants in 1999. I also conduct my 
analysis using alternative samples based on different population thresholds to test the 
robustness of the findings. My sample thus exploits both the boundary and population 
discontinuities of the SRU policy. I rely on Equation (3.2) to measure the impact of the 
SRU policy reform on social housing supply using an approach akin to a difference-in-
differences in the first stage.  
ℎ𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1. 𝐷𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑧,𝑡. 𝛾2 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝛿𝑡 + µ𝑑 . 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡   (3.2) 
𝐷𝑚,𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether a municipality is ‘treated’ by the policy reform 
and must increase its supply of social dwellings. The other variables are defined as above. 
The coefficient 𝛾1 captures the difference-in-differences estimate of the reform impact. 
                                                          
25 French départements (NUTS 3 EU classification of administrative units) are referred to as districts.  
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Regression results obtained from Equation (3.2) are the first stage used to predict the stock 
of social housing in two-stages least squares (2SLS) estimations of Equation (3.1). 
The research design thus exploits the before/after and discontinuous policy variations to 
isolate the causal impact of social housing supply. I estimate these two equations with least 
squares and standard errors clustered at the municipality level to address issues stemming 
from serial correlation. The majority of the findings presented next are 2SLS estimates, but 
unbiased reduced form estimates are also available in Appendix. In all the municipalities in 
my sample, the share of foreigners in the population is always well below 50%. I therefore 
assume that a higher share of foreigners correspond to greater ethnic diversity. 
 
3.4 Ile de France 
3.4.1 Main findings 
Appendix Table C.1 displays summary statistics for outcome and explanatory variables 
used in the analysis in the 1999 pre-treatment period for the main sample of 189 
municipalities. Balancing tests run on several variables using 1999 census data are shown in 
Table 3.1. The first and second columns display covariate averages for the control and 
treatment arms in the pre-treatment period. The third and fourth columns show the t-
statistics and associated p-values of tests of equality of means across the two groups. The 
only two variables for which there is a statistically significant difference are population and 
industrial employment share. The latter is controlled for in all regressions. The difference in 
terms of population size is not surprising given that policy eligibility is defined according to 
the municipality number of residents. Appendix Figure A.1 shows that the parallel trend 
identifying assumption seems to hold for the municipalities treated in 2000. Further 
empirical tests underpinning the validity of the identification strategy are discussed in what 
follows.  
I begin with a discussion of the effect of the SRU policy reform on municipality social 
housing stocks. Table 3.2 presents first stage estimates for various samples defined 
according to municipality population in 1999 and geographic location. For instance, the 
sample of the first two columns is based on a balanced sample of municipalities with 500 to 
9,000 residents in 1999. Columns 7 and 8 present regression estimates based on 
municipalities with 800 to 6,000 inhabitants in 1999. For every sample, I estimate Equation 
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(3.1) without a district time trend in the first column and with such a linear trend in the 
second column. Across the five samples the policy effect estimate is positive and significant 
at conventional levels of statistical significance. The inclusion of district linear trends does 
not affect the patterns of results. Furthermore, the point estimates are relatively stable 
across the different specifications and samples. For example, the results of column 8 based 
on a sample of municipalities with population between 800 and 6,000 residents indicate 
that in treated municipalities the social housing stock increased by 1.3 percentage point 
(pp) over the study period. This is equivalent to 38 additional social rental units. Appendix 
Table C.2 presents the results of a Granger causality test with anticipatory and post-
treatment effects following the methodology discussed by Autor (2006) and Angrist and 
Pischke (2009, p.237-8). The absence of any significant lead anticipatory effects gives credit 
to the identification strategy. Overall these findings suggest the SRU policy implementation 
has augmented the provision of social rental units as intended. The magnitude of the 
impact is rather limited but in line with other studies analysing the SRU reform 
consequences (see e.g., Gobillon and Vignolles 2016).   
The next tables measure the effect of the social housing stock on various population 
composition and social outcomes. They are structured in a similar fashion as Table 3.2. The 
first table focuses on the share of foreigners in the total population (Table 3.3). Social 
housing is instrumented with the policy reform binary indicator as discussed in the 
previous section26. The results show quite convincingly that in treated municipalities the 
relative presence of foreigners has increased over the study period in response to greater 
social housing provision. The point estimates are positive and statistically significant in all 
samples. The reported coefficient based on the preferred sample in column 4 indicates that 
a 1 pp increase in the social housing stock translates in a 0.6 pp increase in the share of 
foreigners. This corresponds to 19 new foreign migrants. These results corroborate the 
findings of Verdugo (2015).  
Having established a positive link between social housing and foreigner presence, Table 3.4 
concentrates on several migrant characteristics, including gender and economic activity 
status. It is divided in six panels, each focusing on a specific outcome variable. The 
regression results presented in this table are again displayed for alternative samples based 
on population size. In Panels A and B, I focus on female and male migrants. The point 
                                                          
26 The 2SLS results presented are based on specifications excluding district linear trends. Including district 
trends leads to problems in the estimation of the covariance matrix. The point estimates are barely affected 
however. Levels of statistical significance do not change either.  
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estimates consistently suggest the positive impact of social housing provision on ethnic 
diversity is channelled through a greater presence of female immigrants. This is consistent 
with descriptive studies and reports on the characteristics of social tenants (see e.g., Jacquot 
2007, Fougère et al. 2011). In particular, single parent households are given priority in 
social dwelling waiting list (Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot 2009). According to the results of 
column 4 in Panel B, the foreign women population increases by 0.4 pp for every 1 pp of 
additional social housing supply. Again, since access to social housing units is given in 
priority to single parent households, these results are not particularly unexpected.  
The next four panels concentrate on the share of foreign unemployed, inactive, active, and 
student individuals among the adult population aged 15 years old or more27. The social 
housing sector does not seem to have much of an effect on the relative presence of 
unemployed migrants (Panel C). While the coefficient estimates are positive, they are not 
statistically significant. The positive impact of the social housing stock on the share of 
inactive migrants is a lot more robust. In all but the last column of Panel D, the measured 
effect is positive and significant at conventional levels. I do not detect any effect on the 
share of active foreigners, however (Panel E). I focus next on foreign students. Greater 
social housing supply seems to increase the share of foreign students in the population. 
This is consistent with the earlier results on inactive foreigners since students are classified 
are economically inactive. The size of the impact is small and ranges between 0.10 pp and 
0.16 pp (Panel F).  
Having looked at the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants, I now focus on 
their professional occupation. Socio-professional category diversity is one element of local 
social heterogeneity. The French statistical office distinguishes between six main 
professional categories: i) farmers; ii) craftsmen, traders and entrepreneurs; iii) executives 
and higher intellectual professions; iv) intermediate professions; v) employees; and vi) 
workers. To measure local socio-professional diversity28, I construct Herfindahl indices 
measuring professional diversity using information for both foreigners and the total 
population for each municipality in each census year. I calculate the squares of each 
profession share and sums across the six categories. The index can vary between 0 and 100, 
with higher values indicating greater concentration. I thus have two indices: one for the 
foreign population, one for the total population. I then use these measures as outcomes 
                                                          
27 The National Statistical Office (Insee) records economic activity status for individuals aged 15 years old and 
above. 
28 I refer to ‘job diversity’ at times in the tables of results for the sake of concision. 
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variables in the first two panels of Table 3.5. Social housing supply is found to have a 
negative (more diversity) but insignificant effect on the Herfindahl index for the foreign 
population. On the other hand, the policy reform appears to have a positive effect on total 
job diversity (foreigners and nationals), but the impact is insignificant. The main message 
from the first half of this table is that social housing does not lead to greater professional 
heterogeneity in the Ile de France region. Appendix Table C.8 shows that the absence of 
significant effects on the Herfindahl indices does not hide heterogeneous effects on the 
individual professional category shares.  
Municipality total unemployment rates and household median incomes are the focus of the 
last two panels of Table 3.5. Lower median household incomes seem to be associated with 
a higher availability of social dwellings. This negative measured impact is robust to the use 
of all five alternative samples. Column 4 estimates suggest that a 1 pp increase in the stock 
of social housing translates in a median income reduction of 520 euros. Baum-Snow and 
Marion (2009) also find that affordable housing developments depress local household 
median income. The results in Panel D unambiguously show no policy effect on aggregate 
unemployment rates. The coefficient is not significant and changes sign across samples. 
Overall, these findings imply that social housing availability draw immigrants and poorer 
households. This in turn might have important implications in terms of peer and 
neighbourhood effects on long term residents.        
3.4.2 Robustness tests  
I now turn to several robustness tests to assess the internal validity of my results. The first 
two tests deal with issues stemming from spatial spillovers. Assuming social housing is seen 
as a disamenity, residents living near SRU treated municipalities might leave and relocate 
elsewhere. If this population flight mostly concerns natives, one might worry that the 
previous results are underestimated. On the other hand, if native residents of treated 
municipalities flee to neighbouring municipalities (to avoid interactions with social dwellers 
but stay within the same local labour market), the previous findings could be 
overestimated. I begin by testing the sensitivity of my findings when restricting the control 
group to the outer ring neighbouring municipalities only. The sample is thus made of only 
the treated municipalities belonging to the urban units of Paris and Meaux and boundary 
municipalities (control group). That is, my sample comprises the red and grey 
municipalities in Figure 4. Doing so might restrict the potential for social housing spillovers 
to contaminate the analysis as I free the sample from some municipalities contiguous to 
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treated administrative units. I present 2SLS estimates using municipalities with a population 
in the 800-6,000 inhabitants range in 1999 in Table 3.6. Each column reports the 
coefficient estimates of separate regressions measuring the effect of social housing 
provision on alternative municipality outcomes. First stage least squares results (in 
Appendix Table C.11) show that the policy reform is found to have a positive and 
significant effect on social housing supply. In turn, a higher social housing stock is 
associated with a greater share of foreigners in the population. This positive association is 
driven by immigrant women as earlier (Panel A, columns 1-3). The point estimates are 
quite close to the ones discussed previously. For instance, the impact of the share of social 
dwellings on the percentage of foreigners is approximately equal to 0.5 pp as opposed to 
0.6 pp earlier. I also find a positive and significant effect on inactive migrants. With respect 
to the income distribution, median household income decreases by approximately 630 
euros for every additional pp increase of the social housing stock. These results are robust 
to alternative population-based samples. In sum, this robustness test supports the validity 
of the findings discussed earlier.  
To address the possible spillover issue further, I construct a different sample containing the 
municipalities that are part of the second external ring, and all the municipalities within the 
policy territory (Appendix Figure C.2). This sample experiment provides another test 
aiming at alleviating spatial spillover concerns. However, the potential for heterogeneity in 
unobservable characteristics increases as some control units now lie farther away from the 
SRU Law eligibility boundary. I additionally restrict the sample to units with a population 
in the 800-6,000 range in 1999. The results are presented in Table 3.7, which is structured 
in a similar fashion as the previous one. The main conclusions discussed earlier are robust 
to this sample modification. The SRU policy coefficient estimate is positive and significant 
(see Appendix Table C.12). The strength of the first stage is weaker, however. In 
consequence, I lose statistical significance in the 2SLS results. Reduced form estimates are 
generally stronger as can be seen in Appendix Table C.12. The share of female29 and 
foreign students is still positively associated with social housing supply, whereas median 
income is a negative function of social dwelling availability. Interestingly, the social housing 
sector is now found to enhance diversity among the socio-professional categories occupied 
by migrants. This finding is in line with the objective of the French social housing policy, 
which aims at attracting heterogeneous groups and fostering the mingling of populations. 
                                                          
29 The coefficient is borderline significant at the 10% level.  
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Overall these two tests do not suggest that spatial spillovers are a serious concern for the 
validity of the main findings discussed earlier.  
The next robustness test exploits the spatial discontinuity of the SRU policy eligibility 
criteria further. I restrict the analysis to municipalities adjacent to the Paris and Meaux 
urban units’ boundaries. In other words, I limit the sample to units located just ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ the urban units of Paris and Meaux as shown in Appendix Figure A.3. Once this 
selection has been operated, the sample is further restricted to municipalities with a 
population size around the 1,500 residents threshold as before. This new sample definition 
reduces the risk that unbalanced unobservable characteristics might be driving the patterns 
identified so far. The approach is somewhat akin to a boundary discontinuity design. This 
test comes at a cost of a higher potential for spatial spillovers. First stage and reduced form 
results are displayed in Appendix Table C.13. I find additional evidence that the SRU policy 
has augmented the provision of social dwellings. The policy point estimate is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. It is also of a magnitude similar to the ones 
found earlier. The 2SLS estimates are displayed in Table 3.8. Again, in every column a 
different dependent variable is considered. The results in column 1 show that the share of 
foreigners increases with social housing supply. Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A indicate that 
migrant women presence increases in areas with more low income housing. The coefficient 
estimates shown in Panel B are in accordance with the earlier findings as well. Social 
housing provision is positively and statistically significantly associated with foreign student 
presence. It also appears to reduce median household incomes. In sum, the results of this 
additional sensitivity check strengthen the credibility of the main findings.  
Last, I take advantage of the SRU policy geographic criteria and design a placebo test. It 
compares the outcomes of the first and second contiguous municipalities outside the urban 
units of Meaux and Paris (Appendix Figure C.2) with a population relatively close to 1,500 
residents. I design the placebo test as follows. I assume that all the municipalities belonging 
to the first contiguity external ring are treated in the last two time periods. The second ring 
constitutes the control group throughout the four time periods. I estimate Equations (3.2) 
and (3.3) using this sample and report results in Table 3.9.  The dependent variable in Panel 
A is the social housing stock. As expected, in none of the five columns where alternative 
population based samples are used is the policy binary indicator statistically significant. 
Point estimates are imprecisely estimated and change signs across columns. Panel B 
concentrates on the share of foreigners and report reduced form estimates. Reassuringly, 
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no policy effect is detected here either. Overall, this placebo test strengthens the credibility 
of the identification strategy adopted.  
 
3.5 Additional findings: Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse 
This section extends the analysis to the three largest French metropolitan units after Paris. 
It begins with the urban unit of Lyon. It then discusses Toulouse and Marseille before 
pooling the data from the four metropolitan areas studied and assessing heterogeneous 
policy effects. 
3.5.1 Lyon 
Lyon is the second largest metropolitan area in France. It is located in the Eastern part of 
the country. The population of its urban unit totalled 1.6 million residents in 2014. Its 
stock of social housing is relatively high and represents 19% of the primary residences of 
the urban unit. Foreigners represent close to 9% of the population, which is above the 
national average (Appendix Table C.14). Lyon is a major centre for banking, as well as for 
the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotech industries. 
The municipalities belonging to Lyon’s urban unit are shown in Appendix Figure C.4 and 
highlighted in green. The units coloured in grey are municipalities directly adjacent to the 
urban unit boundary. This urban unit lies at the intersection of three districts as can be seen 
in the map30. Appendix Figure C.5 shows in red the municipalities which were treated in 
2002, i.e., required to provide a greater number of social dwellings according to Article 55 
of the SRU reform. I replicate the analysis previously conducted for this metropolitan area. 
I only consider municipalities that are part of the urban unit of Lyon and the ones 
contiguous to it. Since the population thresholds used for regions other than the Ile de 
France by the SRU policy is 3,500 residents, I use slightly different population cut-offs to 
define my sample. To be specific, in what follows I present results based on municipalities 
with population sizes lying in the [500; 9,000], [1,000; 8,000], and [1,500; 7,500] intervals in 
1999. The rest of the empirical methodology is identical to the previous section.  
First stage results are presented in Appendix Table C.15. For each of the three samples I 
present results obtained with and without a district linear time trend. The policy appears to 
                                                          
30 These districts (départements) are: Ain, Isere, and Rhône. 
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have stimulated the construction of social housing units. In all samples, the effect of the 
SRU policy on social housing provision is positive and statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the policy impact seems a little inferior to the one in Ile de France. I focus on 
the foreign population and median income in Table 3.10. The availability of social housing 
does not seem to have any effect on the share of migrants. The estimated coefficients are 
positive but insignificant in all three samples. This finding is quite puzzling and will be 
discussed in greater detail later on. Diversity among professional categories is not affected 
either (Appendix Table C.17). The impact on household median income is negative as in 
Ile de France. The magnitude of the impact is lower and insignificant, however. Therefore, 
it seems that the SRU policy has encouraged the production of social rental units to some 
modest extent in the metropolitan area of Lyon. However, social housing does not appear 
to stimulate much ethnic or professional category diversity here. One reason for the 
absence of statistical significance in the 2SLS results could stem from the relatively low 
impact of the policy reform on the social housing sector. These findings must be 
interpreted with caution consequently.  
3.5.2 Toulouse  
The second metropolitan area I focus on is Toulouse. Situated in the Southwestern part of 
the country, its urban unit had close to one million inhabitants in 2014. It is the urban unit 
with the lowest share of foreigners and social housing units among the areas studied. 
Toulouse is known for being the centre of the European aerospace industry.  
Appendix Figures C.6 and C.7 shows the urban unit of Toulouse and its neighbouring 
municipalities. I replicate the same analysis as above based on municipalities with a 
population relatively close to 3,500 inhabitants and lying within or at the periphery of the 
Toulouse urban unit. The impact of the SRU policy on social housing supply is shown in 
Appendix Table C.18. While the study area overlaps with two districts, once the sample is 
limited to units with a smaller population, only one district is left in the sample. For that 
reason, I cannot estimate a linear district trend in the first stage with these two samples. I 
find evidence that the policy has encouraged municipal authorities to provide more social 
dwellings. The policy coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in all 
samples. It is also somewhat larger than in Ile de France.   
Table 3.11 concentrates on the effect of social housing on foreign population presence and 
median income. As in Lyon, social housing supply does not appear to affect the share of 
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foreigners in the population. The estimated coefficient is positive but always insignificant. I 
also find evidence of a negative impact on median income suggesting that population with 
lower incomes have settled in treated units. The household income reduced form estimates 
are significant but the 2SLS estimates are not. As in Lyon, the evidence presented here 
suggests that social housing provision has limited impacts on the municipalities in which 
they are built with respect to population composition.   
3.5.3 Marseille  
The last metropolitan area I study is Marseille. It is the third largest metropolitan area 
according to the 2012 census. 7% of its 1.6 million inhabitants are foreigners. Marseille is 
France’s largest port for commerce, freight and cruise ships. 
The implementation of the research design used so far is a little more complicated here. 
The urban unit of Marseille lies in close proximity to the urban units of Toulon and 
Avignon (Appendix Figures C.8 and C.9). To take this feature into account while 
preserving the empirical approach followed up to now, I concentrate on the three urban 
units. As earlier I identify the municipalities lying at the boundary of these urban units and 
select them to comprise the control arm. I further limit my sample to the municipalities 
with a population around the 3,500 inhabitants cut-off.  
First stage results are shown in Appendix Table C.21. The point estimates suggest that in 
the broad metropolitan area of Marseille studied the SRU policy has also increased the 
availability of social dwellings. The policy coefficient is positive in all six columns. 
Statistical significance is lost in the smaller sample however (columns 5 and 6). Moreover, 
the size of the policy impact implies a lower effect of the policy on the housing sector. 
Instrumental variable estimates can be seen in Table 3.12. The estimated effect of social 
housing supply is in line with the previous findings. It has a positive but insignificant effect 
on the share of foreigners, while its effect on the median income is negative and 
insignificant. The conclusions derived here are to be taken with caution as the policy 
appears to have had a modest effect on the social housing sector. The 2SLS results are 
therefore based on relatively weak first stages. 
3.5.4 Pooled regressions and interactions 
Having conducted the analysis for each urban unit separately thus far, I now pool all the 
four datasets together and replicate the analysis. I then assess whether the impact of social 
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housing provision is conditional on the political orientation of municipalities, the size of 
the initial foreign population, and labour market tightness. The analysis is based on the 
municipalities belonging to and bordering the urban units studied. The set of cross-
sectional units is further constrained to those with a population in the 800-6,000 residents 
range in Ile de France in 1999. In the three other study areas I select the municipalities with 
populations in the 1,000-8,000 inhabitants bandwidth.  
Table 3.13 presents first stage results based on the estimation of Equation (3.2) defined 
above. In the first two columns, I present regressions results for the four study areas with 
and without a district linear time trend. The third column excludes the Ile de France 
sample. The Marseille sample is omitted in column 4. The last column focuses on Lyon and 
Toulouse only. In all five columns I find evidence of a positive and significant effect of the 
SRU policy on the stock of social dwellings. The coefficients are stable and approximately 
equal to 1 pp. It is clear from these estimates that the greater Paris region is not driving the 
results.  
In the next table, I show 2SLS estimates of the impact of social housing supply on the 
share of foreigners, the income distribution, and professional occupation diversity. Table 
3.14 is structured as earlier with three panels for each dependent variable considered. The 
results displayed in Panel A indicate a positive and significant impact of the policy on the 
relative presence of migrants when all the observations are used (column 1). Looking at the 
three other columns, it is clear the estimates in column 1 are due to the inclusion of the Ile 
de France sample. When the latter is omitted in columns 2 and 4, the coefficient turns 
insignificant and much smaller in size. Panel B supports the finding that municipalities with 
a larger share of social dwellings tend to have lower median incomes. The estimated social 
housing coefficient is negative across the four samples. The impact magnitude is plausible 
and ranges between 630 euros and 965 euros. Lastly, the estimates in Panel C confirm the 
absence of any effect on aggregate professional occupation diversity discussed earlier. 
Social housing supply has no significant effect in all of the four samples.   
In the final Table 3.15, I report interaction terms with the objective of elucidating possible 
conditional effects. I concentrate on three potential mechanisms. First, I investigate 
whether the effect of social housing is higher in travel-to-work areas with a larger foreign 
population. Previous research has shown that immigrants tend to locate in areas where a 
sizable co-ethnic population presence (see e.g., Zavodny 1999, Bauer et al. 2005). Such 
areas provide migrants with access to larger social networks. I assess next the contribution 
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of the local unemployment rate31. Damm (2009) finds that refugees in Denmark tend to 
leave economically more deprived regions. Everything else equal social housing 
developments located in dynamic labour markets should be more attractive. I focus last on 
local political preferences. I interact social housing supply with a binary indicator measuring 
whether in the 1995 presidential elections the Socialist party candidate won more than 50% 
of the cast votes in the second round against the right-wing candidate and ultimately 
winner Jacques Chirac. This approach allows to me to broadly distinguish between right-
wing and left-wing oriented municipalities. I avoid using post SRU reform political 
outcomes to limit endogeneity issues. By bringing in relatively disadvantaged households, 
new social housing developments might affect local political preferences. As is common in 
the literature, I use the interaction of the policy reform dummy with each of these three 
variables as instrument. I introduce separately the three interaction terms in the first three 
columns of Table 3.15, and include them all in the last one.  
The baseline coefficient is positive and significant in all columns except the first. The 
estimates in columns 1 and 4 indicate that the effect of social housing supply is larger in 
TTWAs with more migrants. This suggests that social housing units offering a greater 
access to social networks are more attractive to migrants. This is consistent with evidence 
from Munshi (2003) and Edin et al. (2003) of a positive impact of ethnic networks on 
labour outcomes. On the other hand, the attractiveness of low income housing appears to 
be lower in sluggish labour markets. The interaction between social housing and the 
unemployment rate is negative and significant in column 4. I do not find any evidence of a 
nonlinear effect depending on the political orientation of municipalities. These findings 
must be interpreted with caution, however. The power of the first stage is not always 
strong enough to discard econometric issues related to weak instruments.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Social housing provision is one of the main policy tools used by the French government to 
promote access to decent accommodation and social diversity in medium and large cities. 
This paper assesses whether this public policy attracts immigrants and generates greater 
social mixing in France’s largest metropolitan units. The empirical analysis relies on a quasi-
experimental research design exploiting a nationwide policy reform. I find solid evidence of 
                                                          
31 It is defined at the TTWA level as well.  
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a positive relationship between social housing and ethnic diversity in the municipalities of 
the Greater Paris region. Social housing is also found to lower median household income. 
This median income depression effect holds in the urban units of Lyon, Marseille and 
Toulouse. However, no effect is detected on ethnic diversity there. Further, in all four 
study areas I fail to find any effect on professional occupation diversity. Overall my results 
suggest that the French affordable housing policy is successful in attracting lower income 
households. It also promotes ethnic diversity in areas with tight labour markets and access 
to ethnic-based social networks.  
The econometric strategy based on policy discontinuities imposes lower external validity. 
The empirical findings still offer valuable lessons to French lawmakers and other developed 
countries contemplating reforms of their social housing policies. The French experience 
suggests affordable housing policies can be successful in decreasing income segregation in 
housing markets. It also suggests that local economic conditions and ethnic diversity affect 
the extent to which social housing supply attracts immigrants.   
Findings in this paper add to the small but growing literature on the impact of social 
housing developments on the neighbourhoods in which they are built as well as the 
literature on immigrant location decisions. A number of questions for further research are 
raised. The analysis has measured the net effect of social housing on ethnic composition 
and social diversity at the municipality level. Due to the research design and data 
constraints, little can be said on channels and micro impacts. In particular, it remains to be 
seen whether foreigners live in in the private or social sector in the Ile de France 
municipalities with a higher stock of social housing. At the very local level, affordable 
housing construction may bring about various costs and benefits to surrounding 
neighbourhood residents. These might vary depending on neighbouring characteristics, and 
ultimately affect the residential choices of the native population. More evidence is needed 
in this respect.  
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3.7 Main Tables & Figures 
 
Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Balancing tests on pre-treatment characteristics 
 
  Control (n=111) Treated (n=78) t-stat  p-value 
Population 2.146 3.538 -6.950 0.000 
Social housing stock (%) 4.875 5.398 -0.485 0.628 
TTWA unemployment rate 10.081 10.155 -0.219 0.827 
TTWA industrial employment share 15.539 14.767 2.011 0.046 
TTWA public administration employment share 32.728 32.581 0.629 0.530 
Foreigners (% population) 5.379 5.117 0.416 0.678 
Male foreigners (% population) 2.739 2.712 0.082 0.934 
Female foreigners (% population) 2.640 2.405 0.652 0.515 
Foreign children (% population less 15 y. old) 2.844 3.362 -0.558 0.578 
Unemployed foreigners (%  population 15+ old) 0.378 0.304 0.800 0.425 
Inactive foreigners (%  population 15+ old) 2.044 1.632 1.321 0.188 
Job concentration - foreigners - Herfindahl index 45.564 48.606 -0.681 0.497 
Job concentration - total - Herfindahl index 0.249 0.249 -0.159 0.874 
Median income (Euros) 39948.712 40470.756 -0.508 0.612 
Unemployment rate 7.306 7.255 0.212 0.832 
Notes: 1999 pre-treatment municipality level data. Data source: 1999 French housing and population census. TTWA = France's 1990 zones 
d'emploi. Sample restricted to municipalities with population between 800 and 6,000 inhabitants. 
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Table 3.2: First stage results 
  
             
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
  Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[600 ; 8,000] 
 
[700 ; 7,000] 
 
[800 ; 6,000] 
 
[900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy 1.064*** 0.792** 
 
1.127*** 0.817** 
 
1.082*** 0.743* 
 
1.477*** 1.284*** 
 
1.529*** 1.467*** 
 
(0.353) (0.362) 
 
(0.363) (0.388) 
 
(0.395) (0.424) 
 
(0.383) (0.380) 
 
(0.393) (0.391) 
Unemployment rate 0.183 0.0941 
 
-0.137 -0.155 
 
-0.282 -0.342 
 
-0.0397 0.0210 
 
-0.373 -0.178 
 
(0.425) (0.404) 
 
(0.315) (0.336) 
 
(0.327) (0.349) 
 
(0.376) (0.391) 
 
(0.327) (0.359) 
Industry employment -0.121** -0.0886 
 
-0.0991* -0.0612 
 
-0.102 -0.0710 
 
-0.0966* -0.0603 
 
-0.0905* -0.0479 
 
(0.0586) (0.0556) 
 
(0.0582) (0.0546) 
 
(0.0626) (0.0591) 
 
(0.0507) (0.0540) 
 
(0.0493) (0.0534) 
Public sector employment -0.0544 -0.0588 
 
-0.0207 -0.0196 
 
-0.0139 -0.0150 
 
0.0271 0.0296 
 
0.0213 0.0255 
 
(0.0448) (0.0462) 
 
(0.0415) (0.0416) 
 
(0.0446) (0.0444) 
 
(0.0384) (0.0410) 
 
(0.0388) (0.0408) 
                              
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y     Y     Y     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.341 0.359 
 
0.345 0.359 
 
0.325 0.340 
 
0.364 0.378 
 
0.361 0.376 
Observations 1,072 1,072 
 
984 984 
 
872 872 
 
756 756 
 
632 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. 
Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3.3: Two-stages least squares results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
  Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [600 ; 8,000]   [700 ; 7,000]   [800 ; 6,000]   [900 ; 5,000] 
          
Social housing (%) 0.572* 
 
0.651* 
 
0.778* 
 
0.577** 
 
0.585* 
 
(0.333) 
 
(0.347) 
 
(0.421) 
 
(0.282) 
 
(0.313) 
Unemployment rate 0.109 
 
0.286 
 
0.351 
 
0.0126 
 
0.0686 
 
(0.333) 
 
(0.304) 
 
(0.371) 
 
(0.335) 
 
(0.415) 
Industry employment 0.0547 
 
0.0787 
 
0.111 
 
0.110 
 
0.0670 
 
(0.0768) 
 
(0.0791) 
 
(0.0910) 
 
(0.0752) 
 
(0.0767) 
Public sector employment -0.0118 
 
-0.0120 
 
-0.0307 
 
-0.0725 
 
-0.0814 
 
(0.0423) 
 
(0.0453) 
 
(0.0519) 
 
(0.0454) 
 
(0.0496) 
                    
K-P First stage F-stat 9.12   9.67   7.50   14.88   15.13 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 1,072 
 
984 
 
872 
 
756 
 
632 
Municipalities  268   246   218   189   158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, 
and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment 
shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.4: Two-stages least squares results - other outcomes 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[600 ; 8,000] 
 
[700 ; 7,000] 
 
[800 ; 6,000] 
 
[900 ; 5,000] 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Male foreigners (% population) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.166 
 
0.222 
 
0.252 
 
0.170 
 
0.198 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.164) 
          
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Female foreigners (% population) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.406** 
 
0.429** 
 
0.526** 
 
0.407** 
 
0.387** 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.173) 
          
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Unemployed foreigners (% adult population) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.0831 
 
0.0864 
 
0.108 
 
0.0435 
 
0.0436 
 
(0.0545) 
 
(0.0558) 
 
(0.0687) 
 
(0.0372) 
 
(0.0402) 
          
 
Panel D. Dependent variable: Inactive foreigners (% adult population) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.322* 
 
0.336* 
 
0.422* 
 
0.326** 
 
0.227 
 
(0.173) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.150) 
          
 
Panel E. Dependent variable: Active foreigners (% adult population) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.108 
 
0.207 
 
0.241 
 
0.144 
 
0.238 
 
(0.210) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.198) 
          
 
Panel F. Dependent variable: Foreign students (% adult population) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.0886 
 
0.119* 
 
0.161* 
 
0.0957* 
 
0.0932 
 
(0.0655) 
 
(0.0709) 
 
(0.0897) 
 
(0.0560) 
 
(0.0598) 
          
K-P First stage F-stat 9.12   9.67   7.50   14.88   15.13 
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 1,072 
 
984 
 
872 
 
756 
 
632 
Municipalities  268   246   218   189   158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 
2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are 
defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.5: Two-stages least squares results - other outcomes 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[600 ; 8,000] 
 
[700 ; 7,000] 
 
[800 ; 6,000] 
 
[900 ; 5,000] 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Job diversity - foreigners 
          
Social housing (%) -0.0285 
 
-0.0257 
 
-0.0405 
 
-0.0264 
 
-0.0286 
 
(0.0305) 
 
(0.0315) 
 
(0.0377) 
 
(0.0286) 
 
(0.0306) 
K-P First stage F-stat [11.20] 
 
[11.17] 
 
[8.37] 
 
[15.75] 
 
[16.10] 
Observations 1,019 
 
940 
 
834 
 
729 
 
613 
          
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Job diversity - total 
          
Social housing (%) 0.0165 
 
0.0127 
 
0.0139 
 
0.00748 
 
0.0109 
 
(0.0104) 
 
(0.00896) 
 
(0.0104) 
 
(0.00657) 
 
(0.00756) 
K-P First stage F-stat [9.12] 
 
[9.67] 
 
[7.50] 
 
[14.88] 
 
[15.13] 
Observations 1,072 
 
984 
 
872 
 
756 
 
632 
          
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Median income 
          
Social housing (%) -404.2* 
 
-413.9* 
 
-397.5 
 
-519.9* 
 
-433.3 
 
(219.2) 
 
(223.5) 
 
(254.9) 
 
(304.2) 
 
(322.7) 
K-P First stage F-stat [23.56] 
 
[23.95] 
 
[19.01] 
 
[15.70] 
 
[15.21] 
Observations 804 
 
738 
 
654 
 
567 
 
474 
          
 
Panel D. Dependent variable: Unemployment rate 
          
Social housing (%) -0.0369 
 
-0.0481 
 
0.0427 
 
-0.0105 
 
0.0367 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.133) 
K-P First stage F-stat [9.12] 
 
[9.67] 
 
[7.50] 
 
[14.88] 
 
[15.13] 
Observations 1,072 
 
984 
 
872 
 
756 
 
632 
                    
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Municipalities  268   246   218   189   158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 
2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares 
are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.6: Outer rings and treated municipalities 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
Panel A 
 
Total  
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Unemployed 
 
Inactive 
Dependent Foreigners  
 
foreigners  
 
foreigners  
 
foreigners 
 
foreigners 
variable: (% pop) 
 
(% pop) 
 
(% pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
                  
Social housing (%) 0.478** 
 
0.156 
 
0.322*** 
 
0.0356 
 
0.266** 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.0248) 
 
(0.105) 
K-P First stage F-stat [36.31] 
 
[36.31] 
 
[36.31] 
 
[36.31] 
 
[36.31] 
Observations 632 
 
632 
 
632 
 
632 
 
632 
                    
 
Panel B 
 
Active 
 
Foreign 
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity 
 
Median 
Dependent foreigners 
 
students 
 
(foreigners) 
 
(total) 
 
income 
variable: (% adult pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
Herfindahl 
 
Herfindahl 
 
(euros) 
 
  
 
              
Social housing (%) 0.109 
 
0.0566 
 
0.00267 
 
0.00285 
 
-631.2** 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0189) 
 
(0.00441) 
 
(292.4) 
K-P First stage F-stat [36.31] 
 
[36.31] 
 
[38.48] 
 
[36.31] 
 
[17.80] 
Observations 632 
 
632 
 
609 
 
632 
 
474 
                    
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Municipalities  158   158   158   158   158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with population in the 
[800 ; 6,000] range in 1999. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and 
public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. Herfindahl indices are expressed in logs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7: Second outer ring municipalities 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
Panel A 
 
Total  
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Unemployed 
 
Inactive 
Dependent Foreigners  
 
foreigners  
 
foreigners  
 
foreigners 
 
foreigners 
variable: (% pop) 
 
(% pop) 
 
(% pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.350 
 
0.0497 
 
0.301 
 
0.0427 
 
0.228 
 
(0.319) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.0472) 
 
(0.160) 
K-P First stage F-stat [10.89] 
 
[10.89] 
 
[10.89] 
 
[10.89] 
 
[10.89] 
Observations 724 
 
724 
 
724 
 
724 
 
724 
                    
 
Panel B 
 
Active 
 
Foreign 
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity 
 
Median 
Dependent foreigners 
 
students 
 
(foreigners) 
 
(total) 
 
income 
variable: (% adult pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  
 
(euros) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.0191 
 
0.123* 
 
-0.0835* 
 
0.0117 
 
-490.8 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.0719) 
 
(0.0470) 
 
(0.00908) 
 
(302.1) 
K-P First stage F-stat [10.89] 
 
[10.89] 
 
[9.78] 
 
[10.89] 
 
[16.14] 
Observations 724 
 
724 
 
695 
 
724 
 
543 
                    
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Municipalities  181   181   181   181   181 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with population in the [800 ; 
6,000] range in 1999. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public 
administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. Herfindahl indices are expressed in logs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.8: Boundary rings 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
Panel A 
 
Total  
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Unemployed 
 
Inactive 
Dependent Foreigners  
 
foreigners  
 
foreigners  
 
foreigners 
 
foreigners 
variable: (% pop) 
 
(% pop) 
 
(% pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.905** 
 
0.312* 
 
0.593*** 
 
0.0743 
 
0.407** 
 
(0.376) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.0474) 
 
(0.189) 
K-P First stage F-stat [12.33] 
 
[12.33] 
 
[12.33] 
 
[12.33] 
 
[12.33] 
Observations 592 
 
592 
 
592 
 
592 
 
592 
                    
 
Panel B 
 
Active 
 
Foreign 
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity 
 
Median 
Dependent foreigners 
 
students 
 
(foreigners) 
 
(total) 
 
income 
variable: (% adult pop) 
 
(% adult pop) 
 
Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  
 
(euros) 
          
Social housing (%) 0.390* 
 
0.111* 
 
-0.0395 
 
0.00331 
 
-1,314** 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.0628) 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(0.00697) 
 
(646.6) 
K-P First stage F-stat [12.33] 
 
[12.33] 
 
[13.56] 
 
[12.33] 
 
[6.69] 
Observations 592 
 
592 
 
567 
 
592 
 
444 
                    
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Municipalities  148   148   148   148   148 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with population in the 
[800 ; 6,000] range in 1999. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment 
and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. Herfindahl indices are expressed in logs. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.9: Placebo test 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] [600 ; 8,000] [700 ; 7,000] [800 ; 6,000] [900 ; 5,000] 
 
Panel A 
 
Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
      
SRU policy 0.143 0.0108 -0.0141 -0.271 -0.228 
 
(0.333) (0.332) (0.354) (0.384) (0.442) 
R-squared [0.219] [0.224] [0.224] [0.230] [0.227] 
            
 
Panel B 
 
Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
      
SRU policy 0.148 -0.173 -0.276 -0.554 -0.435 
 
(0.416) (0.431) (0.469) (0.495) (0.575) 
R-squared [0.033] [0.033] [0.037] [0.037] [0.036] 
            
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 852 792 700 608 524 
Municipalities  213 198 175 152 131 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 
2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration 
employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level and controlled for. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.10: Lyon - 2SLS results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Foreigners (% population) 
 
Median income 
Population 
sample: 
[500 ;  
9,000]  
[1,000 ;  
8,000]  
[1,500 ;  
7,500]  
[500 ;  
9,000]  
[1,000 ;  
8,000]  
[1,500 ; 
 7,500] 
            
Social  0.0225 
 
0.111 
 
0.160 
 
-619.0 
 
-344.1 
 
-85.53 
housing (0.469) 
 
(0.548) 
 
(0.543) 
 
(494.9) 
 
(361.8) 
 
(233.1) 
                        
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Muni. FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 528 
 
436 
 
336 
 
396 
 
327 
 
252 
Municipalities  132   109   84   132   109   84 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Lyon area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 
French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are 
defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.11: Toulouse - 2SLS results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Foreigners (% population) 
 
Median income 
Population 
sample: 
[500 ;  
9,000]  
[1,000 ; 
8,000]  
[1,500 ; 
7,500]  
[500 ;  
9,000]  
[1,000 ; 
8,000]  
[1,500 ; 
7,500] 
            
Social housing  0.0807 
 
0.0483 
 
0.175 
 
-7,895 
 
-2,689 
 
-1,567 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.172) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(15,053) 
 
(3,199) 
 
(2,509) 
                        
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 392 
 
280 
 
208 
 
294 
 
210 
 
156 
Municipalities  98   70   52   98   70   52 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Toulouse area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, 
and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment 
shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.12: Marseille - 2SLS results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
 
Median income 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
 
[500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000; 8,000] 
 
[1,500; 7,500] 
            
Social housing  0.229 
 
0.486 
 
1.117 
 
-398.9 
 
-350.5 
 
-167.7 
 
(0.499) 
 
(0.626) 
 
(1.217) 
 
(478.7) 
 
(518.5) 
 
(659.2) 
                        
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 416 
 
380 
 
320 
 
312 
 
285 
 
240 
Municipalities 104   95   80 
 
 104 
 
 95 
 
80  
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Marseille area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing 
censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 3.13: Pooled first stage results 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
Sample: All four study areas 
 
Excludes Ile de 
France   
Excludes 
Marseille   
Lyon and 
Toulouse only 
         
SRU policy 1.090*** 1.169*** 
 
1.047*** 
 
1.344*** 
 
1.387*** 
 
(0.198) (0.198) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.316) 
Observations [1,852] [1,852] 
 
[1,096] 
 
[1,472] 
 
[716] 
R-squared 0.392 0.412 
 
0.445 
 
0.418 
 
0.472 
         
Covariates Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Municipalities 463 463   274   368   179 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Municipalities with population in 800-6,000 range in 1999 for the Ile-
de-France region. Municipalities with population in 1,000-8,000 range in 1999 for the other study areas. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 
French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the 
travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.14: Pooled two-stages least squares results 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Sample: 
All four study 
areas  
Excludes Ile de 
France   
Excludes 
Marseille   
Lyon and 
Toulouse only 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
        
Social housing (%) 0.400** 
 
0.00382 
 
0.422** 
 
0.0530 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.188) 
K-P First stage F-stat [30.38] 
 
[15.88] 
 
[30.64] 
 
[17.72] 
Observations 1,852 
 
1,096 
 
1,472 
 
716 
        
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Median income 
        
Social housing (%)  -632.9** 
 
-821.1* 
 
-702.8*** 
 
-964.0** 
 
(246.5) 
 
(423.9) 
 
(251.5) 
 
(471.0) 
K-P First stage F-stat [26.34] 
 
[8.09] 
 
[27.36] 
 
[7.85] 
Observations 1,389 
 
822 
 
1,104 
 
537 
        
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Job diversity (total) - Herfindahl (log) 
        
Social housing (%)  0.00907 
 
0.00487 
 
0.00831 
 
0.00508 
 
(0.00583) 
 
(0.00905) 
 
(0.00555) 
 
(0.00891) 
K-P First stage F-stat [30.38] 
 
[15.88] 
 
[30.64] 
 
[17.72] 
Observations 1,852 
 
1,096 
 
1,472 
 
716 
                
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipalities  463   274   368   179 
Notes: Social housing stock instrumented with SRU policy binary variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. 
Municipalities with population in 800-6,000 range in 1999 for the Ile-de-France region. Municipalities with population in 1,000-8,000 range in 1999 for 
the other study areas. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment 
and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.15: Two-stages least squares conditional effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Dependent variable: foreigners (% population) 
          
Social housing  -0.172 0.851** 0.397** 0.707* 
 
(0.348) (0.404) (0.181) (0.419) 
Social housing * TTWA foreign population  0.0535 
  
0.0633* 
 
(0.0337) 
  
(0.0334) 
Social housing * TTWA unemployment rate  
 
-0.0426 
 
-0.0932** 
  
(0.0301) 
 
(0.0395) 
Social housing * Socialist party municipality 
  
-0.0481 -0.0183 
   
(0.116) (0.132) 
          
K-P First stage F-stat 10.30 13.67 17.36 4.85 
Covariates Y Y Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,852 1,852 1,852 1,852 
Municipalities  463 463 463 463 
Notes: Social housing stock instrumented with SRU policy binary variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level 
in parentheses. Municipalities with population in 800-6,000 range in 1999 for the Ile-de-France region. Municipalities with population 
in 1,000-8,000 range in 1999 for the other study areas. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing 
censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-
area (TTWA) level. In columns 1 and 4 TTWA foreign population share (net of municipality value) is controlled for. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Social housing and immigrant population in French municipalities 
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Figure 2: Urban units of the Ile de France region affected by the SRU policy reform. 
 
 
Figure 3: Municipalities treated in Ile de France in 2000. 
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Figure 4: Neighbouring municipalities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
Appendix C  
The Elusive Quest for Social Diversity? 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table C.1: Summary statistics 
 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Social housing stock (%) 189 5.09 7.28 
Population 189 2720.05 1516.63 
TTWA unemployment rate 189 10.11 2.29 
TTWA industrial employment share 189 15.22 2.62 
TTWA public administration employment share 189 32.67 1.58 
Foreigners (% population) 189 5.27 4.27 
Male foreigners (% population) 189 2.73 2.26 
Female foreigners (% population) 189 2.54 2.44 
Foreign children (% population less 15 y. old) 189 3.06 6.28 
Unemployed foreigners (%  population 15+ old) 189 0.35 0.63 
Inactive foreigners (%  population 15+ old) 189 1.87 2.12 
Job concentration - foreigners - Herfindahl index 189 46.82 30.18 
Job concentration - total - Herfindahl index 189 24.88 2.08 
Median income (€) 189 40164.16 6940.53 
Unemployment rate 189 7.29 1.64 
Notes: Municipality level data. Data source: 1999 French housing and population census. TTWA = France's 1990 
zones d'emploi. Sample restricted to municipalities with population between 800 and 6,000 inhabitants. 
 
 
 
Table C.2: Granger causality test - anticipatory and post-treatment effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
            
SRU policy t+2 1.138 1.171 -0.0105 0.281 -2.007 
 
(2.353) (2.372) (2.653) (2.667) (1.696) 
SRU policy t+1 0.729 0.970 -0.114 0.921 -1.628 
 
(2.441) (2.465) (2.769) (2.746) (1.909) 
SRU policy t 1.538 1.727 0.566 1.639 -0.867 
 
(2.443) (2.475) (2.788) (2.774) (1.939) 
SRU policy t-1 2.664 2.909 1.734 2.768 0.382 
 
(2.450) (2.476) (2.769) (2.755) (1.877) 
            
Population size [500 ; 9000] [600 ; 8000] [700 ; 7000] [800 ; 6000] [900 ; 5000] 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.345 0.349 0.329 0.372 0.371 
Observations 1,072 984 872 756 632 
Municipalities  268 246 218 189 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 
2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares 
are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.3: Foreign population – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
 
Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [600 ; 8,000]   [700 ; 7,000]   [800 ; 6,000]   [900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy 0.609** 0.627** 
 
0.734** 0.710** 
 
0.843** 0.843** 
 
0.853** 0.857** 
 
0.894** 0.910** 
 
(0.305) (0.315) 
 
(0.320) (0.333) 
 
(0.355) (0.371) 
 
(0.388) (0.409) 
 
(0.447) (0.459) 
Unemployment rate 0.213 0.271 
 
0.197 0.228 
 
0.131 0.166 
 
-0.0104 0.0278 
 
-0.150 -0.0646 
 
(0.219) (0.220) 
 
(0.233) (0.230) 
 
(0.256) (0.249) 
 
(0.300) (0.292) 
 
(0.389) (0.369) 
Industry employment -0.0143 -0.00698 
 
0.0142 0.0275 
 
0.0318 0.0435 
 
0.0547 0.0564 
 
0.0140 0.0213 
 
(0.0593) (0.0615) 
 
(0.0590) (0.0618) 
 
(0.0621) (0.0648) 
 
(0.0655) (0.0691) 
 
(0.0538) (0.0561) 
Public sector employment -0.0429 -0.0472 
 
-0.0255 -0.0277 
 
-0.0415 -0.0459 
 
-0.0569 -0.0624 
 
-0.0689 -0.0771 
 
(0.0352) (0.0359) 
 
(0.0358) (0.0364) 
 
(0.0389) (0.0396) 
 
(0.0412) (0.0423) 
 
(0.0455) (0.0466) 
                              
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y     Y     Y     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.037 0.040 
 
0.034 0.036 
 
0.035 0.037 
 
0.035 0.038 
 
0.035 0.040 
Observations 1,072 1,072 
 
984 984 
 
872 872 
 
756 756 
 
632 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry 
employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.4: Male and female foreigners – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Dependent  Male  Female  
 
Male  Female  
 
Male  Female  
 
Male  Female  
 
Male  Female  
variable: foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
  (% pop) (% pop)   (% pop) (% pop)   (% pop) (% pop)   (% pop) (% pop)   (% pop) (% pop) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[600 ; 8,000] 
 
[700 ; 7,000] 
 
[800 ; 6,000] 
 
[900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy 0.192 0.435** 
 
0.243 0.467*** 
 
0.285 0.558*** 
 
0.263 0.594*** 
 
0.322 0.588** 
 
(0.171) (0.168) 
 
(0.179) (0.179) 
 
(0.199) (0.200) 
 
(0.216) (0.224) 
 
(0.251) (0.241) 
                              
Covariates Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
R-squared 0.048 0.030 
 
0.045 0.027 
 
0.044 0.030 
 
0.044 0.032 
 
0.047 0.034 
Observations 1,072 1,072 
 
984 984 
 
872 872 
 
756 756 
 
632 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry 
employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.5: Unemployed and inactive foreigners – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Dependent Unemployed Inactive 
 
Unemployed Inactive 
 
Unemployed Inactive 
 
Unemployed Inactive 
 
Unemployed Inactive 
variable: foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [600 ; 8,000]   [700 ; 7,000]   [800 ; 6,000]   [900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy 0.0842* 0.341** 
 
0.0907* 0.370** 
 
0.112* 0.461** 
 
0.0518 0.480** 
 
0.0646 0.352 
 
(0.0509) (0.156) 
 
(0.0544) (0.165) 
 
(0.0601) (0.182) 
 
(0.0584) (0.199) 
 
(0.0643) (0.216) 
                              
Covariates Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
R-squared 0.040 0.023 
 
0.038 0.021 
 
0.039 0.024 
 
0.045 0.027 
 
0.043 0.025 
Observations 1,072 1,072 
 
984 984 
 
872 872 
 
756 756 
 
632 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry 
employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.6: Active and student foreigners – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
 
Active Student 
 
Active Student 
 
Active Student 
 
Active Student 
 
Active Student 
Dependent foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
 
foreigners foreigners 
variable: 
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop)  
(% adult 
pop) 
(% adult 
pop) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [600 ; 8,000]   [700 ; 7,000]   [800 ; 6,000]   [900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy 0.189 0.114* 
 
0.274 0.145** 
 
0.309 0.197*** 
 
0.278 0.164** 
 
0.411 0.158* 
 
(0.233) (0.0601) 
 
(0.244) (0.0619) 
 
(0.268) (0.0664) 
 
(0.288) (0.0729) 
 
(0.319) (0.0813) 
                              
Covariates Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
R-squared 0.016 0.128 
 
0.015 0.124 
 
0.018 0.133 
 
0.022 0.118 
 
0.030 0.112 
Observations 1,072 1,072 
 
984 984 
 
872 872 
 
756 756 
 
632 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, 
industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.7: Socio-professional categories – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
 
Socio-professional 
diversity   
Socio-professional 
diversity  
Socio-professional 
diversity  
Socio-professional 
diversity  
Socio-professional 
diversity 
Dependent  (Herfindahl) 
 
(Herfindahl) 
 
(Herfindahl) 
 
(Herfindahl) 
 
(Herfindahl) 
variable: Foreigners Total  
 
Foreigners Total  
 
Foreigners Total  
 
Foreigners Total  
 
Foreigners Total  
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[600 ; 8,000] 
 
[700 ; 7,000] 
 
[800 ; 6,000] 
 
[900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy -0.0317 0.0171** 
 
-0.0304 0.0149* 
 
-0.0414 0.0143 
 
-0.0365 0.00921 
 
-0.0327 0.0138 
 
(0.0359) (0.00774) 
 
(0.0378) (0.00797) 
 
(0.0412) (0.00871) 
 
(0.0447) (0.00899) 
 
(0.0496) (0.0101) 
                              
Covariates Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
R-squared 0.346 0.335 
 
0.350 0.350 
 
0.362 0.341 
 
0.371 0.387 
 
0.397 0.378 
Observations 1,020 1,072 
 
941 984 
 
835 872 
 
729 756 
 
613 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Socio-professional categories are classified into six groups: i) farmers; ii) craftsmen, traders and entrepreneurs; iii) 
executives and higher intellectual professions; iv) intermediate professions; v) employees; vi) workers. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry 
employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. Herfindahl indices are expressed in logs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.8: Socio-professional categories – adult foreign population 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Dependent 
Foreign 
agriculture  
Foreign trade and 
services  
Foreign 
executives  
Foreign 
intermediate  
Foreign 
employee  
Foreign 
worker 
variable: share 
 
share 
 
share 
 
share 
 
share 
 
share 
                        
Social housing (%) 0.0981  1.232  -0.502  1.570  0.481  -2.880 
 
(0.283)  (1.113)  (1.240)  (1.676)  (1.639)  (2.039) 
                        
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 729 
 
729 
 
729 
 
729 
 
729 
 
729 
Municipalities  189   189   189   189   189   189 
Notes: Kleibergen-Paap first stage F-stat is equal to 15.75. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with 
population in the [800 ; 6,000] range in 1999. Socio-professional categories are classified into six groups: i) farmers; ii) craftsmen, traders and entrepreneurs; iii) executives and higher intellectual 
professions; iv) intermediate professions; v) employees; vi) workers. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry 
employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.9: Socio-professional categories – total adult population 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Dependent Agriculture 
 
Trade and 
services  
Executives 
 
Intermediate 
 
Employee 
 
Worker 
variable: share 
 
share 
 
share 
 
share 
 
share 
 
share 
                        
Social housing (%) 0.140 
 
-0.140 
 
-0.508 
 
-0.189 
 
0.544 
 
0.153 
 
(0.0889) 
 
(0.231) 
 
(0.399) 
 
(0.400) 
 
(0.402) 
 
(0.347) 
                        
Covariates Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 756 
 
756 
 
756 
 
756 
 
756 
 
756 
Municipalities  189   189   189   189   189   189 
Notes: Kleibergen-Paap first stage F-stat is equal to 14.88. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with 
population in the [800 ; 6,000] range in 1999. Socio-professional categories are classified into six groups: i) farmers; ii) craftsmen, traders and entrepreneurs; iii) executives and higher 
intellectual professions; iv) intermediate professions; v) employees; vi) workers. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, 
industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.10: Median income and unemployment rate – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Dependent Median  Unemployed 
 
Median  Unemployed 
 
Median  Unemployed 
 
Median  Unemployed 
 
Median  Unemployed 
variable: income rate (%) 
 
income rate (%) 
 
income rate (%) 
 
income rate (%) 
 
income rate (%) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [600 ; 8,000]   [700 ; 7,000]   [800 ; 6,000]   [900 ; 5,000] 
               
SRU policy -653.6*** -0.0640 
 
-639.2** -0.0913 
 
-649.6** 0.00211 
 
-825.2*** -0.0593 
 
-874.2** 0.0507 
 
(247.5) (0.168) 
 
(254.6) (0.175) 
 
(283.6) (0.187) 
 
(314.0) (0.192) 
 
(359.2) (0.205) 
                              
Covariates Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District  trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
R-squared 0.895 0.372 
 
0.900 0.378 
 
0.895 0.371 
 
0.899 0.368 
 
0.903 0.377 
Observations 804 1,072 
 
738 984 
 
654 872 
 
567 756 
 
474 632 
Municipalities  268 268   246 246   218 218   189 189   158 158 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry 
employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.11: Outer ring and treated municipalities – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A 
 Social  Total  Male Female Unemployed Inactive 
Dependent housing Foreigners  foreigners  foreigners  foreigners foreigners 
variable: (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
            
SRU policy 1.932*** 1.129** 0.392 0.737*** 0.0760 0.586** 
 
(0.366) (0.439) (0.241) (0.234) (0.0608) (0.229) 
R-squared [0.421] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046] [0.046] [0.034] 
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632 
              
 
Panel B 
 Active Foreign Job diversity  Job diversity Unemployment Median 
Dependent foreigners students (foreigners) (total) rate income 
variable: (%) (%) Herfindahl  Herfindahl  (%) (euros) 
 
            
SRU policy 0.370 0.151* 0.00912 0.00422 0.203 -1,074*** 
 
(0.284) (0.0802) (0.0469) (0.00977) (0.206) (331.8) 
R-squared [0.027] [0.153] [0.418] [0.424] [0.343] [0.902] 
Observations 632 632 609 632 632 474 
              
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with 
population in the [800 ; 6,000] range in 1999. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment 
rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level and controlled for. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
173 
 
 
Table C.12: Second outer ring municipalities as control – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A 
 
Social housing Total  Male Female Unemployed Inactive 
Dependent stock Foreigners  foreigners  foreigners  foreigners foreigners 
variable: (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
       
SRU policy 1.078*** 0.475 0.0801 0.395* 0.0451 0.282 
 
(0.380) (0.407) (0.209) (0.227) (0.0619) (0.180) 
R-squared [0.396] [0.021] [0.027] [0.026] [0.048] [0.030] 
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 724 
              
 
Panel B 
 
Active Foreign Job diversity  Job diversity Unemployment Median 
Dependent foreigners students (foreigners) (total) rate income 
variable: (%) (%) Herfindahl  Herfindahl   (%) (euros) 
       
SRU policy 0.106 0.161** -0.102** 0.0134 0.386 -752.2** 
 
(0.316) (0.0729) (0.0473) (0.00961) (0.235) (328.4) 
R-squared [0.013] [0.105] [0.353] [0.321] [0.303] [0.911] 
Observations 724 724 695 724 724 543 
              
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with population in the [800 ; 6,000] range in 
1999. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares 
are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level and controlled for. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.13: Boundary rings – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A 
 
Social  Total  Male Female Unemployed Inactive 
Dependent  housing Foreigners  foreigners  foreigners  foreigners foreigners 
variable: (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
            
SRU policy 1.517*** 1.331*** 0.458* 0.874*** 0.117* 0.610** 
 
(0.432) (0.476) (0.255) (0.253) (0.0678) (0.243) 
R-squared [0.352] [0.045] [0.044] [0.045] [0.031] [0.028] 
Observations 592 592 592 592 592 592 
              
 
Panel B 
 
Active Foreign Job diversity  Job diversity Unemployed Median 
Dependent  foreigners students (foreigners) (total) rate income 
variable: (%) (%) Herfindahl  Herfindahl   (%) (euros) 
 
            
SRU policy 0.573* 0.181** -0.0499 0.00383 0.206 -1,398*** 
 
(0.318) (0.0845) (0.0555) (0.0105) (0.230) (369.7) 
R-squared [0.023] [0.122] [0.351] [0.359] [0.341] [0.896] 
Observations 592 592 567 592 592 444 
              
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Ile de France sample. Sample based on municipalities with 
population in the [800 ; 6,000] range in 1999. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment 
rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level and controlled for. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.14: Urban unit characteristics 
 
  France Paris Lyon Marseille Toulouse 
Total population (thousands) 65,907 10,659 1,620 1,578 935 
Foreign population (thousands) 4,200 1,526 141 110 69 
Foreign population (%) 6.4 14.3 8.7 7.0 7.4 
Social housing (%) 14.7 23.7 19.0 16.6 5.6 
Unemployment rate (%)* 10.4 9.8 9.8 11.1 10.5 
Notes: Insee 2014 data. Urban unit level data. * 15-64 years old population. 2014 data 
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Table C.15: Lyon - first stage 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 
Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [1,000 ; 8,000]   [1,500 ; 7,500] 
         
SRU policy 0.766** 0.781** 
 
0.657* 0.732* 
 
0.748* 0.846** 
 
(0.341) (0.343) 
 
(0.363) (0.371) 
 
(0.393) (0.401) 
Unemployment rate -0.665 -0.679 
 
-0.785 -0.842 
 
-0.146 -0.0693 
 
(0.845) (0.913) 
 
(0.727) (0.834) 
 
(1.625) (1.847) 
Industry employment 0.850* 0.839* 
 
1.062** 0.998** 
 
0.831 0.785 
 
(0.479) (0.479) 
 
(0.446) (0.443) 
 
(1.113) (1.092) 
Public sector employment 0.0804 0.0777 
 
0.0613 0.0429 
 
-0.0804 -0.0980 
 
(0.115) (0.115) 
 
(0.144) (0.145) 
 
(0.107) (0.128) 
                  
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.462 0.462 
 
0.496 0.498 
 
0.517 0.522 
Observations 528 528 
 
436 436 
 
336 336 
Municipalities  132 132   109 109   84 84 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Lyon area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 
2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares 
are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table C.16: Lyon - Immigrant population – reduced form estimates 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
 
Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000]   [1,000 ; 8,000]   [1,500 ; 7,500] 
         
SRU policy 0.0173 -0.0494 
 
0.0728 -0.0453 
 
0.120 -0.00418 
 
(0.364) (0.355) 
 
(0.362) (0.346) 
 
(0.402) (0.382) 
Unemployment rate -0.812** -0.955*** 
 
-1.021** -1.201** 
 
-1.175** -1.446*** 
 
(0.361) (0.352) 
 
(0.449) (0.459) 
 
(0.512) (0.466) 
Industry employment 0.0685 0.0774 
 
0.227** 0.264** 
 
0.343 0.396 
 
(0.127) (0.141) 
 
(0.0928) (0.123) 
 
(0.234) (0.257) 
Public sector employment 0.0890 0.0967 
 
0.0414 0.0637 
 
-0.00739 0.0116 
 
(0.114) (0.116) 
 
(0.129) (0.134) 
 
(0.127) (0.123) 
                  
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Departement trend   Y   
 
Y   
 
Y 
R-squared 0.076 0.081 
 
0.137 0.154 
 
0.149 0.182 
Observations 528 528 
 
436 436 
 
336 336 
Municipalities  132 132   109 109   84 84 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Lyon area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 
French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined 
at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table C.17: Lyon – Job diversity, unemployment and median income – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Population 
sample: 
[500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
 
Panel A 
 
Job diversity  Job diversity 
 
Job diversity  Job diversity 
 
Job diversity  Job diversity 
Dependent  (foreigners) (total) 
 
(foreigners) (total) 
 
(foreigners) (total) 
variable: Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl) 
                  
SRU policy 0.0149 0.0225 
 
0.0217 0.0291* 
 
0.0574 0.0207 
 
(0.0621) (0.0158) 
 
(0.0659) (0.0163) 
 
(0.0691) (0.0183) 
Observations [472] [528] 
 
[402] [436] 
 
[318] [336] 
R-squared 0.359 0.144 
 
0.362 0.144 
 
0.456 0.174 
                  
 
Panel B 
Dependent  Unemployment Median 
 
Unemployment Median 
 
Unemployment Median 
variable: rate income   rate income   rate income 
         
SRU policy 0.102 -520.8 
 
0.161 -371.0 
 
0.0958 -168.4 
 
(0.270) (362.2) 
 
(0.275) (362.4) 
 
(0.295) (382.7) 
Observations [528] [396] 
 
[436] [327] 
 
[336] [252] 
R-squared 0.279 0.934 
 
0.329 0.942 
 
0.325 0.948 
                  
Covariates Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Lyon area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 French population and 
housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.18: Toulouse - first stage 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
       
SRU policy 2.128*** 2.121*** 
 
1.945*** 
 
1.627*** 
 
(0.493) (0.495) 
 
(0.541) 
 
(0.583) 
Unemployment rate 15.95 15.79 
 
21.97 
 
6.780 
 
(25.31) (25.34) 
 
(26.95) 
 
(28.20) 
Industry employment 33.05*** 33.00*** 
 
28.17*** 
 
27.48*** 
 
(9.181) (9.189) 
 
(9.321) 
 
(9.766) 
Public sector employment 16.52*** 16.51*** 
 
15.88*** 
 
16.78*** 
 
(2.690) (2.688) 
 
(3.331) 
 
(2.499) 
              
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y         
R-squared 0.524 0.524 
 
0.581 
 
0.657 
Observations 392 392 
 
280 
 
208 
Number of districts 2 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Municipalities  98 98   70   52 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Toulouse area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 
2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are 
defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table C.19: Toulouse – Immigrant population – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
       
SRU policy 0.172 0.189 
 
0.0939 
 
0.285 
 
(0.297) (0.299) 
 
(0.338) 
 
(0.340) 
Unemployment rate -10.12 -9.731 
 
-10.16 
 
-11.45 
 
(16.24) (16.23) 
 
(18.79) 
 
(18.53) 
Industry employment 2.218 2.334 
 
-1.174 
 
-6.915 
 
(6.795) (6.823) 
 
(6.668) 
 
(5.961) 
Public sector employment -2.460 -2.430 
 
-2.464 
 
-1.564 
 
(2.142) (2.145) 
 
(2.235) 
 
(1.875) 
              
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y         
R-squared 0.020 0.023 
 
0.033 
 
0.066 
Observations 392 392 
 
280 
 
208 
Number of districts 2 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Municipalities  98 98   70   52 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Toulouse area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 
2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are 
defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.20: Toulouse - Job diversity, unemployment and median income – reduced form 
estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (5) (6)   (9) (10) 
Population 
sample: 
[500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
 
Panel A 
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity  
Dependent  (foreigners) (total) 
 
(foreigners) (total) 
 
(foreigners) (total) 
variable: Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
                  
SRU policy -0.000727 -0.0433*** 
 
0.00872 -0.0226* 
 
-0.0209 -0.0116 
 
(0.0733) (0.0133) 
 
(0.0782) (0.0134) 
 
(0.0816) (0.0155) 
Observations [331] [392] 
 
[249] [280] 
 
[191] [208] 
R-squared 0.439 0.174 
 
0.492 0.146 
 
0.538 0.086 
                  
 
Panel B 
Dependent  Unemployed Median 
 
Unemployed Median 
 
Unemployed Median 
variable: rate income   rate income   rate income 
         
SRU policy 0.370 -2,317*** 
 
0.0993 -1,315*** 
 
0.206 -637.5 
 
(0.255) (420.4) 
 
(0.259) (426.2) 
 
(0.274) (447.1) 
Observations [392] [294] 
 
[280] [210] 
 
[208] [156] 
R-squared 0.543 0.861 
 
0.592 0.876 
 
0.644 0.883 
                  
Covariates Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Muni. FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District 
trend 
        
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Toulouse area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 
French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at 
the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.21: Marseille - first stage 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
  Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
         
SRU policy 0.592** 0.575** 
 
0.496** 0.463* 
 
0.340 0.285 
 
(0.237) (0.252) 
 
(0.243) (0.263) 
 
(0.276) (0.293) 
Unemployment rate 0.156* 0.107 
 
0.121 0.0431 
 
0.122 0.0449 
 
(0.0895) (0.122) 
 
(0.0925) (0.125) 
 
(0.0997) (0.137) 
Industry employment 0.0117 0.0253 
 
-0.00893 0.000933 
 
-0.0120 0.00191 
 
(0.0576) (0.0586) 
 
(0.0636) (0.0623) 
 
(0.0725) (0.0723) 
Public sector employment -0.0468 -0.00164 
 
-0.0684 -0.00514 
 
-0.0684 0.000353 
 
(0.0478) (0.0684) 
 
(0.0499) (0.0707) 
 
(0.0585) (0.0831) 
                  
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District (NUTS-3) trend   Y     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.394 0.399 
 
0.396 0.407 
 
0.405 0.417 
Observations 416 416 
 
380 380 
 
320 320 
Municipalities  104 104   95 95   80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Marseille area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, 
and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment 
shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table C.22: Marseille – immigrant population – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
  Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
Population sample: [500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
         
SRU policy 0.136 0.126 
 
0.241 0.227 
 
0.380 0.361 
 
(0.295) (0.298) 
 
(0.297) (0.299) 
 
(0.315) (0.322) 
Unemployment rate -0.459*** -0.336** 
 
-0.495*** -0.369** 
 
-0.570*** -0.403** 
 
(0.131) (0.166) 
 
(0.139) (0.177) 
 
(0.151) (0.192) 
Industry employment -0.112 -0.119 
 
-0.0859 -0.0970 
 
-0.0910 -0.108 
 
(0.0695) (0.0726) 
 
(0.0756) (0.0772) 
 
(0.0841) (0.0837) 
Public sector employment -0.0825* -0.0625 
 
-0.0591 -0.0474 
 
-0.0118 -0.00934 
 
(0.0470) (0.0591) 
 
(0.0503) (0.0600) 
 
(0.0516) (0.0640) 
                  
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Departement trend   Y     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.223 0.235 
 
0.252 0.265 
 
0.284 0.295 
Observations 416 416 
 
380 380 
 
320 320 
Municipalities  104 104   95 95   80 80 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Marseille area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, 
and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment 
shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.23: Marseille - Job diversity, unemployment and median income – reduced form 
estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (5) (6)   (9) (10) 
Population 
sample: 
[500 ; 9,000] 
 
[1,000 ; 8,000] 
 
[1,500 ; 7,500] 
 
Panel A 
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity  
 
Job diversity  
Dependent  (foreigners) (total) 
 
(foreigners) (total) 
 
(foreigners) (total) 
variable: Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl  
                  
SRU policy -0.149** 0.00345 
 
-0.122* 0.00579 
 
-0.133* 0.0116 
 
(0.0643) (0.00911) 
 
(0.0664) (0.00972) 
 
(0.0766) (0.0101) 
Observations [394] [416] 
 
[363] [380] 
 
[308] [320] 
R-squared 0.379 0.129 
 
0.404 0.121 
 
0.409 0.118 
                  
 
Panel B 
Dependent  Unemployed Median 
 
Unemployed Median 
 
Unemployed Median 
variable: rate income 
 
rate income 
 
rate income 
 
                
SRU policy -0.372 -233.6 
 
-0.192 -204.3 
 
-0.146 -102.3 
 
(0.314) (218.1) 
 
(0.316) (222.1) 
 
(0.342) (243.4) 
Observations [416] [312] 
 
[380] [285] 
 
[320] [240] 
R-squared 0.471 0.951 
 
0.488 0.954 
 
0.509 0.954 
                  
Covariates Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Muni. FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
District trend Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Marseille area sample. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 2007, and 2012 
French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment shares are defined at 
the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.24: Pooled results – reduced form estimates 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Sample: All four study areas 
 
Excludes Ile de 
France   
Excludes 
Marseille   
Lyon and 
Toulouse only 
  
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Social housing stock (%) 
         
SRU policy 1.090*** 1.169*** 
 
1.047*** 
 
1.344*** 
 
1.387*** 
 
(0.198) (0.198) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.316) 
Observations [1,852] [1,852] 
 
[1,096] 
 
[1,472] 
 
[716] 
R-squared 0.392 0.412 
 
0.445 
 
0.418 
 
0.472 
         
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Foreigners (% population) 
         
SRU policy 0.436** 0.386* 
 
0.0673 
 
0.443* 
 
0.0130 
 
(0.194) (0.200) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.239) 
Observations [1,852] [1,852] 
 
[1,096] 
 
[1,472] 
 
[716] 
R-squared 0.050 0.081 
 
0.158 
 
0.052 
 
0.113 
         
 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Median income 
         
SRU policy -592.5*** -633.4*** 
 
-539.9*** 
 
-803.7*** 
 
-843.4*** 
 
(196.2) (169.2) 
 
(186.3) 
 
(212.5) 
 
(277.9) 
Observations [1,389] [1,389] 
 
[822] 
 
[1,104] 
 
[537] 
R-squared 0.897 0.914 
 
0.927 
 
0.907 
 
0.917 
         
 
Panel D. Dependent variable: Socio-professional diversity - Herfindahl (log) 
         
SRU policy 0.00988* 0.00608 
 
0.00347 
 
0.00613 
 
0.00327 
 
(0.00586) (0.00571) 
 
(0.00760) 
 
(0.00692) 
 
(0.0113) 
Observations [1,852] [1,852] 
 
[1,096] 
 
[1,472] 
 
[716] 
R-squared 0.205 0.250 
 
0.114 
 
0.273 
 
0.119 
                  
Covariates Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Municipality FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Year FE Y Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
District trend   Y   Y   Y   Y 
Municipalities  463 463   274   368   179 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Municipalities with population in 800-6,000 range in 1999 
for the Ile-de-France region. Municipalities with population in 1,000-8,000 range in 1999 for the other study areas. Data sources: 1990, 1999, 
2007, and 2012 French population and housing censuses. Unemployment rate, industry employment and public administration employment 
shares are defined at the travel-to-work-area (TTWA) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Figures 
 
Figure C.1: Parallel trends 
 
Notes: Ile-de-France municipalities with a population in the 800-6,000 range in 1999 and within the SRU 
territory or in the first outer contiguous municipality ring.   
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Figure C.2: First and second outer rings 
 
 
Figure C.3: Inner and outer ring municipalities  
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Figure C.4: Urban unit of Lyon. 
 
 
Figure C.5: Municipalities treated in Lyon’s urban unit in 2002 
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Figure C.6: Urban unit of Toulouse. 
 
 
Figure C.7: Municipalities treated in Toulouse’s urban unit in 2002 
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Figure C.8: Urban units of Avignon, Marseille, and Toulouse 
 
 
Figure C.9: Municipalities treated in Avignon, Toulon, and Marseille  
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